The recent armed clash at the Cambodia–Thailand border, which killed a 48-year-old Cambodian soldier, has heightened tensions between the two nations. Although Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s government has sought to cooperate with Cambodia to ease the situation, ultra-nationalist groups within Thailand are exploiting the event for political gain. Beyond merely opposing government policy, these factions are fueling the conflict and questioning the government’s patriotism and legitimacy, potentially paving the way for another military coup.
This pattern is familiar; Thailand’s 2006 and 2014 coups both followed a similar trajectory involving a Shinawatra-led government, a border dispute with Cambodia, and the use of nationalist fervor to justify military intervention. There are signs that this process may be playing out once more now. The Cambodia–Thailand border has again become an important factor in Thailand’s domestic power struggles
In 2006, the military overthrew Thaksin Shinawatra, citing his corruption and abuse of power, with one of the key nationalist flashpoints being accusations that he had undermined Thai sovereignty by allegedly ceding to Cambodia land close to Preah Vihear temple, an eleventh-century Angkorian ruin perched on the border between the two nations.
Thaksin’s close ties with former Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen during his administration were depicted by nationalist groups, particularly the royalist Yellow Shirt movement, as a sign of betrayal and collusion with a foreign power. A similar narrative unfolded in 2014 when the military ousted Yingluck Shinawatra, Thaksin’s sister, amid similar charges of corruption and misconduct. Once again, nationalist sentiment, centered on border disputes with Cambodia, particularly around Preah Vihear, served as a mobilizing force for military-aligned opposition. (A year earlier, the International Court of Justice, or ICJ, ruled that the temple belonged to Cambodia, affirming a 1962 ruling.)
In the case of both coups, the military and conservative elites portrayed Thaksin-aligned democratic governments as threats to national unity and sovereignty, using the Cambodia issue as a powerful symbol of disloyalty and justification for intervention.
Today, Prime Minister Paetongtarn’s government is once again the target of similar accusations. Royalist and nationalist factions are exploiting the recent border incident to depict the administration as weak and incapable of safeguarding Thailand’s territorial sovereignty. These groups are again focusing on the Shinawatra family’s close relationship with Cambodia’s ruling Hun family, now represented by Hun Sen’s son Prime Minister Hun Manet, suggesting that Thai national interests are being undermined, particularly in relation to Koh Kood and the 2001 MoU, a framework for negotiations and cooperation on maritime boundaries between the two nations which critics claim has compromised Thailand’s territorial sovereignty.
By arguing that the government is compromised by foreign influence, these narratives aim to delegitimize its authority and foster public suspicion. Even prior to the recent border tensions, Paetongtarn, as Thaksin’s daughter, has faced considerable criticism from elder Thai politicians, who question her qualification and experience, and accuse her of acting as a mere proxy for her father. These critics, many aligned with the traditional military-backed elite, have voiced deep dissatisfaction with her leadership, culminating in a no-confidence motion against her government in Parliament.
There is also a growing speculation that the recent border shooting may not have been an isolated incident, but rather a calculated provocation by hardline elements within the military. (The Thai military has blamed Cambodia for the clash, claiming that Cambodian soldiers entered a disputed zone and opened fire when Thai soldiers approached them to negotiate.) Such actions could be aimed at manufacturing a national crisis, stoking nationalist fervor, and creating a pretext for military intervention. This approach mirrors past tactics, where military hardliners either orchestrated or exploited crises to justify coups.
Further complicating the current situation are reported divisions within the Thai military itself, with factions split between loyalty to the former junta and support for civilian rule. This internal rift raises the risk of rogue elements acting autonomously, or with silent backing, to undermine the government under the guise of defending national sovereignty.
As of now, Paetongtarn’s cautious approach to the border dispute likely reflects the balancing act she must perform. On one hand, she represents the Red Shirt-aligned civilian government and the Shinawatra legacy, while on the other, she must avoid provoking the military or nationalist hardliners who remain deeply skeptical of her family’s political influence and doubtful about her leadership and legitimacy. Allowing Thai military leaders to take the lead on the border issue may be a strategic choice to avoid escalating tensions internally.
However, even Paetongtarn’s caution may not shield her from criticism, as the Yellow Shirt movement could still portray her as an ineffective leader incapable of defending the nation’s interests. Should Cambodia succeed in bringing the border dispute to the ICJ, Thailand will be legally bound to comply with the Court’s ruling under international law even though the country says that it does not recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction. This would still likely be weaponized by extremist critics, who could accuse her of “ceding or selling out Thai territory to Cambodia,” much like the accusations leveled against her father. Such narratives would further fuel efforts to delegitimize her leadership.
In anticipation of mounting domestic pressure, the latest update from Bangkok shows that Paetongtarn has assigned the Foreign Ministry to lead communications on the border dispute and publicly vowed that no Thai territory will be lost, as the Cambodia–Thailand Joint Boundary Commission (JBC) prepares to meet in Phnom Penh on June 14. The government also reaffirmed its stance of not recognizing ICJ jurisdiction in the matter, emphasizing bilateral negotiation via the JBC as the preferred approach.
From here, the situation could unfold in various ways. One possibility is further escalation, with nationalist outrage intensifying and elements within the military leveraging the crisis to portray the government as weak, laying the groundwork for political destabilization and potentially a coup, as seen in past crises involving the Shinawatra family. Another possibility is that tension will gradually decrease as the two governments pursue bilateral talks via the JBC, and exercise restraint and compromise.
However, while a gradual de-escalation through bilateral mechanisms remains a theoretical possibility, this scenario appears increasingly unlikely. Cambodia remains firm in its intention to ask the ICJ to rule on four sensitive areas along the border, a move that Thailand has rejected on the grounds that it does not recognize the ICJ’s jurisdiction. This fundamental legal disagreement has led to growing frustration and nationalist dissatisfaction within Thailand, particularly among conservative factions that still view the government’s diplomatic posture as overly conciliatory and compromising national sovereignty.
The military could allow border tensions to escalate, inflaming nationalist sentiment and undermining the civilian government’s legitimacy. Large-scale protests reminiscent of the Yellow Shirt demonstrations of 2006 could be orchestrated to destabilize the administration, and protests have already been organized by the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC), led by Pichit Chaimongkol, which has organized anti-Thaksin Yellow Shirt demonstrations in the past. These have targeted Defense Minister Phumtham Wechayachai and Prime Minister Paetongtarn for showing political weakness and failing to respond firmly to Cambodia on the border issue. The judiciary could also serve as a tool to disqualify or undermine government officials, further weakening the administration’s legitimacy. Combined with rising nationalist sentiment and accusations of foreign collusion, these factors could pave the way for a military intervention, which would – as always – be framed as a necessary move to protect national security and remove a leader perceived as compromised by foreign ties.