It has been a turbulent period for South Korean politics, triggered by then President Yoon Suk-yeol’s illegal declaration of martial law on December 3 last year, which prompted his impeachment by the National Assembly on December 14, followed by his removal from power by the Constitutional Court on April 4 of this year, and ultimately victory for Lee Jae-myung and the Democratic Party of Korea in the presidential election held on June 3. Lee’s administration was inaugurated the following day.
South Korea’s conservatives went into the election with the political baggage of Yoon being removed from office. While more than 60 percent of the public had been calling for a change of government, Lee in fact won with 49.4 percent of the vote, just shy of a majority. He secured a plurality of support in traditionally progressive strongholds and many other regions, including the Seoul metropolitan area, and across almost all age groups, particularly among voters in their 40s and 50s.
The progressive camp worked to elect Lee with a largely united front, while the conservative camp was split between two candidates: one from the People Power Party (PPP) and one from the Reform Party. The PPP itself was further divided over how to respond to Yoon’s emergency martial law and impeachment, so the party was hardly united. After losing the previous presidential election three years ago, Lee was well-prepared for a comeback, in sharp contrast to the conservative’s candidate Kim Moon-soo, whose nomination only came as a result of complex internal party dynamics. In light of the election’s structure, the capabilities of both camps, and the personal strengths of the candidates, Lee’s victory ultimately came as no surprise.
Lee did not have the usual two-month post-election period to prepare for government, but was required to take up office immediately. His first priority has been to restore political stability and bring an end to the six months of turmoil that had resulted from the absence of a president. The most pressing issue for his administration is to try and bridge the country’s sharp political and social divides. However, this will require institutional reform that would put the spotlight on Yoon’s “insurrection.” Achieving both unity and reform will thus not be an easy task. Still, the conservative opposition is in disarray and lacking any sense of accountability. In fact, some parts of the conservative opposition may resort to more extreme forms of street politics, depending on developments.
Lee must achieve political stability while also working to improve the lot of ordinary South Koreans, whose livelihoods have been damaged by the domestic and international turmoil. Expanding domestic demand through proactive fiscal stimulus will likely be key to this goal. The success or failure of these efforts will directly impact the administration’s early approval ratings.
Another area of interest will be Lee’s approach to diplomacy. Following the transition from the progressive Moon Jae-in administration to Yoon’s conservative government, there was a deep-sea change in South Korea’s foreign policy. Seoul’s approach to North Korea shifted from engagement to deterrence, while South Korea’s position on U.S.-China relations also moved from one of strategic ambiguity to the adoption of an Indo-Pacific strategy. This strategy sought to attract greater U.S. engagement against China through cooperation with Japan, Australia, and other like-minded countries that share similar values like liberal democracy. To strengthen the alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, Korea took the lead in resolving historical issues with Japan and worked to institutionalize security cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and South Korea. However, with the return of a progressive administration, there are both hopes and concerns that South Korea’s foreign policy may revert to its earlier direction
Given the current situation, though, Lee appears more likely to focus on continuing Yoon’s diplomacy rather than returning to Moon’s approach. While a country’s foreign policy does usually reflect the political leanings of its leader, the recent shifts in South Korea’s foreign policy have been less about the president and more the result of changes in the surrounding strategic environment. This includes North Korea’s push to develop nuclear missiles and the change to a two Korea policy that no longer seeks reunification, as well as the deepening and restructuring of the U.S.-China rivalry.
Yet this does not mean that the new administration will simply continue Yoon’s diplomacy. Instead, Lee is expected to correct some of the excesses that were evident in his predecessor’s approach. First, the administration will need to adopt a posture of engagement toward North Korea. Second, it will need to maintain an appropriate distance from China and Russia, while also making strides in economic cooperation and other areas. Third, while continuing to emphasize cooperation between Japan, the U.S., and South Korea, it will need to draw a clear distinction from the previous administration’s unilateral concessions to Japan on historical issues. The Lee administration has signaled its intention to pursue pragmatic diplomacy, emphasizing the national interest centered on economic benefits rather than ideology or values, and attention will be focused on how this administration balances continuity with correction.
South Korea’s progressive administration should not be labeled anti-Japanese, as has occasionally been done in the past. Rather, in light of the current strategic environment, Japan should emphasize the important common interests shared by both nations and the need for cooperation to achieve them. This will require persuading both sides of the need to jointly manage contentious issues, particularly historical ones, to prevent them from becoming politically charged.