The continuing uncertainty in Myanmar and the increased involvement of major powers like China and Russia may produce a problematic outcome for India, according to a prominent Chin political leader, who also warned about a spike in drug trafficking along the India-Myanmar border.
In an interview with The Diplomat, a senior leader of the Chin National Front (CNF), one of Myanmar’s oldest ethnic armed organizations, spoke about the escalating air strikes by the Myanmar military and the worsening humanitarian crisis that has resulted. He also advised India to reassess its policy of neutrality toward Myanmar, given the growing crime and instability along the Indo-Myanmar border and the expanding influence of China and Russia in the country.
Speaking to this correspondent by phone last month, CNF Vice-Chairman Sui Khar condemned the military’s continuing air and artillery attacks on resistance-held regions of the country. “Air strikes have intensified across Myanmar,” he said. “And the target is not the armed actors but innocent civilians.”
These attacks have proceeded despite the unilateral ceasefires that the State Administration Council (SAC) junta announced in the wake of the powerful earthquake that hit central Myanmar on March 28. On May 12, an airstrike on a resistance-run school in Depayin township in Sagaing Region resulted in the death of 22 people, including 20 children, and injury to around 100 others. The next day, a junta fighter jet bombed a village in Rathedaung township in Rakhine State, killing at least 13 civilians and injuring over 20 others.
According to a report by the Ministry of Human Rights of the shadow National Unity Government (NUG), military airstrikes in April resulted in 233 fatalities, including 34 minors. In the Sagaing Region alone, there were 70 airstrikes, which destroyed 10 schools.
Meanwhile, the military is pressing ahead with its plans for elections scheduled for later this year, widely seen as a means of retaining power behind a civilian façade. Sui Khar expressed concern about Russia’s growing support for Myanmar’s military, which he feared may also help legitimize the elections it has planned for later this year.
Sui Khar said that the deepening military and political ties between Myanmar and Russia were especially worrisome for civilians already bearing the brunt of the civil war. He said that this growing alignment may only encourage the military to intensify its attacks in the run-up to the polls, and after.
“It’s true that the SAC has procured sophisticated weapons from Russia, likely at a discounted price. Given Russia’s need for funds, this arrangement benefits both sides,” he said. “It also seems that the SAC’s domestic arms production may not be meeting its needs.”
Sui Khar suggested that the military regime’s growing engagement with Russia is not only about providing international legitimacy to the regime’s planned elections, but also an opportunity for the junta to create a perception that it retains the backing of powerful allies.
“It’s unclear how Russia will assist Myanmar in holding elections expected at the end of this year or early next year, but we are watching… It’s evident that Min Aung Hlaing is seeking international support to legitimise the process,” he said.
Observers said the recent “goodwill visits” by Min Aung Hlaing to Russia and Belarus this year showed efforts of strengthening ties and securing military and diplomatic support. His fifth visit to Russia since the coup included a state banquet hosted by President Vladimir Putin at the Kremlin Palace in Moscow on May 8, after the pair met during a state visit in March.
Although no formal bilateral meeting was confirmed between the two, Min Aung Hlaing’s office later announced he also met Chinese President Xi Jinping and Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev in Moscow.
Sui Khar, the vice-chairman of the Chin National Front (CNF), in conversation during a previous interview at Camp Victoria, Chin State, northwestern Myanmar, November 29, 2023. (Karishma Hasnat)
Last week, the Democratic Voice of Burma reported that the regime is procuring weapons and drones from Russia. A May 22 report in the Global New Light of Myanmar highlighted Russian assistance in industrial projects, including the No. 2 Steel Mill in Shan State, which will use local iron ore to produce pig iron.
In May 2023, the United Nations reported that Russian firms sold $406 million in military equipment to Myanmar’s military since the February 2021 coup.
“The Ceasefire Is Only to Appease China”
On China’s deepening involvement in Myanmar’s civil war, Sui Khar said the recent ceasefire that it brokered between the military and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, a grouping of three major ethnic armed groups, is largely symbolic, and aimed at appeasing Beijing.
“Both the State Administration Council and the Three Brotherhood Alliance publicly support the ceasefire, but the ground reality is contradictory,” he said.
While China seeks to position itself as a regional peacemaker, its influence over either side is limited. “Neither the SAC nor the Brotherhood Alliance truly listens to China. They have made a reservation for themselves – by labeling every offensive as a defensive response, they leave room for continuing the fighting despite the ceasefire,” he said.
In January of this year, China brokered a deal between the Myanmar military and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), a member of the alliance, following talks in Kunming. The agreement aimed at preventing the full collapse of the military position in northern Shan State, where the Alliance has made significant territorial gains since late 2023, and allowing crossborder trade to resume.
China has since sent a monitoring team to oversee implementation of the agreement.
Despite the shared fight against the military, tensions between the anti-junta forces are becoming more apparent, Sui Khar alleged. He said that the MNDAA, representing the Kokang ethnic Chinese, sidelined the People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) after gaining territory.
“Even while they discussed the ceasefire with the SAC at the intervention of China, the group did not consult with anyone when it came to Kokang interests,” he said.
The Border Crisis in Mizoram
Sui Khar also discussed the question of India’s policy toward Myanmar. The Chin resistance movement has a strong connection with the northeastern state of Mizoram, which shares a 510-kilometer border with Myanmar. Camp Victoria, the base of CNF’s armed wing, the Chin National Army (CNA), lies just a few kilometers from the border.
Over the past few years, life in the villages of the Indo-Myanmar border has been occasionally disturbed by the sound of Myanmar Air Force jets roaring over the Tiao River, which forms the natural boundary between India and Myanmar. These attacks have caused waves of refugees to stream across the border. Many Chin people have ethnic and kinship ties in Mizoram, and resistance fighters have been found to rely on Indian communities for food and medical supplies.
Mizoram, unlike neighboring Manipur, has welcomed displaced people, though concerns over “illegal immigration” have surfaced from time to time. Chief Minister Lalduhoma recently cautioned that the rising influx could affect law and order, even as the state remains committed to supporting its “Chin brothers.”
The pedestrian border crossing at the town of Rihkhawdar, linking India’s Mizoram state and Myanmar’s Chin State, May 20, 2017. (Depositphotos)
Sui Khar praised Lalduhoma’s role in uniting the various Chin resistance factions inside Myanmar. The chief minister played an important role in the formation of the Chin National Council (CNC) in Aizawl, Mizoram, in March. The CNC brought together the Chinland Council and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council, two groups previously at odds. The formation of the CNC was facilitated in Aizawl by Lalduhoma, in the presence of Chin resistance leaders, including CNF representatives. The CNF, a founding member of the Chinland Council, played a central role in the CNC’s formation.
Despite the formation of the CNC, Sui Khar said some differences remain among the Chin groups, although he acknowledged that the Mizoram chief minister had “tried his best” to bridge these differences.
The CNF leader cautioned India about the rise in drug trafficking along the Indo-Myanmar border, particularly in Mizoram.
“Indian authorities have to understand why drug trafficking is so rampant in Mizoram, and who is actually behind it. While the Mizos are raising questions, it’s important to realize that the displaced people from Myanmar would never engage in such activities,” he said.
Sui Khar added that “others” were responsible for the drug trafficking. He did not elaborate, but noted that illegal activities have increased significantly since the COVID-19 pandemic and the military coup, and in particular over the past two years.
According to official figures from the Assam Rifles that were shared with The Diplomat, over ₹190 crore ($22.75 million) worth of narcotics were seized in Mizoram’s Champhai district between March and May, including 34 kilograms of methamphetamine and four kilograms of Heroin No. 4.
Since the beginning of the year, 28 Myanmar nationals have been arrested for alleged illegal cross-border activities, according to state authorities.
A report released by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in late May noted the “intensified scale of methamphetamine tablet trafficking into Northeast India” in 2024.
On Ties With Bangladesh
The CNF leader also mentioned Bangladesh’s growing contact with the Arakan Army (AA), a member of the Three Brotherhood Alliance that, after significant territorial gains over the past 18 months, now controls the entire 271-kilometer Myanmar-Bangladesh border. While Dhaka says that it has engaged with the AA out of “necessity,” Sui Khar said Dhaka has also made attempts to reach out to the CNA.
“We share the border: Chin State and Bangladesh. Whether Bangladesh or the SAC likes it or not, they have to reach out to the ones who control the border areas,” said Sui Khar. “They have maintained contact with the AA, and there have been attempts to contact the CNA as well.”
However, he denied any collaboration between the CNF and the Arakan Army. “Even as we focus on a common enemy, there are stumbling blocks to building a good relationship with the Arakan Army. We are not sure whether they are our collaborator or something else,” he said, hinting at diverging priorities of Myanmar’s welter of ethnic armed organizations.
This statement comes amid a wider diplomatic realignment, with Bangladesh recalling its ambassador from Myanmar on May 29, describing it as an “administrative decision,” and increasingly acknowledging resistance groups as the new powerbrokers along the frontier.
“I believe there may be an undisclosed diplomatic rift between the SAC and Bangladesh,” said Sui Khar. “While neither side may want to disclose it, the move appears to be a form of silent diplomatic protest.”