On June 6, Chief Adviser of Bangladesh’s interim government Muhammad Yunus announced that general elections will be held in April 2026. “After reviewing the ongoing reform activities related to justice, reform and elections,” he said, “…the next national elections will be held on a day in the first half of April 2026.”
The Election Commission would announce a detailed roadmap of the election at an “appropriate time” based on the projected schedule, he added.
Previously, Yunus had said that elections would be held in June next year.
Days after the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League (AL) government was ousted from power on August 5, 2024, following a student-led mass uprising, Yunus was appointed chief adviser of the interim government.
He set up several commissions to reform the constitution, the election system, the judiciary, police, etc. From the early days of his rule, Yunus has said that the interim government would hold a free, fair and participatory election after democratic institutions that were destroyed by the AL regime have been reformed.
However, some sections in Bangladesh have opined that reform of institutions is the work of an elected government, and hence, Yunus must hold elections soon and leave reforms to the government that emerges from the election. Over the months, Yunus has avoided committing himself to a date or a clear timeline for elections. This led to criticism that he was keen to hang on to power and thus unwilling to commit to an election timeline.
Yunus’ recent announcement followed immense pressure from various political players on when the election should be held. His June 6 announcement advancing elections from June to April 2026 reflects a confluence of strategic maneuvering, longstanding institutional interests, and mounting external pressures.
Bangladesh’s main players in the political arena have taken different positions on when elections should be held. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the AL, and the military are among those that favor early elections.
The BNP has been pushing for early elections as it views an expedited vote as the quickest route to power. Widely considered the most popular party in the country, the BNP is at present the best organized of all Bangladesh’s parties to face the voters. It has been calling for elections to be held by December 2025. The BNP’s motivation is clear: securing power sooner rather than later.
The BNP sees the April 2026 date set by Yunus for the election as delaying its anticipated return to power. Expressing dissatisfaction with Yunus’ announcement, it raised doubts about the interim administration’s intentions. “The public is beginning to question whether an election under this government is even possible,” senior BNP leader Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury said.
At the June 13 meeting in London between BNP acting Chairman Tarique Rahman and Yunus, the BNP proposed that the next parliamentary election be held before the upcoming Ramadan in February. Yunus agreed in principle to the proposal but said that an election within that timeframe would be possible only if meaningful progress is achieved on key reforms and justice-related issues.
Another key player in Bangladesh’s current political arena is the military. Its intelligence wing, the DGFI, has been implicated in enforced disappearances during the Sheikh Hasina regime, making its relationship with the interim government complicated. However, none of the interim government’s numerous reform commissions deals directly with the military. There has been no effort to restructure the armed forces.
In a speech to army officers at the Dhaka Cantonment last month, Army Chief Gen Waker-uz-Zaman called for elections to be held by December 2025, thus opposing the Yunus government’s earlier plan to conduct elections by June next year. The military’s push for an early election may be driven by two key concerns: preserving the institutional framework established under Hasina and avoiding investigations into its involvement in human rights violations, particularly enforced disappearances.
The sweeping reform agenda of the revolutionaries and the interim government poses a potential threat to the military’s interests — unlike political governments, which typically maintain the status quo. As such, the return of a political government may be seen as the military’s safest and most strategic option.
Interestingly, the AL, which was banned recently, favors early elections too. Several of its leaders, including Hasina, are facing trial at the International Crimes Tribunal. The tribunal has become a focal point of political maneuvering, and the AL’s strategy focuses on minimizing the post-July impact that led to judicial trials and political bans against them.
Navigating the legal challenges it faces may be easier under an elected political government rather than the Yunus-led interim administration, where anti-AL sentiment remains strong. Thus, an expedited election could provide the AL with a more favorable environment to address its legal and political concerns. Even if the BNP, its decades-old political rival, returns to power, it will be easier for the AL to deal with a political government.
The AL continues to control vast amounts of ill-gotten money. It has a vast network of members, and enjoys the support of a powerful network of oligarchs and their business organizations. AL sympathizers exist in every institution, including academia, the military, police, the civil administration, and judiciary, The AL may have been ousted but it still wields enough power to influence the electoral process.
As for India, it has long supported the AL and enjoyed strong ties with Hasina. With her gone, its ties with Bangladesh under the interim government have floundered. It has therefore been keen on an early election in Bangladesh.
As for the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the National Citizen Party (NCP), they have responded to the April election date announcement with conditional acceptance.
The JI has expressed confidence in the election schedule, with its Ameer Shafiqur Rahman stating that the chief advisor’s announcement has reassured the nation. He emphasized that the public expects the government to take all necessary steps to ensure a transparent and credible electoral process within the designated timeframe.
NCP Convenor Nahid Islam said his party supports holding elections in April, but only if the July Proclamation — a proposed declaration intended to consolidate the unity, anti-fascist spirit, and desire for state reform that emerged during the July uprising — and the accompanying July Charter are officially issued, and a fair, unbiased election environment is ensured. He explained that since the election month has been announced, they will back the timeline as long as these documents are released on time as promised.
As the country begins moving toward elections, the most pressing concern is the need for political consensus. With key parties differing on electoral schedules, the risk of prolonged disagreements remains. The BNP’s dissatisfaction over the April timeline stands in contrast to the JI and NCP’s conditional support. Moreover, Yunus’ meeting with Rahman in London has been criticized by the NCP and JI. The government must navigate these competing demands to ensure a stable transition.
Yunus has committed to holding what he describes as “the best election,” contingent on consensus among political stakeholders. He said he wants to “deliver the most free, fair, competitive, and widely accepted election in the country’s history.” Achieving this political consensus is crucial for Bangladesh’s political trajectory. Without agreement among major parties, the electoral process faces potential delays and further instability.