On 19 June, the first trilateral summit between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was held in the southwestern Chinese city of Kunming on the sidelines of the 9th China-South Asia Exposition and the 6th China-South Asia Cooperation Forum. The summit was attended by Chinese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Sun Weidong, Pakistani Additional Secretary (Asia-Pacific) Imran Ahmed Siddiqui, and Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary Md. Ruhul Alam Siddique, with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch participating virtually.
The summit took place amidst acute international and regional crises.
The flare-up of the Israeli-Iranian conflict and the participation of the United States present the world with dire possibilities of global conflagrations and economic shocks, and South Asian states are likely to be hit hard if the conflict results in the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the recent India-Pakistan clashes have further destabilized South Asia, and the conflict has the potential to re-erupt at any time. Meanwhile, India and Pakistan continue to grapple with protracted insurgencies within their territories, with the former embroiled in Jammu and Kashmir, Chhattisgarh, and Manipur, and the latter preoccupied in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Meanwhile, following the change of government in Bangladesh in August 2024, relations between India and Bangladesh have nosedived, with the outbreak of media wars, the intensification of border skirmishes, and the beginning of apparent forced returns of civilians from India into Bangladesh. In addition, the civil war in Myanmar is dragging on, with attendant negative ramifications for Bangladesh and the region.
Amidst this volatile situation, the strengthening of the ties among China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh holds substantial geopolitical salience for several reasons.
First, the holding of the first Sino-Pakistani-Bangladeshi trilateral summit indicates the growing alignment among the three states and the possibility of their formation of a geopolitical triangle. It should be noted that a similar geopolitical axis had originated in the mid-1960s, when China and Pakistan formed an alliance to counter India. At that time, Bangladesh constituted the eastern wing of Pakistan, and the erstwhile East Pakistan formed an important part of this axis. The axis was weakened as a result of the independence of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, but in the late 1970s and 1980s, Dhaka moved to repair its relations with Beijing and Islamabad. However, the formation of a geopolitical triangle among the three states did not materialize.
At present, China shares comprehensive political, economic, and military-strategic ties with Pakistan and Bangladesh. Pakistan and Bangladesh are active participants in China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, and China continues to be the largest supplier of military equipment to both Pakistani and Bangladeshi armed forces. From the Chinese perspective, building up extensive ties with both Pakistan and Bangladesh holds significant strategic value, as it creates strategic threats to India on both the west and the east, and puts China in a more favorable position vis-à-vis India. From the Pakistani perspective, forming a geopolitical triangle with China and Bangladesh improves its diplomatic and strategic position, offsets Indian superiority in men and materiel, and increases its profile on the wider international stage. From a Bangladeshi perspective, greater cooperation with Beijing and Islamabad is a logical continuation of the current Indo-Bangladeshi rift. However, owing to Bangladesh’s geographical location, military-strategic situation, and economic reality, it cannot risk antagonizing New Delhi.
Accordingly, the trilateral summit reflects the growing strategic concordance among the three countries. While they emphasized in their joint statement that the summit was not directed at any third party, Indian media outlets have interpreted the event as an attempt at the encirclement of India. However, this is not an accurate representation of reality. The summit focused on fostering greater cooperation among the countries in various economic and cultural sectors. Moreover, while China and Pakistan proposed that the three countries form a joint working group to coordinate the implementation of the understandings, Bangladesh did not agree to the proposal. This indicates that Bangladesh is willing to engage in greater cooperation with Beijing and Islamabad, but in continuation of its long-standing policy of non-alignment, it is not yet ready to participate in a formal alliance.
Second, Bangladesh is integral to Indian national security. When the country formed a part of Pakistan, Pakistani intelligence services used Bangladesh’s territory to shelter, train and equip northeast Indian insurgent groups, including Mizo and Naga insurgents, and thus, waged proxy wars against India. However, Bangladesh’s security cooperation with India in the 2010s proved instrumental in India establishing control over its restive northeastern provinces, particularly Assam. Taking into account the current state of Indo–Pakistani and Sino–Indian relations, it would be a strategic boon for Pakistan and China if they manage to use Bangladeshi territory to destabilize Northeast India. Hence, forming a geopolitical axis with Bangladesh makes political and strategic sense for Islamabad and Beijing.
However, despite the recent downturn in Indo–Bangladeshi relations, Bangladesh has not moved in that direction, opting for engagement and dialogue with New Delhi. Thus, the country’s decision not to join the proposed joint working group with China and Pakistan represents its holding of another olive branch to India.
Third, Bangladesh’s hesitation to join the joint working group also reflects Dhaka’s preoccupation with domestic issues. Over the previous months, the unity that had developed among the country’s various political forces amidst the July Uprising has given way to increasing political polarization. The interim government of Bangladesh is slated to be replaced by a new government after proposed elections in early 2026. So the interim government is unlikely to initiate any major geopolitical realignment during their tenure.
Finally, from a long-term Bangladeshi perspective, getting entangled in any form of alliances can prove detrimental to its national interests. Forging a formal alliance with Pakistan is unlikely to bring Bangladesh any substantial benefit. Meanwhile, Bangladesh has strong economic relations with both China and its rival, the U.S. Unless the country’s economic structure is substantially altered, Dhaka will have to maintain a stable partnership with both Beijing and Washington. Under these circumstances, Dhaka has to walk a diplomatic tightrope.
At present, Bangladesh is confronted with an acute dilemma. On the one hand, deteriorating Indo–Bangladeshi relations provide the country with an incentive to forge alliances with external partners. On the other hand, Bangladesh’s political, economic, and military-strategic realities compel the country to adhere to its traditional policy of non-alignment.
However, as geopolitical tensions continue to rise across South Asia and the wider world, there will be increasing domestic and international pressure on Bangladesh to make a choice. The attempt to include Bangladesh in a geopolitical triangle is not the first such attempt, and neither will it be the last one.