Almost one year has passed since the disbandment of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). In June 2024, the leaders of JI announced the disbandment and pledged their loyalty to the Republic of Indonesia. They also pledged to revisit the curriculum of their affiliated schools or pesantren.
Many analysts argue that the disbandment is real, not merely camouflage, as the leaders had held intense and careful discussions about the group’s future. Indonesia’s counterterrorism agencies will safeguard the process after the disbandment, including collecting data on JI members, providing rehabilitation programs, and assisting the adjustment of JI’s pesantren curriculum.
Regardless of their statement on disbanding the organization, however, JI’s community still exists, and there are a few members who oppose the disbandment. The future developments remain uncertain. What could Indonesia do to further regulate JI’s operations?
Indonesia may learn something from Japan’s experience after the disbandment of Aum Shinrikyo, the perpetrator of the 1995 sarin gas bombing in the Tokyo subway. This attack caused massive casualties, killing 13 people and injuring roughly 5,800. In the aftermath of the attack, Aum’s leaders were arrested, including Asahara Shoko, the mastermind of the attack. Asahara was sentenced to death and was finally executed in 2018. The Japanese government forcibly disbanded the organization after the Tokyo Metropolitan Government revoked its status as a religious corporation in 1995.
In 2000, however, Aum Shinrikyo rebranded “by changing its name to “Aleph,” indicating “a new beginning.” Aleph leaders emphasized that the organization would distance itself from violent teachings and extremist doctrines. Despite the rebranding, the Japanese authorities remain alert to the presence of Aleph and other Aum Shinrikyo splinter groups. Some members are still devoted to Asahara’s extremist teachings.
As a result, Aleph is subjected to surveillance under the Subversive Activities Prevention Act (SAPA). Under this law, the Japanese domestic intelligence agency, the Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA), can closely monitor Aleph’s activities. Aleph is required to submit a report every three months on information related to its members, activities, and assets. In addition, Aleph is also required to pay compensation to those who were affected by its attacks.
However, Aleph often failed to submit the mandated reports, or the reports were inadequate. The PSIA alleged that Aleph attempted to conceal its assets to evade the obligation to pay compensation. In 2023, the Japanese authorities imposed restrictions on the use of Aleph’s facilities across the country. This restriction effectively limited the group’s activities, including recruitment.
Despite these moves by the Japanese government, Aleph is actively recruiting the younger generations. The recruitment process is done without mentioning the identity of the group; Aleph first approaches targeted individuals by offering yoga sessions or mental health consultations. The COVID-19 pandemic reduced the number of new members recruited each year, but Aleph remained committed to swelling it numbers by expanding to the online sphere.
Last March marked 30 years since the fatal sarin gas attack, and many younger Japanese have no memories of the incident. They are particularly vulnerable to being lured into the organization. According to the PSIA, around 860 individuals have joined Aum’s splinter groups in the past ten years, of whom 52 percent were born after the 1995 attack. As of January 2025, the PSIA estimated that Aum’s splinter groups had around 1,600 members, of which 1,200 belong to Aleph. The continuing recruitment process targeting the younger generation has become a main concern for Japan.
However, the legal measures allow the Japanese authorities to pursue a two-track approach: active monitoring from the PSIA and reports from Aleph to keep track of the growth of Aleph’s members. Such measures serve to demonstrate how committed Aleph is to fulfilling its obligations to the government. Once the authorities detect suspicious underreported data, Japan can restrict the group’s activities.
Indonesia could learn from Japan’s two-way approach. It is important to note that Aum was forcibly disbanded, while JI was not. Yet both are similar in shifting their focus in an effort to rebrand themselves. The emergence of JI splinter groups is likely, but it would take a considerable amount of time for them to reorganize themselves.
The dynamics within the existing JI community are uncertain. For now, they may abide by the leader’s decision to disband, but changing domestic and global conditions in the future might create friction, as has happened in the past. In the future, there will naturally be an increase in younger Indonesians who are unfamiliar with JI and even the 2002 Bali Bombing. These uncertainties should prompt Indonesia to pursue long-term measures to check the group of extremist offshoots.
Indonesia may emulate Japan’s approach to impose an obligation on JI to report data on its current members, activities, and assets. Such measures will bind JI to a specific legal instrument. The failure to report or an insufficient report would allow the authorities to take stronger measures against JI. It can serve as a complementary measure while the relevant agency continues its efforts in distancing JI from violent ideologies.