India’s relationship with the United States is under strain.
On June 18, Trump hosted Pakistani Army Chief Gen Asim Munir for a lunch meeting at the White House. While his courting of Munir was probably aimed at enlisting Pakistan’s support for U.S. military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities and sealing deals on cryptocurrency and trade in critical minerals, the meeting is likely to have involved discussions and decisions that will impact India.
“There would have been a quid pro quo,” an Indian government official told The Diplomat on condition of anonymity. “Trump would have agreed to provide Pakistan with new military aid and to boost its military capabilities through the sale of advanced fighter aircraft, among other things. Given Trump’s newfound interest in mediation and peace-making, he could have promised Munir that he would push India to accept a settlement of the Kashmir conflict.”
Trump’s meeting with Munir came days after General Michael Kurilla, commander of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), described Pakistan as a “phenomenal partner” of the U.S. in countering terrorism and praised its role in the “arrest and extradition” of Islamic State Khorasan terrorists.
Kurilla’s high praise of Pakistan’s contribution as a counter-terrorism partner marks an important shift in the Trump administration’s perception of Pakistan.
In 2017, Trump had slammed Pakistan for providing “safe havens for terrorist organizations, the Taliban, and other groups that pose a threat to the region and beyond.” Although the U.S. had given Pakistan billions of dollars in aid, “they are housing the very terrorists that we are fighting,” he said.
The Trump administration’s newfound appreciation of Pakistan’s value in countering terrorism comes at a time when India has stepped up highlighting Islamabad’s role in supporting anti-India terrorism. The U.S. support to India on this matter has disappointed Delhi in recent months.
Although the U.S. expressed solidarity with India after the terrorist attack at Pahalgam on April 22, it did not support India’s right to self-defense once India’s launched military strikes on Pakistan, adopting instead a cautious, even neutral position, calling for a quick end to the military exchanges. Despite India’s opposition to third parties intervening in India-Pakistan conflicts, the U.S. reportedly brokered the May 10 ceasefire. Not only did the ceasefire come at a time when the war was going against Pakistan, but also, Trump repeatedly boasted about having mediated the agreement and arm-twisting the two sides with trade deals to end the war. This did not go down well in India.
Trump hyphenated or equated India with Pakistan, which Delhi loathes. Besides, he put the Narendra Modi government in an embarrassing spot as India has traditionally opposed third-party mediation in its conflicts with Pakistan. In effect, the U.S. president “undermined carefully developed political understandings on key issues, especially on Kashmir and Pakistan,” C. Raja Mohan, distinguished fellow at the Council for Strategic and Defence Research, wrote in the Indian Express.
Among the “understandings” that Trump disregarded with his “loose cannon comments was India’s long-standing opposition to third parties playing a role in settling India-Pakistan conflicts,” the government official said.
Washington’s praise of Pakistan’s counterterrorism efforts was particularly offensive to New Delhi as it came less than two months after the Pahalgam attack. Trump’s courting of the Pakistani military, which India sees as the patrons of the anti-India terrorist groups, was particularly distasteful.
“Public opinion in India now tends to see the U.S. as an unreliable partner,” Ajay Bisaria, a former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, told DW.
It wasn’t supposed to be this way.
Trump’s re-election as president was welcomed in India. Trump 2.0 was expected to work in India’s favor. After all, despite bilateral differences on the Russia-Ukraine war and hiccups on immigration and trade issues, India-U.S. bilateral relations warmed during Trump’s first term, benefiting from not only the personal rapport between Trump and Modi but also the strong bipartisan consensus that existed in the U.S. on the importance of India-U.S. cooperation. With Trump back in the White House, India-U.S. relations were expected to deepen, especially since the new Trump team had several officials of Indian origin or said to be closer to India on India-Pakistan issues.
However, things have not gone according to that script.
Since February, thousands of Indian nationals have been deported back to India for illegally entering the U.S. They were sent back in chains on a 40-hour flight home. Indian foreign ministry officials reportedly objected to their shackling and raised the issue with their American counterparts. But that did not alter the U.S. mistreatment and humiliation of Indian nationals.
Then, with regard to the imposition of “reciprocal tariffs” on U.S. trade partners, Trump showed India no leniency. While the 26 percent tariff imposed on India is lower than that on several Asian countries, the U.S. has sealed a deal with China. With little over a week to go for the July 9 deadline, a trade deal with India remains elusive.
Should India be worried about the downturn in its relations with the U.S.? Not overly.
The U.S. has warmed up to Pakistan and its generals in the past as well, and India has weathered previous crises that emerged from fraying ties with Washington.
Besides, the India-U.S. partnership today enjoys bipartisan consensus in the U.S., and draws its resilience and strength from the firm institutional foundation, shared strategic vision, converging interests and structural logic that defines the partnership. U.S. national security documents not only see India as a “major defense partner” but also as a “like-minded partner and leader in South Asia and the Indian Ocean, active in and connected to Southeast Asia,” and a “driving force of the Quad and a net security provider in the region.”
The U.S. is no doubt important for India, but so is India to the U.S.
In its response to the Trump-Munir meeting, India said last week that it is “confident” that India’s relations with the U.S. would continue to be the “most consequential partnership of the 21st century.” “Our partnership with the United States is wide ranging, grounded in shared democratic values and growing strategic convergence,” MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal said.
This confidence stems from the broad and deep foundation on which the India-U.S. partnership is based.
And yet India must not underestimate Trump’s capacity to damage bilateral relations in pursuit of his interests. Without responding shrilly to every remark that he makes, India should be proactive in protecting the partnership.
While the White House plays a central role in foreign policy making, there are other actors, including the U.S. Congress, business corporations, civil society and the Indian diaspora, whose support India must draw upon.
The powerful Indian diaspora is known to have played a key role in swinging U.S. foreign policy decisions in India’s favor in the past, as with the India-U.S. civilian nuclear deal. Unfortunately, it has been reduced to playing cheerleaders at Modi-Trump public events in recent years. Instead, India should draw on the diaspora’s connections to articulate not the narrow vision of any party or person, but the long-term interests of the country.