As the presidents of the European Council and Commission met with their five Central Asian counterparts in Samarkand on April 4, expectations were high for a reset in relations. An updated EU Strategy on Central Asia and the launch of a Strategic Partnership signaled Brussels’ intent to deepen cooperation in trade, energy, and connectivity. Yet for this partnership to transcend symbolic diplomatic milestones, the EU must reckon with a persistent flaw: while principled, its engagement remains misaligned with the region’s complex realities. The EU tends to apply the same slow-moving, technocratic methods to all five states, resulting in policies that are well-meaning but too often ineffective.
While the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan share certain post-Soviet legacies and challenges, the region is far from a monolith. Amid shifting geopolitical currents and calls for inclusive connectivity, it is naive to keep relying on a standard toolkit of human rights dialogues and oversimplified capacity-building. This one-size-fits-all approach overlooks the sharp societal, institutional, and political differences between them.
The issue is not goodwill, but nuance: an oversight that risks alienating partners, missing opportunities, and undermining the EU’s credibility in a strategically vital region.
Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s largest and most resource-rich country, serves as the region’s geopolitical and economic anchor. Its multivector foreign policy carefully balances Russia, China, and the West. Yet behind this agility, Russia’s war on Ukraine has heightened anxieties, particularly given Kazakhstan’s 7,600-kilometer shared border and Moscow’s ceaseless imperialist posturing. Officially neutral, Astana is quietly pursuing increased national resilience: politically, economically, culturally, and linguistically. Here, the EU has an opportunity to move beyond symbolism and offer targeted support. Brussels should assist with strategic communications and provide technical expertise in border and customs management. Capacity-building in hybrid threat mitigation, migration governance, and security cooperation could help Kazakhstan fortify itself without overtly provoking Moscow. Domestically, reforms remain slow and uneven, with societal frustration over inequality, corruption, and limited pluralism simmering, and people are ineluctably looking westward. The EU can share its unique expertise on administrative reform, judicial independence, public sector modernization, and anti-corruption, fostering institutional resilience. It can support economic diversification beyond hydrocarbons, notably in green energy, logistics, and sustainable agriculture, while deepening transport and customs cooperation along, among others, the Middle Corridor. This blend of strategic support and pragmatic engagement aligns EU capabilities with Kazakhstan’s needs: strengthening sovereignty without inflaming tensions.
Kyrgyzstan remains the most politically open society of the five, yet is plagued by chronic instability, frequent government turnovers in response to authoritarian consolidation, dependence on Russian remittances and security mechanisms, and large-scale gender-based violence. The country stands out for its vibrant civil society, open public discourse, and relative pluralism. These are increasingly endangered, however, by serious institutional fragility, elite fragmentation, and rising authoritarian tendencies. In recent years, the government has cracked down on independent media and NGOs while consolidating executive power under the guise of stability. This is where the EU could – and should – step up. Brussels can strengthen Kyrgyzstan’s institutions through targeted judicial and public administration reforms, boost media resilience and civic education, and advance the institutionalization of Kyrgyz over Russian language – as already consolidated in the other four republics. More than elsewhere in the region, small, agile programs can have outsized impact here. While the country’s mountainous geography limits large-scale infrastructure projects, it holds untapped potential in renewable energy, sustainable tourism, and digital services. EU support for vocational education, regional trade integration, and SME development would directly benefit Kyrgyzstan’s young, largely underemployed population. Tailored engagement could help preserve one of Central Asia’s most open, if precarious, societies.
Tajikistan has been under strict one-man rule since 1994 and is Central Asia’s most economically fragile state. Landlocked and the world’s second most mountainous country, its debt and infrastructure are dominated by China, while nearly half of the economy relies on remittances from Russia, leaving it highly vulnerable to external shocks. This dual dependency constrains Tajikistan’s desired sovereignty, even as developmental and environmental pressures mount. Hydropower is both a national lifeline and a regional flashpoint. The Nurek Dam and long-delayed Rogun Dam are critical to Tajikistan’s energy future but central to discussions over cross-border water use. Here, the EU could make a pragmatic difference by promoting transparent, cooperative water management upholding regional dialogue. Targeted EU support for vocational education, rural livelihoods, and climate adaptation could reduce remittance dependence and build grassroots resilience. Quiet, technically focused engagement offers the most realistic and meaningful path for the EU to achieve sustainable impact in Tajik society.
Turkmenistan, by far the most isolated of the five, maintains a rigid “positive neutrality” doctrine under a tightly sealed political system. Its economy relies heavily on vast natural gas reserves, making it an energy powerhouse, though vulnerable to market fluctuations and geopolitical pressure. While the country’s engagement with external powers remains limited, recent measures reveal cautious economic diversification and careful opening. The EU’s approach must be patient and pragmatic, prioritizing technical assistance, environmental cooperation, and people-to-people exchanges without premature political demands. Brussels could offer much-desired industrial expertise and innovative technologies to develop solar, wind, and other renewables suited to Turkmenistan’s vast sun-rich terrain, solidifying its energy modernization and aligning with EU climate ambitions. This would open opportunities for sustainable trade and integration into European markets. Additionally, the EU can assist in modernizing Turkmenistan’s transport infrastructure as part of the Trans-Caspian Corridor, enhancing regional connectivity and economic resilience.
Uzbekistan stands out for its recent economic liberalization and a government eager to engage internationally, including with the EU, improve regional ties, and gradually open civic space. Yet progress remains uneven. Bureaucratic inertia, a fragile rule of law, and restrictions on political and media freedoms complicate deeper transformation. Despite strong GDP growth, Uzbekistan faces structural unemployment and underinvestment in public services – challenges felt most by its growing young population. The EU has a key opportunity to support Uzbekistan’s reform path through targeted legal and judicial cooperation, public sector modernization, and employability-focused education initiatives. Brussels is well positioned to assist in digital governance and transparent public procurement – areas where demand for expertise is high. But this requires more than statements; it calls for consistent, on-the-ground collaboration with local institutions. By recognizing Uzbekistan’s distinct trajectory and investing in trust-based, long-term partnerships, the EU can help turn reform ambition into sustained progress.
A uniform EU approach cannot address the region’s profoundly different contexts.
Tailored to each of the five Central Asian nations, the message should be clear: the EU is an equal strategic partner – not demanding alignment, but offering cooperation that supports sovereignty, institutional reform, and economic stability where genuinely needed and embraced. While principled, the EU’s normative tools risk appearing punitive compared to China’s no-strings-attached investments and Russia’s entrenched ties and comfortable accommodation of elite structures. Soft power instruments like educational exchanges, civil society support, and governance aid remain vital, but without political heft or contextual sensitivity, they risk irrelevance. The EU must reconcile its values with realism, adapting to local political and institutional realities. It should invest in resilience, deepen ties where reform is possible, and engage pragmatically in cautious spheres.
The EU holds exceptional expertise, tools, and credibility – widely sought by government bodies requesting know-how in digitization and institutional and regulatory reforms. These demands must not be met with symbolism or bureaucratic inertia. Strategic confidence is now essential. The EU must act clearly, flexibly, and ambitiously – not the least in pursuit of its own interests. If there is one common thread across Central Asia, it is a young generation looking to Europe as a unique model for prosperity, transparency, innovation, and opportunity – and now is the time to meet that expectation.