In April, Up Media reported that Taiwan’s request to purchase two long-sought weapons – the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft and MH-60R anti-submarine helicopters – from the United States was likely rejected once again. According to the report, the U.S. viewed the proposed purchase as incompatible with Taiwan’s need for “asymmetric capabilities.” While surprising, this is hardly the only instance in recent years of friction in Taiwan-U.S. arms discussions. In fact, these two specific systems have been denied multiple times over the years.
Washington’s refusal to sell these weapons to Taiwan is puzzling, given that the two are close partners and the U.S. remains the only country willing to sell arms to the island. While disagreements over arms sales are not uncommon, the frequency with which such negotiations break down in Taiwan-U.S. relations suggests a deeper structural issue.
The U.S. takes issue with Taiwan’s prioritization of major defense investments. Take Taiwan’s acquisition of F-16 C/D fighter jets, for example. These aircraft are combat-proven and equipped with the latest technologies, including advanced AESA radar, upgraded high-thrust engines, conformal fuel tanks, and streamlined logistics, making them versatile in a range of scenarios. However, this purchase alone accounted for 70 percent of Taiwan’s 2019 defense budget. Regardless of the jets’ capabilities, allocating such a large portion of the budget to a single platform is viewed as an inefficient way to address Taiwan’s most urgent defense needs.
In light of the criticisms, over the years, there have been numerous efforts – both within and outside of Taiwan – to transform the island’s defense posture to rely more heavily on an asymmetric warfare strategy, including initiatives led by former Chief of the General Staff Admiral Lee Hsi-ming. However, judging by Taiwan’s recent arms purchases, it is clear that the island has not fully adopted this approach. Against this backdrop, our recent research investigates the underlying factors hindering Taiwan’s full embrace of an asymmetric strategy.
The most important finding is the significant gap between Taiwan’s and the United States’ assessments of the island’s primary security threats and the corresponding strategies for addressing them. Despite the advantages that an asymmetric strategy offers, many in Taiwan believe that this approach alone cannot address the full range of security challenges the island faces. On a daily basis, Taiwan contends with a growing number of gray zone operations, including intrusions into its Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), naval maneuvers, drone activity, and, more recently, small boat landings. The concern is that if Taiwan were to fully abandon its symmetric capabilities, it would lack the baseline level of naval and air combat power needed to respond to the full spectrum of threats. In the event of open conflict, the island might even lack the operational mobility required to effectively engage. Our interviews revealed that even staunch supporters of asymmetric strategies acknowledge the continuing importance of air and naval forces in confronting a wide array of threats.
Without long-term planning, an overreliance on short-term asymmetric solutions could lead to the loss of Taiwan’s remaining reliable symmetric capabilities by 2030. This concern, in the view of many experts, justifies continued investment in expensive but essential symmetric platforms. The sentiment that asymmetric strategy is being overemphasized was clearly expressed in the interviews we conducted. One expert remarked: “If we allow the CCP to freely cross the median line of the [Taiwan] Strait without resistance, the next step could be them directly entering our outer airspace. Then our air defense would only extend 12 nautical miles. That’s a joke!”
No democratic government can tolerate People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incursions within 12 nautical miles without responding. Failing to act would deal a severe blow to morale in Taiwan.
Other reasons center on the military’s bureaucratic parochialism and path dependency. Generations of Taiwanese military cadets and officers across various branches have been trained in symmetric warfare, and this mindset is deeply ingrained in the institution’s identity. It also shapes career trajectories and promotion pathways. Understandably, a rapid shift to an asymmetric strategy would introduce uncertainties about the future and instill anxiety among personnel who might see themselves and the platforms they operate as becoming obsolete within the armed forces.
Our study also helps refute the myth that large, state-of-the-art weapons systems are sought primarily for their symbolic significance. While this reasoning may hold some truth in the considerations of politicians, it is rarely shared by the military. As discussed above, military decisions regarding arms purchases are largely driven by strategic and practical concerns. Similarly, although there is growing discourse around U.S. skepticism in Taiwanese society, we found little evidence to support this theory. The insistence by our interviewees on maintaining symmetric capabilities does not stem from distrust toward the United States, but rather from a genuine concern over Taiwan’s insufficient capacity to defend itself.
Clearly, our research highlights a potential hurdle in Taiwan-U.S. relations: Taiwan’s insistence on acquiring systems deemed unnecessary by Washington could lead to political friction, public distrust of the United States, and potentially a reduced U.S. commitment. However, these concerns can be managed. It is worth noting that many within Taiwan’s military do not oppose placing greater emphasis on asymmetric strategies. Importantly, even experts who support retaining symmetric capabilities acknowledge the cost-effectiveness of asymmetric approaches. They argue that Taiwan has not abandoned asymmetric strategies, as demonstrated by continued investments in missile density, mobile radar systems, and the Cloud Leopard wheeled armored vehicle.
Consequently, if the United States can offer alternative systems with comparable capabilities while understanding the concerns of Taiwan’s military, both sides’ security interests can be addressed. The U.S. would succeed in promoting cost-effective and rapidly deployable capabilities for Taiwan, while Taiwan could retain a baseline of symmetric strength. Most critically, this approach would allow both sides to collaboratively build defense capacity, avoiding delays caused by prolonged negotiations.
In addition to resolving differences over arms sales, some might argue that what Taiwan needs most is a clear U.S. security commitment or even a formal defense treaty. Yet, for the sake of political stability in the Taiwan Strait, enhancing Taiwan’s deterrence capabilities remains the most practical and feasible path forward. It is a strategy that warrants careful consideration by decision-makers in both Washington and Taipei.