U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach to the Indo-Pacific has been defined less by strategic foresight than by political undoing. In his first term, he withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, exited the Paris Climate Agreement, sidelined ASEAN, and undermined multilateral diplomacy. Now in his second term, the pattern continues. He withdrew from the Paris agreement – again. The Pentagon has launched a formal review of AUKUS, the trilateral alliance of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework has been deprioritized. Washington has gone quiet on the Quad, and regional diplomacy has been reduced to slogans.
Rather than offering a forward-looking strategy, Trump is dismantling what remains of the Obama and Biden administrations’ Indo-Pacific legacy. In trying to erase his predecessors’ record, he is creating a vacuum filled not by U.S. alternatives, but by confusion, resentment, and retreat. As a result, Southeast Asia, long a focal point of great power attention, is learning to move forward without the United States.
One of the clearest expressions of this reversal came on April 2, when Trump declared “Liberation Day” and announced sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” on nearly every U.S. trade partner. Although a 90-day pause on the “reciprocal tariffs” was later introduced, Trump kept in place a 10 percent universal tariff. The announcement sent a shockwave through Southeast Asia. Under the original formula, Cambodia was hit with a 49 percent tariff, Laos 48 percent, Vietnam 46 percent, Myanmar 44 percent, Thailand 36 percent, and Malaysia and Brunei 24 percent. Even the Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, faced a 17 percent tariff.
These measures were not guided by clear economic logic. They were political pressure tactics, and they damaged trust and undermined the United States’ credibility as a stable economic partner.
Key industries were not spared from the uncertainty. Malaysia and Vietnam together account for over 30 percent of U.S. semiconductor imports. Although semiconductors were temporarily exempted from the tariff list, the Trump administration has since floated new tariffs of up to 25 percent on components such as GPUs and AI server chips. This unpredictability calls into question U.S. claims to champion supply chain resilience. In Southeast Asia, economic engagement is increasingly being viewed not as partnership but as leverage.
China, by contrast, responded with a calculated show of diplomacy. Within two weeks of the tariff announcement, President Xi Jinping visited Malaysia, Vietnam, and Cambodia – three of the countries hardest hit by Trump’s tariffs. His visit to Malaysia, the current ASEAN chair, sent a clear message that Beijing is stepping into the space Washington is vacating. Unlike the United States, which now vacillates between coercion and indifference, China is offering consistent, if self-interested, engagement. Southeast Asia is not naïve about China’s intentions, but it is pragmatic. And right now, China is showing up.
Strategic concerns are also growing. The Pentagon’s review of AUKUS has stirred anxiety among regional governments. While officials insist the review is routine, it is difficult to separate it from Trump’s broader skepticism of alliances. In a region where deterrence depends on long-term commitments, even a hint of retrenchment invites uncertainty. Many in Southeast Asia are quietly asking: if the United States is reconsidering its security priorities, what will it still defend?
This uncertainty deepened during Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s keynote address at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. Hegseth projected strength, spoke of deterrence, and declared the United States was “here to stay.” But his speech lacked substance and sensitivity. When referencing global threats, he described the events in Gaza as “Islamist terror on October 7th in Israel,” while praising U.S. resolve in Ukraine. He condemned Russian aggression but made no mention of Israel’s military campaign or the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. This silence stood out. In Muslim-majority countries like Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia, his framing appeared condescending and hypocritical. To decry civilian suffering in Ukraine while ignoring it in Palestine undermines U.S. credibility.
Just as striking was the omission of Myanmar – where a long-running conflict has destabilized Southeast Asia, displaced thousands, and fractured ASEAN unity. While Hegseth focused on faraway wars, he said nothing about the crisis in Washington’s declared priority theater.
To many in the region, the message is now painfully clear. “America First” does not mean mutual growth or shared responsibility. It means shut up, do what we say, or face the consequences. This approach is alienating the very partners Washington claims to value. It also exposes the contradiction at the heart of Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy: deterrence without diplomacy, presence without trust, leadership without listening.
ASEAN is responding in its own quiet way. On April 10, under Malaysia’s chairmanship, the bloc convened a Special Economic Ministers’ Meeting. While the statement emphasized dialogue, it also signaled a shift. Efforts are underway to upgrade the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement, finalize the ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement, and deepen cooperation under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). These initiatives reflect a growing desire to reduce reliance on an increasingly erratic United States and strengthen internal economic resilience.
This shift is happening at a moment of global reordering. ASEAN now contributes over 7 percent of global GDP and more than 8 percent of global growth over the past decade. The region is indispensable to global trade, maritime security, and technology supply chains. But Washington appears to treat it as peripheral. Even the fact that the United States remains the largest source of ASEAN foreign direct investment – accounting for 32.4 percent of the regional total in 2023 – cannot compensate for policy inconsistency and strategic tone-deafness.
The deeper problem is that the United States under Trump continues to operate as if it is still living in the unipolar moment. But it is no longer the only game in town. The region has choices. And while the United States was in pole position to strengthen its leadership in Southeast Asia through trade, technology, and security it has instead squandered the opportunity through self-inflicted missteps. In a multipolar world, influence must be earned, not assumed. Washington is learning that lesson too slowly.
Southeast Asia is not abandoning the United States, but it is adjusting. Governments are hedging more actively, strengthening ties with middle powers, and investing in regional self-reliance. The days of strategic dependence are over. What Southeast Asia seeks is not protection but partnership, and that requires consistency, humility, and mutual respect.
Trump’s first term removed the United States from Southeast Asia’s economic future. His second is cutting it out of the region’s strategic present. There will be no dramatic exit, no final rupture. But when Southeast Asia finally stops looking to Washington, it will not be out of disloyalty. It will be out of necessity. And it will remember who turned away first.