Donald Trump’s return to the White House coincides with a deeply unsettled international order defined by escalating tensions with China, an unresolved war in Ukraine, and persistent instability in the Middle East. His “America First” foreign policy approach – characterized by transactional diplomacy, skepticism toward traditional alliances, and a preference for bilateralism – has elicited both hope and apprehension across regions vying for U.S. attention.
Amid these global uncertainties, a pressing question arises for Central Asia: Will the region remain on Washington’s strategic radar or once again slip into the periphery of U.S. foreign policy? While no one expects Central Asia to top the new administration’s foreign policy agenda, there is still cautious optimism across the region about the potential to deepen ties with Washington as part of the regional states’ multivector foreign policy to gain greater strategic autonomy.
A Mixed Legacy
During Trump’s first term, Central Asia-U.S. relations experienced a modest but meaningful revival. The 2019-2025 U.S. Strategy for Central Asia underscored a renewed commitment to the region. High-level visits by the leaders of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan to Washington and reciprocal delegations from the Departments of State and Commerce signaled a reinvigoration of bilateral ties.
Key initiatives included USAID-led economic development programs, support for Uzbekistan’s World Trade Organization (WTO) accession, and trade normalization through the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Perhaps most significantly, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) signed a $1 billion memorandum of understanding with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 2021, underscoring the United States’ intent to enhance regional trade and investment.
In contrast, the Biden administration, while hosting the inaugural C5+1 Presidential Summit in 2023, did not maintain the same level of sustained attention. Its foreign policy largely prioritized reinvigorating democratic alliances, preserving NATO cohesion, and managing crises in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific. As a result, Central Asia, once again, was deprioritized, despite regional enthusiasm for deeper ties with Washington.
Trump 2.0: Signs of Drift?
As Trump embarks on his second term, the early signs are mixed. While discussions in U.S. Congress and among foreign policy experts indicate renewed interest in the region, actionable policy has lagged. During now-Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s confirmation hearings in January, Senator Steve Daines emphasized the strategic importance of Central Asia post-Afghanistan and called for strengthening the C5+1 format and eliminating Cold War-era barriers like the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. Rubio concurred, calling the amendment an “absurd relic of the past.”
Some foreign policy experts have echoed these sentiments, with some proposing ambitious steps such as a U.S. presidential visit to Central Asia and a diplomatic gesture that could signal a serious commitment.
Yet practical engagement remains tepid. Central Asia has featured minimally in early foreign policy briefings. Key appointments – including the assistant secretary of state for South and Central Asia, NSC directors for the region, and related Pentagon roles – have been delayed, leaving a vacuum in leadership.
On Capitol Hill, congressional committees overseeing Central Asian affairs are predominantly staffed by individuals specializing in South Asia or Middle Eastern affairs. For instance, the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee responsible for Central Asia is led by Senator Dave McCormick, whose expertise does not closely align with the region. The subcommittee’s thematic focus appears likely to remain skewed toward counterterrorism and Israel. A similar pattern is evident in the House of Representatives, where the subcommittee on South and Central Asia is headed by Rep. Bill Huizenga and Rep. Sydney Kamlager-Dove, figures more closely aligned with India-focused priorities.
Trump’s announcement in April of sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” – a 10 percent universal tariff and a 27 percent rate on imports from Kazakhstan (the latter paused for 90 days, until July) – further perplexed and raised concerns that early Trump-era gains may not translate into a deeper, long-term partnership during his second term.
Turning Ambiguity Into Opportunity
Paradoxically, this strategic ambiguity offers a rare opportunity. Rather than waiting for Washington to act, Central Asian governments should seize the initiative. By articulating a clear and pragmatic vision for bilateral and regional cooperation, they can potentially shape the U.S. agenda on their own terms.
A recent development exemplifies this potential. In April 2025, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, under Secretary Kristi Noem, executed a major deportation operation in partnership with the Uzbek government. Over 100 undocumented migrants from Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan were repatriated in a mission fully financed and logistically supported by Tashkent. In a statement, Noem commended Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev for his decisive leadership, describing the initiative as a “model for bilateral cooperation” on law enforcement and border security.
While controversial, the operation reflected a new kind of alignment – one rooted in Trump’s preference for cost-sharing and practical outcomes. Uzbekistan’s willingness to shoulder responsibility in a politically sensitive domain offered a blueprint for transactional diplomacy that aligns with core U.S. domestic priorities.
Strategic Imperatives for Engagement
Beyond law enforcement, Central Asia holds considerable strategic value to the United States, both as a geographical nexus in Eurasia and as a region of economic and security relevance to the U.S. national security.
First, the region’s vast reserves of critical minerals and rare earth elements make it indispensable to U.S. defense, manufacturing, and technological competitiveness. A 2018 U.S. Geological Survey identified 384 sites containing rare earth elements and rare metals across the region – 160 in Kazakhstan, 87 in Uzbekistan, 75 in Kyrgyzstan, 60 in Tajikistan, and two in Turkmenistan – ranging from initial mineral occurrences to early-stage deposits.
Uzbekistan alone possesses over 30 strategic metals, including lithium (174,000 tons), graphite (15.2 million tons), tantalum and niobium (10,000 tons), and titanium, iron, and zirconium (62 million tons). Uzbekistan also has substantial reserves of nickel, cobalt, magnesium (19.7 million tons), vanadium, rare earth elements (12.3 million tons), and zinc (1.6 million tons). Ernst & Young analyses suggest that only 40 percent of Uzbekistan’s territory has undergone geological exploration, highlighting substantial potential for expanding its mineral resource base. Over the next three years (until 2029), Uzbekistan plans 76 projects covering 28 rare minerals, totaling $2.6 billion, along with increased funding for geological research and exploration.
Second, Central Asia could play a frontline role in tracking and managing terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan, which still remains a major source of regional and international instability. Key concerns include the presence of terrorist groups such as the Islamic State in Khorasan Province, al-Qaida, Jamoat Ansarullah, Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, and the Islamic Jihad Union. The ripple effects of instability – terrorism, radicalization, and refugee flows – directly impact not only Central Asia but also Western countries, including the United States.
Following the chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, most Western nations distanced themselves from the Taliban government, while Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries adopted pragmatic engagement, aiming to balance critical security considerations with potential economic opportunities. Their geographic proximity and intelligence capabilities make Central Asia an indispensable partner for counterterrorism cooperation – yet this potential remains underleveraged.
In all, Trump’s return to office has rekindled both uncertainty and opportunity for Central Asia-U.S. relations. His first term demonstrated the potential for engagement through economic and diplomatic channels. His second term, thus far, has been characterized by mixed signals: high-profile congressional endorsements entwined with trade disruptions and bureaucratic delays.
Central Asian countries, however, need not await a fully fleshed-out U.S. strategy. By proactively defining a clear agenda – centered on critical minerals, counterterrorism, and refugee reintegration – they can convert strategic ambiguity into opportunity. Ultimately, whether Trump 2.0 becomes a turning point or a missed chance will not depend only on the White House’s rhetoric but also on Central Asia’s willingness to lead, adapt, and forge partnerships on its own terms in an increasingly complex and multipolar world.