The Strait of Hormuz is widely regarded as one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints due to its central role in the transportation of oil and natural gas. Situated between Iran and the Musandam Peninsula – controlled by Oman and the UAE – it serves as the sole sea passage from the oil-rich Persian Gulf to the Arabian Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific. Any disruption in this narrow 21-mile corridor can generate cascading effects, not only in the Middle East but across the entire Indo-Pacific region.
In June 2025, after the United States launched precision strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, Iran’s parliament responded by passing a resolution calling for the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. While the decision awaits final approval by Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, the threat alone has already sent shockwaves through global energy markets – especially among Indo-Pacific economies heavily dependent on oil flows from the Gulf. The episode has reignited fears of supply chain disruption, price volatility, and regional escalation, underscoring the strait’s enduring role as a strategic pressure point.
The Strait of Hormuz facilitates the passage of nearly 20 percent of the world’s daily oil consumption. A sustained closure would not only send oil prices skyrocketing but would also destabilize global markets, slow industrial production in Asia, and challenge military and diplomatic responses in real time.
For Indo-Pacific states – especially India, China, Japan, and South Korea – the implications are immediate and profound. All four are heavily reliant on Gulf energy imports, with Japan and South Korea importing more than 70 percent of their crude oil through the Strait of Hormuz. India’s dependency is similarly high, while China remains one of the world’s largest indirect beneficiaries of Gulf oil via its manufacturing-driven supply chains.
Iran’s threats have triggered robust international responses. The United States has adopted a forward-leaning deterrence posture. Washington warned Tehran that any move to close the strait would be an act of “economic suicide,” and urged China to use its influence to restrain Iran – highlighting Beijing’s own energy vulnerability.
Meanwhile, U.S. and allied military deployments in the Gulf signal both resolve and the risk of escalation. Commercial actors are already adjusting: shipping insurers have raised premiums, supply chain managers are reviewing risk models, and warnings have been issued over potential use of drones, anti-ship missiles, or sea mines targeting civilian vessels.
Beyond state-level confrontation, the Strait of Hormuz is increasingly exposed to hybrid threats, including terrorism and maritime piracy. Terrorist organizations, including al-Qaida and its affiliates, have a documented history of targeting strategic maritime infrastructure, as seen in attacks like the bombing of the USS Cole and the French tanker Limburg. The goal is clear: to bleed major economies – especially the United States – by targeting vital energy arteries.
This vulnerability is compounded by the strait’s narrowness and geography. Oil tankers transiting Hormuz are large, slow-moving, and minimally defended – rendering them prime targets. A successful asymmetric attack or coordinated sabotage effort in the strait could result not only in substantial loss of life and environmental catastrophe, but also in global energy paralysis. Even a temporary disruption of a few days would spike shipping costs, destabilize insurance markets, and trigger a severe energy shock, especially in the energy-dependent Indo-Pacific economies.
Given that nearly half of the world’s seaborne oil (around 43 million barrels per day) transits through chokepoints like Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Suez Canal, multipronged disruption is no longer far-fetched.
This unfolding scenario reveals the structural fragility of maritime chokepoints in an era marked by hybrid threats and economic weaponization. It also raises difficult questions for Indo-Pacific policymakers: How can states shield themselves from strategic chokepoint shocks? What kinds of alliances, corridors, and redundancies are most effective?
In this context, regional integration frameworks such as the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) and I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, U.S.) are no longer abstract diplomatic visions – they are strategic imperatives.
These initiatives aim to diversify energy and logistics routes, reducing dependence on single chokepoints such as Hormuz. They are also emblematic of a broader shift toward multimodal connectivity, combining land, sea, and digital infrastructure to build geopolitical resilience.
One actor stands out in this architecture: Israel. Often perceived as peripheral to Indo-Pacific debates, Israel has quietly become a critical bridge between India and the Gulf. As Sameena Hameed demonstrated, Israel’s logistical assets, port infrastructure, and high-tech sector position it as India’s strategic pivot within IMEC. Overland corridors running through Israel may offer vital alternatives in times of maritime insecurity.
For Japan and South Korea, the current crisis serves as a wake-up call. Deeper cooperation with Israel – both bilaterally and through frameworks like I2U2 – can enhance energy security, technological exchange, and regional coordination in the face of mounting threats.
The current crisis thus requires a two-tiered response: tactical resilience and strategic resilience.
Tactical resilience would involve enhanced maritime security cooperation between industrialized nations, joint naval patrols, investment in maritime domain awareness, and adoption of defense technologies (e.g., anti-drone systems and “secure-ship” electrified barriers). Countries in proximity to the strait, such as Oman and the UAE, could be supported to build local capacity through multilateral initiatives.
Strategic resilience looks to the long term by diversifying energy sources, accelerating green transitions, and building alternative transport corridors that bypass vulnerable maritime chokepoints. Here, proposals such as a land-based oil pipeline from Saudi Arabia to Israel’s Haifa port via Jordan gain new urgency. These would complement IMEC and reduce dependency on contested waterways.
For Indo-Pacific states, the lessons are acute. Without credible redundancy in energy transport and proactive engagement in Middle East–Indo-Pacific integration (such as I2U2), they remain exposed to every fluctuation in Gulf stability.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis serves as a potent reminder that energy security is inseparable from supply chain security and geopolitical foresight. For Indo-Pacific powers, the lesson is clear: the time to invest in alternative routes and resilient partnerships is now.
Israel’s growing integration into India’s connectivity strategy – via IMEC and I2U2 – offers more than a workaround. It is a strategic inflection point for like-minded democracies to reshape the future of energy flows, economic corridors, and regional stability from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific.