As military conflict between the United States, Israel, and Iran intensifies, much of the world’s attention has focused on nuclear sites, retaliatory strikes, and the risk of a broader regional war. But one of the most far-reaching consequences of this confrontation and a potential collapse of governance in Iran could unfold not in the Middle East or Europe, but in Central Asia.
A large-scale Iranian refugee crisis could send millions eastward through Afghanistan and into Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, in particular. Although these countries share historic affinities with Iran, both face serious constraints in their ability and willingness to absorb a major influx of people. Neither has a well-developed asylum system or significant international support infrastructure in place to handle a sudden surge.
Iran’s population exceeds 90 million, and if even 10 percent of the population is displaced, it will rival the largest refugee movements of the century. Recent regional migration analyses have focused on Iranian migration toward Turkiye or Europe, but a growing number of Iranians could instead turn east, especially if routes through the Gulf are blocked or militarized. Eastern corridors may appeal more to those with familial connections to Central Asia, or those seeking less expensive and politically risky destinations.
Turkmenistan shares an 1,148-kilometer border with Iran and maintains deep historical and cultural ties to the Persian world. But despite its proximity, Turkmenistan is the least likely destination for fleeing Iranians. It is widely regarded as one of the most closed societies in the world, with heavy restrictions on media, internet access, and cross-border movement. Much of its economy is concentrated in state-controlled gas exports, leaving it highly undiversified and fragile. The country lacks meaningful refugee infrastructure, maintains limited cooperation with international humanitarian organizations, and has historically kept its borders tightly sealed. If a refugee crisis unfolds, Turkmenistan is unlikely to serve as a viable corridor or host country.
Tajikistan, which shares a mountainous border with Afghanistan, is the only Persian-speaking country in Central Asia. It maintains deep cultural and linguistic ties with Iran. In the event of upheaval, many Iranians may see Tajikistan as a more accessible destination, and the country’s relative affordability may also make it attractive to displaced working and middle-class Iranians.
Tajikistan’s ability to receive refugees is highly limited. It receives the equivalent of half its GDP in remittances sent back by migrant laborers, Meanwhile, public services are overstretched, and healthcare infrastructure is fragile. When the Taliban regained power in 2021, Tajikistan kept its borders largely closed to Afghan refugees. While officials expressed humanitarian concerns, they cited the country’s limited capacity and risks to internal stability, and the experience remains fresh in the minds of the public and policymakers.
Uzbekistan presents a parallel case. Although Uzbek is the official language, Tajik Persian is still spoken in cities like Bukhara and Samarkand, where Iranian cultural influence has endured for centuries. Iranian refugees may feel drawn to these cities due to cultural familiarity. However, the Uzbek government has taken a strict approach to cross-border migration. During the 2021 Afghan crisis, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev stated that “Afghanistan should not be left alone with its problems,” but emphasized that Uzbekistan would not absorb large numbers of refugees, citing national security.
These policies reflect more than logistical constraints. In both countries, public anxieties about extremism, surveillance, and economic pressure have shaped refugee responses in the past. A large wave of Iranians fleeing conflict or state collapse could trigger similar reactions, and governments may face domestic backlash for providing even limited support.
If Iran’s western neighbors close their doors, and access to the Gulf is constrained, the Afghanistan-Tajikistan corridor could face congestion. Informal crossings, smuggling networks, and spontaneous encampments could emerge quickly, placing immense pressure on already vulnerable communities. Host governments may respond by tightening borders, deploying security forces, or restricting humanitarian access, and resentment may build among local populations and within fragile state systems.
Outside powers could also move in. Russia and China have invested heavily in Central Asian security and infrastructure and might help in exchange for deeper influence, and Gulf states might seek to mediate or fund refugee management in ways that serve their regional agendas. The response to a refugee crisis may become yet another arena for geopolitical competition in the region.
International agencies like the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees have warned that Central Asia cannot sustain another large-scale displacement without major support. With donor governments focused on crises in Gaza, the Red Sea, and Eastern Europe, Central Asia remains a blind spot in global contingency planning.
Some practical steps can be taken immediately. Quiet coordination between Central Asian governments, multilateral institutions, and local civil society groups could help clarify capacity, identify risks, and build early frameworks for managing population flows. The goal would not be to predict catastrophe, but to prevent paralysis if the situation escalates.
Iran’s collapse, or a deeper unraveling triggered by ongoing strikes and internal unrest, may still seem distant. But if it happens, the consequences will be swift and will extend beyond Iran’s borders. Central Asia may not be centered in current headlines, but it could soon find itself on the front lines of the next refugee crisis. Beyond the headlines, families will cross borders in search of safety, and leaders across Central Asia will face difficult choices about who they let in and who they leave behind.