China’s President Xi Jinping is in Russia on a state visit from May 7 to 10, highlighted by his attendance at the massive military parade in Moscow to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in the European theater.
At a joint press appearance with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin on May 8, Xi noted that he has visited Russia more than any other country since assuming China’s top office. He’s currently on his 11th visit – more than twice the number of trips Xi has taken to any other country (second place is a tie between France, Kazakhstan, and the United States, with five visits each).
While Xi has visited Russia nearly every year since 2013 (with the exception of the pandemic interregnum), he hasn’t attended the annual Victory Day parade since 2015, for the 70th anniversary celebrations. It’s an interesting lacuna, given that the Victory Day festivities are a crucial signaling tool for Putin, and his government frequently highlights the number of state leaders in attendance as proof of Russia’s international standing.
This year, Xi was joined by leaders from 26 other countries (the full list: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Burkina Faso, the Republic of the Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Myanmar, Palestine, Serbia, Slovakia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe).
For both China and Russia, World War II plays a crucial role in attempts by their respective governments to frame themselves as legitimate actors upholding the international order. Xi frequently speaks of the need to “to uphold the correct historical perspective on WWII,” a manta repeated again during his meetings with Putin.
As I wrote back in 2015, on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war, for Xi that “correct historical perspective” means portraying the Chinese Communist Party – which, in fact, had only a very limited role in fighting the Japanese – as a “key to victory” in the “World Anti-Fascist War.” In the 10 years since, China has explicitly moved to emphasize cooperation with Russia to “firmly defend the victorious outcome of WWII.” However, in practice – as Vincent K.L. Chang and Eric Siyi Zhang noted in a 2023 analysis for The Diplomat – this convergence remains mostly rhetorical, and is mostly occurring on China’s side. Russia continues to almost entirely ignore the Asian theater of the war.
While history provided the immediate excuse for Xi’s visit, his presence in Moscow was driven by modern-day strategic considerations. Xi made that clear when he declared to Putin: “As long as China and Russia maintain strategic resolve and uphold strategic coordination, no force can stop the two countries from achieving national development and revitalization… and no force can hold back the prevailing trends of world multipolarity and economic globalization.” That served as a direct declaration of China’s central strategic consideration – namely that close cooperation with Russia is essential to China’s goal of escaping U.S. containment and rolling back the U.S.-led world order.
And that provides yet another clear reminder that efforts to “split” China and Russia are doomed to fail.
Even the callbacks to history were imbued with the modern flavor of a Sino-Russian axis to counter the United States. “Eighty years ago, the Chinese and Russian peoples made immense sacrifice and secured a great victory,” Xi intoned. “… Today, in the face of unilateralist countercurrents, bullying and acts of power politics, China is working with Russia to shoulder the special responsibilities of major countries…”
Beyond having Xi stand at Putin’s side during the military parade, there weren’t many breakthroughs to be had in the already-strong China-Russia relationship. The two countries made strong rhetorical statements, issuing joint declarations on “global strategic stability” and “upholding the authority of international law.” But on a practical level, the agreements signed – in “biosecurity, investment protection, digital economy, quarantine, and film cooperation” – pale in comparison to the symbolic overtones of the relationship.
Perhaps most intriguing, especially in the context of the Trump administration shuttering U.S. state media outlets like Voice of America and Radio Free Europe, was an agreement to advance cooperation between Russia and China’s state media (specifically the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency, the Xinhua News Agency, and the China Media Group).
Notably, there was once again no announcement on the long-stalled Power of Siberia 2 pipeline – which would link Russian natural gas supplies to China via Mongolia – despite Mongolian President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa also being in Moscow for the parade.