Barring some exceptions, 2025 has been a rather quiet year for the Islamic State of Khorasan Province (ISKP), the official franchise of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. This year, ISKP’s propaganda output has seen a sharp decline, and its external attack capability has also weakened. Thus far in 2025, ISKP was not involved in any external attack plot. Concurrently, the group has not carried out any significant high-profile attacks besides routine assaults and targeted assassinations in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
ISKP’s current situation contrasts sharply with that in 2024, when the terror group was expanding its propaganda operations by adding new language expertise to its repertoire, carrying out overseas attacks in Russia, Iran, and Turkiye as well as plotting attacks in the West. For Western security officials, ISKP posed the most imminent threat in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
So, what has changed in the last few months, and what does it mean for ISKP’s evolution as a terrorist group in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region?
In recent months, ISKP has struggled to sustain momentum in cyberspace, where its propaganda output has seen a sharp fall. In 2024, two key tools of Islamic States’ online propaganda communication, the I’lam Foundation and Al-Raud, were taken down in a coordinated action of the Eurojust and the Europol. The two nodes “created, operated and supported websites and other communication channels linked to IS.” Concurrently, IS’ Rocket Chat server, Tech Haven, which is frequently used by ISKP, has been infiltrated as well, resulting in low-key online activity, renewed guidelines for online security as well as heavy purges of unknown users in various Telegram channels.
Critically, in June, the arrest of a high-profile ISKP propagandist identified by his online handle, Khurasan.Lion (real name Ozgur Altun, alias Abu Yasir At-Turki), in a joint Turkish-Pakistani intelligence operation, sent shockwaves through the group’s online ecosystem. Reportedly, Khurasan.Lion, who has close links to Al-Azaim Media Foundation, acted as a moderator and disseminator of Al-Azaim’s Turkish and English content. He was in possession of a significant amount of cryptocurrency. Since his arrest, ISKP’s online users have been posting about precautionary measures for ensuring their online safety and avoiding detection to survive in the digital space. I’lam Foundation and Al-Raud’s removal, together with the arrest of Khurasan.Lion has slowed ISKP’s propaganda momentum and generated online security concerns.
At the same time, ISKP’s ability to plot online attacks has slowed since a 48-member cell linked to its external arms operations (overseas attacks) was busted by Pakistani authorities in a seven-month-long operation in 2024. Those arrested in this operation included the masterminds of the attacks in Russia and Iran, as well as the 2021 Kabul International Airport attack. American officials shared intelligence for this operation with their Pakistani counterparts. The mastermind behind the Abbey Gate attack, Sharifullah, was extradited to the U.S., where he is facing a legal trial. These arrests seem to have dented ISKP’s ability to plot and execute overseas attacks.
Hitherto, ISKP’s ability to plot overseas attacks presented an anomaly as it did not control territory as did al-Qaida, al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabab, and Boko Haram. The control of territory is deemed critical in planning and carrying out overseas attacks.
ISKP’s dual organization structure accounted for its ability to successfully plot external attacks despite losing territories in Afghanistan. The dual organization structure has an outer layer, which operates in the form of cells across Afghanistan and Pakistan, and an inner core that is highly secretive, mobile, and focuses only on external arms operations. Seemingly, the crackdown against ISKP in Balochistan has dented the inner core for the first time since the terror group raised international concerns through its overseas plots. This is the reason why ISKP has not been able to plot a single overseas attack in 2025.
Financial challenges are another key factor that seems to have slowed down ISKP’s operational momentum across the online-offline divide. As mentioned, the Khurasan.Lion was allegedly in possession of a significant but unspecified amount of cryptocurrency assets, which were confiscated following his detention. Since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, ISKP gradually shifted from traditional (hawala and hundi, extortion, and public donations) sources to nontraditional (cryptocurrency) sources of funding as it became increasingly difficult to secure finances through the former means.
At the same time, in 2023, the killing of a key IS figure linked to its Al-Karrar Office, Bilal al-Sudani, and the disruption of ISKP’s financial network in Turkiye following the arrest of a Tajik national Shamil Hukumatov (who amassed $2 million on Torn Blockchain), crippled ISKP’s finances. In this period, the group struggled to pay salaries to its fighters in Afghanistan. Sudani had routinely transferred funds to ISKP through the Al-Karrar Office for overseas attacks. While ISKP has been publicizing QR Codes in its propaganda publications for donations in cryptocurrencies in recent months, notwithstanding their secure and anonymous nature, they are not a substitute for traditional funding in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
The fourth key factor that seems to have slowed ISKP’s momentum is its evolving rivalry with Pakistani Baloch separatist groups in the restive Balochistan province. In May, ISKP declared war on Baloch separatist groups for ruthlessly killing its fighters in Mastung district despite a non-aggression pact. Despite being in ideologically opposite camps, until recently, the two groups co-existed in parts of Balochistan due to their shared enmity with the Pakistani state. That allowed ISKP to overcome operational challenges arising from the Taliban’s ruthless crackdown in Afghanistan. However, the Baloch insurgent groups’ hostility toward ISKP will further squeeze the operational space for the latter in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. In Balochistan, ISKP is outgunned and outnumbered by Baloch separatists and despite declaring a war on the latter, it cannot challenge their monopoly in the restive province.
Despite facing enormous challenges in the past on several occasions, ISKP has always bounced back by successfully negotiating difficult periods through pragmatic and smart decision-making. In the past, it has leveraged its alliances with like-minded groups in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region to persist and endure. Likewise, it will be a mistake to write off ISKP this time, especially in rapidly evolving geopolitical environments in the Middle East and South Asia, which will provide enough openings to the terror group to maintain relevance and resurge.