On May 14, Russian President Vladimir Putin received Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim for bilateral discussions with an official welcome in the ornate Green Room of the Grand Kremlin Palace, the ceremonial space reserved for foreign dignitaries. The Malaysian delegation, which included more than 70 officials led by senior ministers responsible for foreign affairs, agriculture, science and technology, higher education, and agricultural plantations, had arrived for a four-day visit to explore expanded cooperation across the trade, investment, aerospace, and energy sectors.
This diplomatic spectacle unfolded barely two days after an international aviation body definitively established Russian responsibility for the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17, a tragedy that claimed 43 Malaysian lives among its 298 victims. The timing highlighted Russia’s systematic efforts to sustain and deepen bilateral partnerships while side-stepping accountability for one of this century’s most thoroughly investigated air disasters.
In neighboring Indonesia, just a month before the Anwar-Putin meeting, another episode of increasing Russian presence was unfolding. It was reported that Russia had requested to base its long-range warplanes at Manuhua Air Force Base in Papua. The report created a diplomatic hassle between Indonesia and Australia and became a talking point in the Australian federal election campaign, driving a wedge between the eventual winner, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, and the challenger Peter Dutton. Moreover, Australian researcher Matthew Sussex’s article in the Jakarta Post, arguing that Australia needs to be firm in responding to the issue while also highlighting that Australia would have to do business with “partners who have friends Australia do not like,” prompted a response from the Russian Ambassador Sergey Tolchenov, who accused Australia (and, for some reason, the United States) of double standards and interfering in Indonesia-Russia bilateral relations.
While the Indonesian government was quick to deny the report and said that no military bases will be used for foreign interests, this episode shows that Russia is intent on increasing its presence in Southeast Asia, either through economic and military engagement or via the narrative war it wages against the West in the region.
Both events highlighted Moscow’s expanding influence in Southeast Asia, especially at a time when the Trump administration is putting more economic pressure on the region and when Europeans are having problems with their own priorities. Russia’s increasing engagement is a challenge for countries in the region, but also to the other partners outside the region.
The Case of Malaysia
Anwar’s Moscow visit illuminated Russia’s methodical approach to attacking the Western consensus in Southeast Asia. The visit occurred shortly after the release of a ruling by the U.N.’s International Civil Aviation Organization, which determined that Russia was responsible for the crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 in 2014. The Boeing-777 aircraft was downed by Russian-supplied Buk missiles, killing 298 civilians on board. Despite the ICAO ruling, and forensic evidence linking the weapon to Russia’s 53rd Anti-Aircraft Brigade, Putin proceeded with business as usual, as if nothing had happened.
The Malaysian premier’s light-hearted exchange with Putin, during which he joked about “second wives” while examining Tsarist furniture in the Kremlin, revealed the asymmetrical nature of their relationship. Anwar’s subsequent claim that he had raised the questions of MH17 accountability with Putin ring hollow when compounded by his repetition of Moscow’s standard rhetoric about “thorough and comprehensive investigation that is not politicized.” This language directly contradicts documented evidence that Russia actively worked to sabotage the Dutch investigation while publicly calling for “independence” and “thoroughness.”
Putin’s strategic acumen manifests in his ability to separate diplomatic engagement from legal responsibility. Rather than allowing international criticism to constrain bilateral engagement, he treats economic partnerships as entirely separate from justice mechanisms. This approach serves to undermine international law while preserving the veneer of diplomatic respectability.
Russia’s influence strategy in Malaysia operates across several interconnected channels. Defense partnerships create structural dependencies extending far beyond initial sales contracts. Malaysia’s reliance on Russian military hardware, including Sukhoi Su-30MKM fighters and Mi-17 helicopters and their respective maintenance systems, generates ongoing requirements that bind Kuala Lumpur to Moscow. Russia reportedly marketed “battle-tested” weapons systems at the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition 2025, one of the region’s major defense exhibitions, explicitly leveraging its Ukraine operations to enhance export credentials, transforming international condemnation into commercial advantage.
Economic integration proceeds despite Western sanctions through calculated persistence. Russia’s 11.46 billion ringgit ($2.7 billion) trade relationship with Malaysia and establishment of high-tech cooperation centers create technological dependencies while offering alternatives to Western systems. The emphasis on aerospace, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity represents strategic positioning for long-term influence rather than mere commercial opportunity.
BRICS partnership provides institutional architecture for this strategy. By offering Malaysia and other ASEAN nations alternative frameworks to Western-dominated systems, Russia positions itself as facilitator of emerging power coalitions. This exceeds economic cooperation, representing systematic efforts to reshape global governance structures to ensure that Moscow faces fewer constraints. Moreover, the success of the inaugural “World of Opportunities: Russia-ASEAN” International Business Forum in Kuala Lumpur last November, organized by the Roscongress Foundation (formerly St. Petersburg International Economic Forum Foundation) demonstrates this strategic approach. Following positive reception, Roscongress has proposed making it an annual event to serve as a major business platform for Russia to develop business relationship throughout the region.
The Anwar-Putin dynamic demonstrates the sophisticated exploitation of ideological and religious narratives alongside legitimate grievances. Russia recognizes Anwar’s rhetorical foundation in civilizational discourse and pan-Islamic solidarity and calibrates its approach accordingly. Anwar’s two visits to Russia as prime minister had involved meetings with Orthodox and Muslim clerics. His engagement with Tatar religious leaders in Kazan, a Muslim-majority Russian republic, reinforces broader narratives of Russian religious tolerance and its relationship with Islamic communities.
This religious dimension extends into policy circles through systematic engagement with Malaysia’s foreign policy apparatus, indicating coordinated outreach beyond leader-to-leader diplomacy. Putin expertly channels Anwar’s ideological predispositions alongside his economic motivations. Russia appears to amplify prevailing sentiment rather than manufacturing it, finding ample opportunities in a region that is increasingly receptive to alternatives to the West.
More troubling is Moscow’s successful cultivation of doubt within Malaysian society, where many dismiss irrefutable evidence of Russia’s responsibility for shooting down of flight MH17 as a “Western fabrication.” This reflects broader a disillusionment with Western powers, due to their perceived inconsistencies on foreign policy, particularly on the question of Palestine, a subject on which Anwar has long been vocal. Indeed, this sentiment has been further compounded by former Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamed’s anti-Western stance, who has himself categorically rejected the Dutch Safety Board’s finding. Mahathir cultivated close ties with Russia during his premiership, even attending the recent Russia Day celebration hosted by Russian Ambassador Naiyl Latypov in Kuala Lumpur.
The Case of Indonesia
With Indonesia, Russia is employing several strategies of engagement. The first is to present historical nostalgia as the bedrock of the partnership. The year 2025 is very important as it is the 75th anniversary of the bilateral relationship between Indonesia and Russia (even though at that time, it was the Soviet Union). As a result, this year will see many bilateral diplomatic meetings between the two countries, all the more so that Indonesia is now a member of BRICS.
On February 25, shortly after the third anniversary of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Sergei Shoigu met with Indonesia’s President Prabowo Subianto to discuss further defense cooperation. More importantly, during the meeting, Prabowo described Putin as his “long-term best friend” and said that he had received a “personal letter” from the Russian leader.
In April, Denis Manturov, Russia’s first deputy prime minister, headed a delegation to the Russia-Indonesia business forum and the Russian Indonesian Joint Commission on Trade, Economic, and Technical Cooperation. Among the many discussions were the possibility of increasing the number of direct flights from Indonesia to Moscow, which would increase people-to-people interaction, and the Indonesia-Eurasian Economic Union Free Trade Area. The FTA negotiations were concluded this week, when Prabowo attended the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.
According to the Russian Embassy, these are just the big events, with other smaller bilateral meetings happening almost every week of this year.
However, bilateral diplomatic engagement is not the only strategy that Russia employed in Indonesia. More strategic is Moscow’s engagement with Indonesian society. The Russian embassy in Jakarta is very active in public engagement, both in terms of writing op-eds in national media and in public engagements at universities across Indonesia. Based on the published posts on its Instagram account, from January-May this year, the embassy has published nine op-eds (including from former ambassadors), six letters to the editor of the Jakarta Post and Kompas responding to several op-eds or editorials there, and four university speeches and visits (to National University, Universitas Indonesia, Bakrie University, and Universitas Satya Negara Indonesia). It has also engaged in significant engagement with the media and civil society. Furthermore, in March, the Russian government organized a press tour of Zaporizhia (and called it “Zaporozhye, one of Russia’s new regions”) which was attended by two journalists and a lecturer from Indonesia.
Another interesting approach is to organize screenings of movies regarding the so-called Great Patriotic War in several cities in Indonesia. Jointly organized by Russia Today and the Russian House in Indonesia, the movie “The Cranes Are Flying” was screened in Jakarta and Surabaya last month. This reflected a strategic choice of using the Russian version of history to influence Indonesians, who are not well-versed in the history of World War II. Many Indonesians see the war as a struggle for their own independence and had no direct connection with what happened in the European theater of war. By advancing the notion that the Soviet Union (therefore, Russia) helped liberate Europeans from Nazism and fascism, Russia tries to use one facet of history to attract Indonesians and justify their anti-Nazi narrative in Ukraine. This narrative obviously downplays the role of the other countries, especially the U.S., in helping to bring down Nazi Germany, and also glosses over the Soviet Union’s subsequent postwar occupations in Central and Eastern Europe.
More influential is the usage of the Islamic dimension in Russian public diplomacy. In a June event organized by the Russian House and Zeekend called “Cranes of Peace,” Russia cleverly used the issue of children in war by coopting the narrative “protect the children in Donbass and Gaza.” Clearly neglecting the thousands of Ukrainian children who have been kidnapped by Russia, the Russian House in Indonesia managed to use the issue of Gaza to attract empathy and support from the Indonesian public for its policies in Ukraine. The presence of the Palestinian ambassador at the event also highlighted the extent to which Russia is successful in using the anti-Western narratives in order to curry support for (or at least blunt criticism of) its own problematic policies.
All these societal efforts are part of a broader Russian strategy, in addition to the one taking place through military cooperation. The presence of Minister of Defense Sjafrie Samsoeddin in the Victory Day celebration in Moscow last month, and the report that the new Indonesian ships will join the Russian Navy Day Parade in July can be seen as evidence of a deepening of the security partnership with Russia, especially after the 2024 Orruda Naval Exercise. Moreover, Prabowo’s decision to skip the G-7 meeting this month and fly to Russia to mark the 75th anniversary of Indonesia-Russia relations, combined together with the rumor of the reactivation of Indonesia’s interest in buying Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets, reflects the upward trajectory of Indonesia-Russia relations.
The Strategic Implications of Normalized Impunity
The Anwar-Putin meeting demonstrated Russia’s systematic erosion of consequences for international crimes. Through platforms like the Valdai Club’s Kuala Lumpur Conference on “Malaysia, Russia and ASEAN: Navigating Emerging Multipolarity” last December, Moscow has created and disseminated intellectual frameworks that legitimize its challenge to the Western-led order. Meanwhile, in Indonesia, by using soft power targeting society and public opinion, Russia has built the societal infrastructure capable of influencing the mindset of Indonesians. Even more than that, as in Malaysia, Russia manages to create the intellectual bedrock of its soft power by organizing academic forums such as the Valdai Club’s “70 Years On: The Legacy of Bandung” discussion and cooperate with academic associations such as the Indonesia International Relations Scholars’ Association.
This soft power infrastructure extends across Southeast Asian think tanks and policy circles, providing conceptual scaffolding for Russia’s hard power projections. Moscow’s reported attempt to establish military presence at Indonesia’s Manuhua Air Base regardless of Jakarta’s denials is interesting, since Russia knows very well that it has established a good image in Indonesian society. Even if at this moment and by the virtue of its strategic culture, the Indonesians are not keen to permit a Russian base on Indonesian soil, with the growing tension between the United States and China, Russia is likely hoping that the situation will change in the future.
Most concerning is Russia’s success in weaponizing legitimate grievances against Western double standards, particularly regarding Gaza, and positioning itself as an anti-imperialist alternative while conducting a similar imperial conquest in Ukraine. The implications of Russia’s charm offensive extend beyond Southeast Asia. If Russia maintains economic partnerships worth billions whilst facing international condemnations for mass murder, it establishes precedent for other powers contemplating similar calculations. China is watching carefully how economic interdependence shields Russia from meaningful consequences, potentially informing Beijing’s strategic timeline regarding Taiwan.
Moreover, Western institutions struggle with the fundamental contradictions of sanctioning individual Russian entities while middle powers like Malaysia and Indonesia maintain substantial trade, economic, and military relationships with Moscow. This structural incoherence requires no direct or overt Russian manipulation to become a permissive environment for the Kremlin’s influence efforts.
Ultimately, the fate of flight MH17 is emblematic of Russia’s strategic goals, in which conclusive evidence, international consensus, and moral clarity prove insufficient against patient, systematic influence campaigns that exploit genuine grievances while offering practical alternatives for middle-power nations pursuing hedging strategies born of pragmatic necessity.
The Indonesian case is a sign that, in addition to an ambivalent and pragmatic government, a pro-Russian society will make it easier for Russia to exert its influence in the future. What makes it easier for Moscow in the case of Southeast Asia is that Russia does not want these countries to change their position regarding Russia. They simply want to maintain the status quo (both Malaysia and Indonesia keep hedging and maintaining relations with Russia) while exploiting the Western inconsistencies and lack of credibility through outreach to society at large.
Until the Western credibility gaps that make Russian narratives attractive are addressed, Moscow’s patient cultivating of alternative partnerships will continue fragmenting the international consensus, one carefully managed engagement at a time.