In the intricate landscape of global diplomacy, shaped by the shifts in Donald Trump’s foreign policy and ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, an intense struggle persists over the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan – formally known as the Republic of China. The People’s Republic of China has claimed sovereignty over Taiwan since the end of the Chinese Civil War in 1949; Beijing not only refuses to recognize the ROC government but will not hold diplomatic ties with any country that does.
Currently, only 12 small states maintain formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This number has sharply declined from over 20 in 2016, largely due to Beijing’s successful diplomatic campaign. This opens the possibility for more nations, particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean, to change their stance in the future.
The United States has been Taiwan’s primary diplomatic, economic, and military supporter in recent decades, despite not officially recognizing its independence, nor maintaining full diplomatic relations. Other powers are also assisting Taiwan in its quest to maintain an international presence. Foremost among them is Japan, a historical rival of China in the region, which has been forging strategic alliances with Taiwan’s few remaining allies.
Recently, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru met with the presidents of Guatemala and Paraguay, two of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies. Both nations agreed to elevate their relationships with Japan to a “strategic partnership,” with promises of investment and economic support. For instance, Japan will grant visa exemptions to Paraguayans for short stays.
Meanwhile, both Guatemalan President Bernardo Arévalo and Paraguayan President Santiago Peña have reaffirmed their support for Taiwan, even in the face of increasing Chinese economic pressure, which impacts businesses in both countries. Paraguay, the only South American nation allied with Taiwan, has secured an agreement to export pork to Taipei with zero tariffs starting in July 2025, an initiative expected to double the 5,000 direct jobs provided by the sector. Additionally, Paraguay and Taiwan agreed to eliminate visas for their citizens from late 2024, strengthening their political, economic, and tourism exchanges.
While Paraguay can be considered a staunch ally of Taiwan, pressure from the Paraguayan agricultural lobby for closer ties with China is growing. Furthermore, Paraguay finds itself in an uncomfortable position within Mercosur, due to the interest of some bloc members in pursuing a free trade agreement with China. On this issue, Peña’s government has recently signaled greater pragmatism, hinting that Paraguay will not be an obstacle if Mercosur decides to move forward with China.
For its part, China continues to intensify efforts to persuade Taiwan’s remaining allies to switch recognition. Countries like Panama (2017), Nicaragua (2021), and Honduras (2023) have already done so in recent years. In response, China has increased its economic commitments to these countries, offering assistance in agriculture, fisheries, infrastructure, tourism, and trade, in addition to supporting police capabilities.
China’s strategy was on display at the recent meeting of foreign ministers from China and Pacific Island nations held in Xiamen. At that meeting, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed the “One China principle,” which states that Taiwan is part of China, and secured the commitment of participating countries to oppose “Taiwan independence.” This strategy seeks to weaken Taiwan’s diplomatic position, even in regional forums like the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), where Taiwan – which has diplomatic ties with three Pacific Island countries – participates as a “development partner” and Japan is increasingly involved.
The shift in diplomatic allegiance from Taiwan to China by the Solomon Islands (2019), Kiribati (2019), and Nauru (2024) in the Pacific demonstrates the effectiveness of Beijing’s strategy of offering economic aid and infrastructure projects, along with agreements that include security cooperation, as in the case of the Solomon Islands. This has raised concerns among the United States’ traditional major partners in the region: Australia and New Zealand.
In this regard, the New Southbound Policy deployed by former Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen starting in 2016 did not yield the expected results. It served to strengthen economic ties with some Southeast Asian and Pacific countries but failed to curb further diplomatic defections. Nevertheless, at the moment no changes in position are expected from Taiwan’s three remaining allies in the Pacific: the Marshall Islands, Palau, and Tuvalu. The first two, notably, are close U.S. partners in the region.
Despite the efforts of the U.S. and other like-minded powers to strengthen ties with Taiwan’s few remaining allies, the general trend suggests that China will continue to exert strong economic and diplomatic pressure. Some countries like Haiti and Saint Lucia have sent representatives to forums with China without breaking ties with Taiwan, which suggests a flexibility on Beijing’s part in pursuit of gradual rapprochement. This was the case at the recent China-CELAC forum held in Beijing in May. These two countries are thus poised to be the next to change their diplomatic stance on Taiwan.
Regarding Taiwan’s three other remaining allies in the region – Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines – no political or economic conditions are currently observed that would suggest potential changes.
The specific cases of the Vatican and Eswatini, Taiwan’s only diplomatic allies in Europe and Africa, respectively, warrant separate consideration. The Vatican’s position is unlikely to change under the new papacy of Leo XIV, although there will probably be a deepening of the diplomatic outreach to China initiated by his predecessor, Pope Francis, which resulted in a historic agreement for the appointment of bishops signed in 2018.
As for Eswatini, Taiwan has clung to this alliance thanks to its ties with the controversial absolute monarch Mswati III, financing various infrastructure, health, and education projects, among other sectors. Even so, in 2023, Eswatini awarded a $163 million contract to PowerChina to build a dam, raising doubts about the future of this small African nation’s relations with Taiwan.
The situation becomes even more complex given U.S. foreign policy. Under the new Trump administration, the dependence of Taiwan’s allies on U.S. economic and financial support could become much more volatile. This could lead Taiwan to further strengthen its ties with Europe in the hopes of winning more support for its diplomatic allies. On her most recent international tours, former President Tsai Ing-wen visited Lithuania, Denmark, and the United Kingdom.
Taiwan will seek to continue strengthening ties with the few countries that still diplomatically recognize it – including pursuing benefits for its allies from other partners. But China’s effective strategy, coupled with geopolitical tensions and uncertainty over new U.S. foreign policy, suggests it’s very likely that more countries, especially in the Caribbean, will consider establishing diplomatic relations with China at Taiwan’s expense in the near future. The adverse international context and the economic advantages China offers are incentives that are difficult for fragile developing economies to ignore.
The article was first published in Spanish in Reporte Asia.