Amid the fervor surrounding China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Tajikistan stands out as a staunch supporter. President Emomali Rahmon has endorsed the BRI, seeing it as crucial for modernizing infrastructure and attracting foreign investment. A significant project under the BRI is the rehabilitation of the Kulma-Khorog-Dushanbe highway, connecting Tajikistan and China via the Kulma Pass border crossing, Khorog, and Dushanbe. This highway, long neglected since the Soviet Union’s collapse, is vital for regional connectivity, particularly between western Tajikistan and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Region (GBAO) in the east.
The rehabilitation of this key route promises notable advancements in transportation connectivity between China, the GBAO, and Tajikistan. Yet, beneath these promises, there is a darker truth to these developments, and the purported local benefits this project will bring are less clear.
Numbering approximately 300,000, the Pamiri people, an Iranian ethnic group, have endured a tumultuous history of oppression across the Badakhshan region, spanning Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and China. The emergence of the Lal’i Badakhshan political party during the waning months of the Soviet Union marked a significant juncture. The group advocated for Pamiri autonomy and sought control of the GBAO. Amid Tajikistan’s civil war in the 1990s, Pamiris, allied with the United Tajik Opposition, faced severe reprisals from pro-government factions, notably the Popular Front. This conflict escalated into a brutal confrontation, compounded by an economic blockade that further isolated the Pamiri region, exacerbating their plight. In response, a significant number of Pamiris sought refuge in the GBAO, only to face targeted ethnic violence from the Popular Front. Survivors of these events shared their harrowing accounts, solidifying the GBAO’s status as a resilient bastion of opposition against the central Tajik government.
Mural of President Emomali Rahmon in Dushanbe, Tajikistan (May 2025). Photo by Oliver Reschreiter.
Following the end of Tajikistan’s civil war in 1997, Rahmon’s government claimed victory but faced significant challenges due to national fragmentation. By the mid-2000s, Rahmon consolidated authoritarian rule by neutralizing former adversaries and extending his authority across most of Tajikistan. However, despite these efforts, resistance persisted in the GBAO, which still bore the scars of war and ethnic cleansing.
Recognizing dissent, Rahmon pursued a hostile agenda, neglecting the region while prioritizing development in Dushanbe and his native Danghara region. Since the civil war’s end, the central Tajik government has conducted several “security operations” in the GBAO, targeting dissent through the targeted killings of community leaders. The most recent crackdown in May of 2022, the bloodiest since the civil war, resulted in the deaths of dozens of Pamiris and the killing of local political leader Muhammadboqir Muhammadboqirov. However, due to the information blackout instituted, the true death toll and events of May 2022 remain uncertain.
With the death of Muhammadboqirov, Rahmon’s government has gone on to claim victory in the GBAO. Rahmon himself has made no secret of his role in the crackdown, saying he personally authorized the security operation against “terrorist elements.” It is perhaps no coincidence that mere months later, construction work would begin on the highway rehabilitation project led by China’s Road and Bridge Corporation under the BRI.
For both Tajik and Chinese authorities, the suppression of dissent in the GBAO will be seen as a positive development. For China, suppressing dissent in the region enables the advancement of its infrastructure projects, thereby deepening Tajikistan’s integration within the broader BRI. Furthermore, the absence of dissent and instability in Tajikistan is considered crucial from China’s security perspective, as it reinforces what they see as regional stability in a neighboring state.
For Rahmon and the Tajik government, the rehabilitation of the highway will allow the central government to further solidify control in the restive region, allowing ease of access for government forces deeper into the mountainous region. Additionally and perhaps most importantly, it will also allow Rahmon to further control and profit from Tajikistan’s lucrative and illicit opium trade between Afghanistan and Europe.
For the Pamiris, the prospects of benefiting from trade and development are dim; rather the populace will almost certainly lose their agency. Chinese involvement in the region is poised to solidify Rahmon’s grip on power rather than bring about tangible benefits. The Tajik central government will likely prioritize keeping dissent in the GBAO managed as a means to keeping the door to China’s investments open. Rahmon’s visit to the GBAO’s regional capital of Khorog in August 2023 thus should not be mistaken for a conciliatory gesture; rather, it underscored the entrenched power dynamics that further oppress an already marginalized populace.