Next week’s NATO summit will, understandably, focus on immediate crises: Ukraine, Iran, Gaza, and the volatile Middle East. Yet, for long-term strategic stability, NATO leaders must also have the discipline to look beyond the immediate and engage with the Indo-Pacific.
For five years, NATO has made incremental progress in engaging its Indo-Pacific partners, including Japan, Australia, South Korea, India and New Zealand. In an era of systemic rivalry and rapid technological advancement, however, NATO’s engagement with and in the Indo-Pacific must move from a secondary consideration to a central pillar of NATO’s strategy.
The urgency – and structural necessity – is clear. China’s expanding military, especially in the maritime domain, increases the risk of coercion and conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Vital sea lanes in the South and East China Seas are critical for global trade, and Taiwan sits at the heart of the 21st century chip-fueled economy. Disruptions in maritime transit or a cross-strait crisis would impact all NATO economies. Beijing understands this, employing gray zone tactics – like harassing Philippine vessels or conducting deep-sea surveillance near Japan – to test resolve and shape the strategic landscape.
Furthermore, China’s undersea capabilities have advanced significantly in recent years. China’s navy is heavily investing in stealthier submarines, autonomous underwater vehicles, and seabed warfare tools. AI is increasingly used for precise target detection, cyberwarfare, and disinformation. These are not future threats, but present realities demanding a coordinated response from NATO and its Indo-Pacific partners.
And, indeed, some coordination is already ongoing. This year’s Sea Dragon exercise involved the U.S., Australia, India, Canada, and South Korea practicing anti-submarine warfare. Japan has increased joint naval drills with NATO members and hosted NATO’s secretary general earlier this year. But more is needed. NATO’s advanced maritime domain awareness tools, particularly the intelligence fusion capacities from Portugal’s Center of Excellence, should be shared and co-developed. A standing joint undersea monitoring mechanism would project allied unity and identify threats proactively.
Alignment is also crucial. As AI and synthetic biology transform warfare, allies and partners must align on standards, regulations, and ethics. China’s biotech investments, including dual-use gene editing and neuro-enhancement research, blur the lines between civilian and military applications. India and South Korea, with advanced research sectors, are beginning to address these challenges. NATO should facilitate structured dialogue on biotech governance to share lessons and prevent a fragmented approach that benefits authoritarian rivals.
This is not about transforming NATO into an Indo-Pacific alliance, but recognizing the interconnected security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific. Australia and Japan are not just regional players; they are net security exporters providing vital intelligence, technology, and diplomatic influence. Their presence at the summit should be leveraged for deeper operational collaboration and long-term planning.
The realities of strategic competition in the 21st century, with the international institutions that have served us well for the previous seven decades under stress, and a new world waiting to be born, demand robust and resilient values-driven international partnerships. From humanitarian aid to strategic deterrence, we now face an era where maritime flashpoints, AI-driven escalation, and biotech breakthroughs provide unprecedented challenges. If NATO is to continue to play as central a role in global affairs for the next seven decades as it has for the past, it must rise to this challenge. And while Ukraine, Gaza, and the Iran will rightly command attention, a NATO summit that risks neglecting the Indo-Pacific risks neglecting the future.