The longstanding U.S. policy of “strategic ambiguity” toward Taiwan was crafted in an era when China was militarily limited and diplomatically cautious. Today, Beijing is neither. China, under Xi Jinping, has aggressively expanded its military capabilities with the goal of being ready to invade Taiwan by 2027.
Strategic ambiguity remains useful in deterring Taiwan from declaring de facto independence, but by itself, no longer has the credibility nor the effectiveness to deter China. In a volatile security environment, it must be complemented with a touch of “tactical clarity”: a clear, transparent, and justified tactical move that revitalizes strategic level deterrence without undermining U.S. commitments or provoking unnecessary escalation.
Tactical clarity would involve openly acknowledging, rather than concealing, U.S. defense assistance to Taiwan, specifically recognizing the presence of U.S. military personnel and contractors providing training and technical support to Taiwan’s armed forces. Such a shift, in conjunction with continued strategic ambiguity, would raise the cost of aggression for China, making it clear that any surprise attack on a Taiwanese military facility could risk direct confrontation with the United States.
The foundation of U.S. policy toward Taiwan rests on one key document: the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979. Alongside the establishment of diplomatic relations with China that same year, the TRA set U.S. expectations on the future of Taiwan being determined by peaceful means. Additionally, the TRA mandates that the United States will provide Taiwan with defense articles and services necessary for Taiwan to maintain sufficient self-defense capabilities.
As a part of any Foreign Military Sales (FMS) package, training is included to provide the purchasing military necessary knowledge to operate and maintain those weapon systems. Inherently, it is implied that a degree of U.S. on-the-ground presence to train Taiwanese service members must occur to fulfill the FMS requirement.
Another key document shaping U.S. Taiwan policy is the 1982 China-U.S. Joint Communique, also known as the Arms Sales Communique. Unlike the TRA, which is a domestic law unilateral to the United States, the Arms Sales Communique is a diplomatic commitment made in the context of China-U.S. relations. The 1982 communique states that the United States: (1) does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan; (2) will not exceed the quality or quantity of arms sales to Taiwan supplied in recent years; (3) intends to gradually reduce arms sales to Taiwan, leading to a final resolution between China and Taiwan. However, as indicated in then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan’s memorandum, the three promises are contingent upon China’s willingness to resolve the “Taiwan issue” in a peaceful manner.
Given Beijing’s aggressive military posturing in recent years – including regular airspace incursions, live-fire drills, and explicit refusals to renounce the use of force to achieve “reunification” – China has effectively voided the conditions upon which U.S. FMS restraints were premised. Washington should no longer feel obligated to feel bound by the Arms Sales Communique, and instead, it should act in accordance with the TRA’s enduring mandate to continue helping Taiwan maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.
The United States already possesses a limited military presence in Taiwan. A 2024 Congressional Research Service report clearly indicated the assignment of 41 U.S. military personnel for duty in Taiwan as of December 2023. While it is possible those service members are serving in attaché positions at the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) or studying at Taiwanese universities, the report also stated that “it is an ‘open secret’ that small numbers of U.S. military personnel conduct work in an advisory capacity on the island.”
Other reports indicate that SEAL Team 6, the 1st Special Forces Group, and other special operations units have consistently engaged in training the Taiwanese military. The U.S. military has denied reports of permanent stationing of U.S. troops on Kinmen, but has not formally addressed the temporary duty (TDY) assignments of service members on Taiwan. It is worth noting that there may already be such a training force present on Taiwan via TDY assignments. On May 15, 2025, retired Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery testified before the U.S. House Select Committee on China that there are currently 500 U.S. troops in Taiwan for training purposes, and advocated for increasing that troop count to 1,000.
This presents an opportunity for the United States to employ tactical clarity, acknowledging not only the presence of U.S. contractors and service members on Taiwan, but also emphasizing the training nature of those TDY personnel justified by the TRA. Training Taiwanese service members on defense-oriented weapon systems cannot happen in broad daylight at the local convention center; it must happen in the vicinity of a military facility or training area.
Such a force disposition would prompt China to reevaluate its predetermined strike targets in an invasion scenario. Given the importance of the element of surprise in warfare, it would be reasonable to infer that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will attack Taiwan unannounced, most likely targeting military bases within the first phase of an invasion scenario. If the United States does not acknowledge the presence of military personnel in Taiwan, China will more easily be able to justify any U.S. casualties as collateral damage. However, by acknowledging that U.S. service members are present at Taiwanese defense bases, it deters the PLA from striking specific military targets. If the PLA willfully attacks locations where U.S. troops are positioned, it will likely spark public outrage within American society and force a proportional response from defense leaders, as they are subjected to audience costs.
Some scholars advocate for the concept of strategic clarity to replace strategic ambiguity. This position makes the assumption that, because China’s economic and military capabilities are growing rapidly each year, the probability that the PLA will initiate a blockade, joint firepower strike, or joint amphibious landing campaign will also increase as time passes. As a result, the logic is that only a definitive statement of U.S. intentions will be able to deter China from escalation. In pursuing strategic clarity, the risk of escalation is swapped from the U.S. to China. If the U.S. were to continue espousing strategic ambiguity, Washington would assume risk by coming to Taiwan’s defense after the initiation of hostilities. On the other hand, with strategic clarity, Beijing must recognize that attacking Taiwan will also result in attacking U.S. forces, forcing China to consider this scenario before commencing aggression.
However, strategic ambiguity’s goal is not merely to deter China from invading Taiwan. The policy rather serves as a form of dual deterrence that also wards off radical moves from Taiwanese leaders. Under strategic clarity, where U.S. commitment is guaranteed, pro-independence leaders on Taiwan would be more incentivized to declare de jure independence and provoke a Chinese invasion, decreasing the likelihood of a peaceful unification – a core U.S. interest within its original One China policy and current Indo-Pacific Strategy.
Ultimately, the United States should adopt an approach that enhances strategic ambiguity by pairing it with tactical clarity. Acknowledging the presence of U.S. personnel conducting training under the key documents that shaped the One China policy enables deterrence by increasing the risks associated with China’s aggression. This realignment between policy and reality reinforces U.S. credibility, preserves strategic flexibility, and upholds the broader objective of sustaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own, and do not reflect the official position of the United States Military Academy, Department of the Army, or Department of Defense.