In modern conflict, power is no longer just projected from aircraft carriers or missile silos – it now comes from constellations in orbit. What was once the preserve of scientific prestige has quietly become one of the most contested spaces in global security. Low Earth Orbit (LEO), long regarded as a domain for civilian exploration or telecommunications, is now at the center of how states perceive, understand, and influence the world around them. Space-enabled intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) is increasingly the difference between decisive action and delayed reaction.
And yet, as this shift accelerates, India still finds itself looking up, without the persistent orbital visibility that modern strategic competition demands.
The message was hard to miss during Operation Sindoor. The operation – marked by the use of long-range munitions and drone strikes – was a signal of how far Indian kinetic capabilities have come. But it also revealed something missing: an integrated, space-based ISR backbone to support precision over time, not just in isolated moments. Without a persistent layer of real-time orbital awareness, tactical excellence risks being episodic rather than systemic. In environments where minutes matter, gaps in space-based vision can quietly shape outcomes on the ground.
To be clear, India isn’t starting from zero. Satellite platforms like RISAT, Cartosat, and GSAT-7A have brought valuable capabilities, from radar imaging to military communications. But they aren’t built for today’s tempo. Their orbits, data latency, and limited revisit rates mean they’re not well suited for real-time tracking of fast-moving threats. They’re excellent tools for a different era of conflict.
This matters because the race is already well underway. As of 2025, more than 10,000 active satellites orbit Earth, more than half launched in just the last five years. Since the Cold War’s earliest satellite launches, orbital intelligence has been a marker of power. That hasn’t changed. What has changed is the speed, the players, and the stakes. Ukraine has demonstrated how even modest access to commercial LEO imagery can help level the playing field. China’s Yaogan constellation now provides a sweeping view of both land and sea in the Indo-Pacific. For India, the absence of a comparable real-time ISR constellation leaves its planners at a disadvantage.
Consider Ukraine again. Without the Starlink satellite network, much of Ukraine’s drone-based ISR and long-range precision targeting would not have functioned. Over time, Starlink became the backbone of Ukraine’s 21st-century military enterprise. It restored the internet and enabled persistent surveillance and communications in a contested battlespace. Without Starlink, there would have been no real-time battlefield awareness, no guided drone strikes, and no resilience in the face of high-tech disruption. Revisit time – the time it takes to receive new satellite imagery of the same location – dropped from hours to minutes. Individual soldiers were empowered to conduct precision strikes using lightweight drones. Space made this possible – not in a decade, but in months. India cannot afford to miss this lesson.
Part of the challenge is structural. India’s space program has been a source of national pride, with a focus, rightly, on scientific progress and developmental impact. But that tradition, while admirable, has also kept space at arm’s length from national security thinking. The civil-military divide in this domain is real, and the pace of institutional change has been incremental. Compared to peers who have embraced the dual-use logic of space, India still approaches orbital capabilities with caution.
And yet, the potential to close this gap is within reach. The country’s growing space tech sector – startups like Pixxel, Skyroot, and Agnikul – is building what looks very much like a future-ready ecosystem: small satellites, modular launch systems, and high-resolution payloads. In other places, those ingredients have been enough to transform ISR access almost overnight. The West has moved on, with the private sector leading the launch of innovation and the deployment of military-grade ISR systems. This evolution has accelerated the concept of civil-military fusion.
The space domain, particularly LEO, is emerging as the new high ground in deterrence and warfighting. Just as hilltops once provided better visibility and intelligence in ground warfare, space provides that advantage on a planetary scale. Satellites in LEO enable persistent surveillance, hyperspectral imaging, jamming-resilient communications, and real-time data for AI-powered targeting. The strategic rewards are not only military; they reshape how nations exert influence, maintain credibility, and resist coercion.
The case for orbital ISR extends beyond borders. As India deepens its engagement across the Indo-Pacific – through maritime security efforts, regional partnerships, and crisis management frameworks – persistent visibility will matter. And in a world where a handful of major powers increasingly govern LEO, the ability to see independently is also the ability to act independently. The power to share what you see, when you choose to, can reinforce deterrence, build trust, or correct misinformation – all on your terms.
Of course, the domain is getting crowded. Anti-satellite weapons are real, cyber threats to space assets are growing, and orbital congestion is no longer theoretical. But these challenges only make one thing clearer: in future conflicts, deterrence will rest as much on what a country can see as on what it can strike. Attribution, early warning, and the control of escalation – all of it flows through space.
India’s 2047 ambition to be a developed, technologically sovereign, and globally influential power will hinge in part on its ability to command the invisible domain. Because in an era where the geometry of power is tilting skyward, the nations with eyes in orbit will be the ones that define what comes next.