Speaking at a security conference in Perm in the Ural mountains of Eurasia on May 29, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the “time has come” to revive the Russia-India-China (RIC) troika, as New Delhi and Beijing have reached an “understanding on de-escalating tensions along their shared border.”
Harshly criticizing the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct, Lavrov claimed that it was “made up” by NATO in 2022 to “drag India into their anti-China schemes,” and underscored the need to “revitalize RIC.”
These remarks come ahead of his scheduled visit to New Delhi, expected this month, which precedes a planned summit between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi later this year.
A concept dating back to 1998, the RIC was formally institutionalized through annual meetings in 2002. It has largely remained dormant since the border clashes between India and China in the Galwan Valley in 2020. Against the backdrop of COVID-19, India virtually hosted the 18th meeting of RIC foreign ministers in November 2021, when the chairmanship was passed on to Beijing. Since then, no meeting of the RIC foreign ministers has taken place.
RIC was originally conceived as a platform of three of the world’s largest non-Western countries for exchanging views on regional, multilateral and global issues of interest. Ideated by the then-Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, at a time when the world was transitioning from a unipolar to a multipolar world, the platform was expected to build a consensus on regional perspectives on a global order, distinct from Western values, premised on multipolarity and democratization of international relations.
Coinciding with an upswing in India’s ties with both Russia and China, the initial years of the RIC dialogues witnessed regular meetings and even expansion of cooperation across multiple sectors, including counterterrorism. However, RIC cooperation has made limited progress in building concrete cooperation programs, mainly due to transformations in the external environment, which have in turn impacted bilateral equations within this troika.
As New Delhi significantly improved relations with Washington, the inherent differences among the three countries, particularly on the future of the Indo-Pacific region, came out in the open. While Russia and China view the Indo-Pacific as divisive and exclusionary, preferring the Asia-Pacific construct, which they consider as more “inclusive and harmonious,” New Delhi views it as a crucial geographical space where it is cooperating with multiple actors, including the United States.
For New Delhi, such cooperation with Washington was also a response to counter-expansion of Chinese influence in its immediate neighborhood and the larger Indian Ocean region. Even though India-China relations seem to have thawed since they reached a border agreement in late 2024, mutual suspicions continue to mar the bilateral relationship. Tensions also persist along the border, especially in Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims is part of its territory, making a return of bilateral ties to their pre-Galwan status quo extremely unlikely. Additionally, New Delhi is deeply wary of the growing China-Pakistan defense cooperation, especially after India and Pakistan came close to war over the Pahalgam terrorist attack. The nexus has only exacerbated Indian suspicions.
Meanwhile, Russia has been able to simultaneously develop ties with China, while preserving its time-tested relationship with India. Even when India-China relations plummeted to a historic low, following the Galwan clashes, putting Russia in an awkward situation, Moscow was able to maintain ties with both sides and even played a key behind-the-scenes mediatory role in defusing tensions. Given its unique position, Moscow is heavily invested in the trilateral relationship, which the Kremlin sees as essential to counter what it views as U.S.-led Western hegemony.
Lavrov’s proposal for the revival of RIC comes at a time when New Delhi’s ties with Washington are facing turbulence. Washington’s re-hyphenation of New Delhi and Islamabad, limited progress on a comprehensive trade deal, and an ongoing war of words over whether Trump mediated the India-Pakistan ceasefire have cast a shadow over India-U.S. ties. At the same time, although New Delhi maintains that the India-Pakistan ceasefire was arrived at bilaterally, the Kremlin’s acknowledgement of Trump’s role has raised Indian concerns about Russia’s credibility as a reliable partner.
Citing unnamed officials, an Indian news media outlet reported that New Delhi is “not averse” to Moscow’s proposal for the revival of RIC. With shifting global and regional power balances and bilateral equations in flux, New Delhi is recalibrating its foreign policy approach post Operation Sindoor. Participating in RIC is an opportunity for India to showcase its strategic autonomy to a global audience and send a message to Washington, which has repeatedly expressed its displeasure over India’s close ties with Russia.
India’s multi-directional foreign policy and its location as a Eurasian power make RIC a viable platform to expand New Delhi’s global ambitions. Being part of the Quad and RIC provides India with an immense strategic opportunity to expand its influence in Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific. However, this depends on whether New Delhi can convince Russia that its Indo-Pacific vision is independent of that of Washington and compatible with President Putin’s concept of a Greater Eurasia, while maintaining a working relationship with China.
Given how RIC dynamics are influenced by U.S. moves, a lot will depend on how India-U.S. ties progress in the coming months.