As Emmanuel Macron wrapped up his visits to Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore – where he delivered the keynote address at the Shangri-La Dialogue at the end of May – the French president reaffirmed the Indo-Pacific’s strategic importance for both France and Europe. In a context of growing geopolitical uncertainty and renewed unilateralism, Macron emphasized France’s commitment to a stable, multipolar order grounded in international law, freedom of navigation, and inclusive multilateralism – an international posture shared with key partners such as India, Japan, and ASEAN.
Building on this common strategic vision, and as the only remaining European Union (EU) member state with sovereign territories in the Indo-Pacific, France seeks to position its diplomacy not only as a national actor but also as a standard-bearer for European engagement in the region.
The exercise of sovereignty is precisely what underpins France’s specificity and credibility as a resident power. The French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs) – La Réunion, Mayotte, les TAAF (or South Antarctic Lands), New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton – which together have a population of 1.65 million inhabitants, play a central role in the construction and elaboration of a credible strategy.
Notably, 93 percent of France’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) lies in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, making it the second largest EEZ in the world after that of the United States. There are also around 200,000 French expats residing in countries of the region, more than 7,000 French subsidiary companies operating in the region, and 8,000 military personnel stationed permanently.
The assimilation of the FIPOCs into a single geostrategic Indo-Pacific framework is a logical step for a state seeking to assert itself as a legitimate actor in the region. However, despite some common geographical, economic, and political characteristics, grouping the FIPOCs into a single macro-region does not fully reflect the diversity of contexts and geopolitical challenges specific to each territory.
A comprehensive and nuanced understanding of local contexts is thus essential to fully comprehend the complexity of France’s Indo-Pacific engagement. This series will explore each of the FIPOCs separately to understand their characteristics, role in France’s Indo-Pacific strategy, and potential friction points between national and local drivers. You can view the full series here; today, we focus on Wallis and Futuna.
A map highlighting the French Indo-Pacific overseas collectivities (FIPOCs). Map by Paco Milhiet.
Bordered by Tuvalu, Samoa, Tonga, and Fiji and embedded within the Polynesian cultural sphere, Wallis and Futuna stands out as one of France’s most distinctive overseas territories.
Populated by Austronesian communities since at least 700 BC, Futuna was discovered by the Dutch explorer Jacob Le Maire in 1616, and Wallis 150 years later in 1767 by British navigator Samuel Wallis. Although a French protectorate from 1887, Wallis and Futuna remained largely insulated from global dynamics until American troops landed in 1942, introducing modern consumer culture and new social norms. The French administrative presence was formalized in 1959, and the islands became an overseas territory (TOM) in 1961 following a referendum.
With a population of just over 11,000, the archipelago may not hold major strategic weight in the Indo-Pacific, but it offers a fascinating case study of institutional hybridity within the French Republic.
Wallis and Futuna, Map created by Paco Milhiet using D-maps.com
Institutional Hybridity
Wallis and Futuna is governed under a unique institutional framework that formally integrates traditional monarchy within the French Republic. The territory recognizes three customary kingdoms – Uvea (Wallis), Alo, and Sigave (Futuna) – whose sovereigns retain local legitimacy and influence.
This hybrid governance model has produced singular institutions: the Territorial Council, which includes the three kings, the French State representative (préfet), and several locally appointed figures, a Territorial Assembly of 20 members (13 for Wallis and seven for Futuna). The territory also elects one deputy and one senator to the French Parliament.
Another defining feature is the enduring role of the Catholic Church. Evangelized by Marist missionaries well before the islands’ political annexation, Catholicism has remained central to social and educational life. A 1969 agreement between the state and the Catholic diocese entrusted primary education to the church – which is still the case today. All primary schools are Catholic-run but publicly funded, a notable exception to the 1905 French law on laïcité, which does not apply in Wallis and Futuna.
Small in Size But Regionally Connected
Despite its geographical isolation and economic dependency on Paris, Wallis and Futuna has increasingly asserted a presence in regional diplomacy. The territory maintains permanent delegations in Nouméa, New Caledonia; Papeete, French Polynesia; and Paris, France, and has joined several Pacific organizations, including the Polynesian Leaders Group, the Pacific Islands Forum (as an associate member since 2018), and the Pacific Community. French diplomacy also benefits from this regional connection by including the president of the Territorial Assembly of Wallis and Futuna in France-Oceania summits, like the recent United Nations Ocean Conference in Nice.
Wallis and Futuna shares maritime borders with five states or territories – Tokelau, Tonga, Fiji, Samoa, and Tuvalu. Like its neighbors, it is at the forefront of challenges commonly faced by small island states, including climate change, marine resource governance, sustainable fisheries, and the development of inter-island transport.
As with other Pacific Islands, emigration also represents a phenomenon that is reshaping the archipelago’s ties with its regional environment. After experiencing strong demographic growth throughout the 20th century – peaking at nearly 15,000 residents in 2003 – Wallis and Futuna has undergone significant emigration, particularly toward New Caledonia, which now hosts more than 20,000 Wallisians and Futunians, more than on the original islands.
This growing diaspora shift reshapes social and familial ties between the two territories and across the Pacific, also contributing to Wallis and Futuna’s visibility on the national and international stage. One of the most striking expressions of this influence can be found in the realm of sport, which has become a powerful vehicle of soft power for the islands.
Sporting Soft Power
Wallisians and Futunians account for less than 1 percent of the French population; however, their impact on national sport, especially rugby, is striking. Numerous players of Wallisian or Futunian descent have donned the jersey of the French national rugby team. Over 30 professional players from the islands currently compete in France’s Top 14 and Pro D2 leagues, and more than 200 play in metropolitan clubs. Even the legendary Jonah Lomu traced part of his ancestry to Wallis. Beyond rugby, the Wallisians have also distinguished themselves in disciplines such as javelin and volleyball.
Wallis and Futuna offers a compelling synthesis of institutional hybridity, spiritual legacy, and cultural soft power. Although often overlooked in broader geopolitical debates, this territory constitutes a singular component of France’s presence in the Indo-Pacific.