It’s springtime in India-Taliban relations.
On May 16, 160 Afghan trucks carrying dry fruits crossed over into India from Pakistan, across the checkpoint in Attari. Although the border crossing is closed for Indo-Pak trade and movement of people since the brief conflict between the two nations in May 2025, it seems Indo-Afghan land trade is now open, as long as Pakistan does not play spoiler and create hurdles.
In the last week of April 2025, India resumed granting visas to Afghan citizens across multiple categories, four years after suspending all visa services following the Taliban’s August 2021 takeover of Kabul. The “New AFGHAN Visa” module on the government’s newly updated visa portal lists categories including student, business, medical, medical attendant, entry, and U.N. diplomat visas. The measure was silently rolled out without any formal official notification, which indicates a subtle shift in policy.
In March, India’s permanent representative to the U.N., Ambassador Parvathaneni Harish, told the U.N. Security Council that New Delhi has discussed with the Taliban regime various issues pertaining to bilateral relations. He stressed that “special” people-to-people ties are the “foundation” of Delhi’s present-day engagement with the country. In January 2025, Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met with Acting Foreign Minister of Afghanistan Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai.
In an unprecedented move, on May 15, India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar held a telephone conversation with Muttaqi, thanking him for condemning the April 22 terror attack in Kashmir, which claimed the lives of 26 people. The attack was the rationale cited by India for launching Operation Sindoor to strike deep inside Pakistan’s territory, at the alleged terrorist infrastructure. In this first-ever discussion with the Islamic emirate since their 2021 comeback, Jaishankar reiterated India’s continued support for Afghanistan’s development needs. Muttaqi, in return, asked Jaishankar to help in securing more Indian visas for Afghan patients and visitors. He also urged the government of India to help in freeing Afghan prisoners in Indian jails. As mentioned previously, at least one of these two requests has been fulfilled by New Delhi.
The Taliban – many of whose members, including Muttaqi, are still on a U.N. list of sanctioned individuals under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1988 – not only condemned the April 22 attack, but hosted Indian diplomat Anand Prakash in Kabul on April 27, in the backdrop of growing India-Pakistan hostilities. A day after Jaishankar’s phone call, Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) officials in New Delhi told the media that India will undertake “bold moves” on Afghanistan and “do whatever is necessary” to establish stronger relations with the Taliban-ruled state, which includes extending humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees who have been forcefully repatriated by Pakistan and Iran. Within days, the media flashed photographs of Afghan women and children sitting inside the premises of the Indian embassy in Kabul with a bag of groceries and other items in front of each. The bags prominently displayed the Indian flag.
Curiously, providing humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people by India has been a tool for both opposing the Taliban in the past and engaging the Taliban now. Although critical, the net volume of India’s assistance to Afghanistan isn’t spectacularly high. But with that modest assistance, India has been able to maintain its benign presence in Kabul and keep options for expanding its footprint open.
Since August 2021, India has delivered 27 tons of relief material, 50,000 tons of wheat, 40,000 liters of pesticides, and more than 300 tons of medicines and medical equipment to the country. Additionally, partnering with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Afghanistan, India, since 2022, supplied 11,000 units of hygiene kits, baby food, clothing, medical aid and more than 30 tons of social support items. However, the development and infrastructure projects India initiated during the years of the Republic are yet to re-start. That has been a key demand of the Taliban.
In my discussions with two senior Taliban officials – Acting Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed Naeem Wardak and Representative of the Governor of Balkh, Said Zohirshoh Aga – in Termez, Uzbekistan, while participating in the inaugural Termez Dialogue in May, it was evident that the Taliban want India to do more. Wardak emphasized the need for greater cooperation with India. Aga highlighted the need for visas for accessing medical facilities in India as well as for pursuing education. He suggested that India can send medical assistance and doctors to the newly established hospital in the Uzbek-Afghan Free Zone-AIRITOM on the border. The Afghan traders in the free zone told me that they would like to do more business and trade with India.
There is a lot that India can do should it decide to scale up. This would, of course, necessitate giving up on gradualism in order to help Afghans in the short and medium term. Beyond its “technical mission” that runs from its embassy in Kabul, it can restart small development (SDP) and infrastructure projects. The SDPs in agriculture, alternate livelihood, education, health and establishing micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) would help rebuild the economic and social capital. There can be greater interaction and investment by the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and the Afghan Chamber of Commerce, which will be a force multiplier for trade and transit. On the other hand, investment in hard infrastructure will help revive Afghanistan as a land bridge for transit and connectivity and provide revenue and employment opportunities for the Afghans.
But the road to Kabul will not be without hurdles. While the Taliban regime may be the unexpected beneficiaries of India and Pakistan’s recent conflict, there are indications that it isn’t severing its ties with its eastern neighbor either. It cannot afford to do so for geographical reasons, as landlocked Afghanistan remains dependent on Pakistan for access to the sea. Despite the recent upheavals, Islamabad is trying to upgrade its ties with Kabul, with help from China. It may be on the verge of appointing an ambassador to Kabul and possibly, receiving one from the Taliban.
Nevertheless, Afghanistan is a large country, and the Taliban are eager to engage with all three regional neighbors – India, Pakistan, and China. The Taliban are quickly learning the ropes of diplomacy and foreign policymaking through the lens of strategic competition. From New Delhi’s perspective, Afghanistan is critical for its Central Asia policy, which never took off during the Republic owing to the incessant, turbulent insurgency. Now there are attempts to activate it with Taliban help. During the January 2025 meeting between India’s foreign secretary and Muttaqi, it was agreed by both sides to promote the use of Chabahar port for supporting trade and commercial activities. However, things have changed drastically with the start of the Iran-Israel war, whose impact is bound to affect the port’s operations, for months.
By warming its ties with the Taliban, India has thrown its dice into a geopolitical hotspot. Its links with the erstwhile officials of the Republic have been almost severed, and demands for inclusive government in Kabul have been relegated to the background. As realpolitik takes over, history would mean little to New Delhi. However, will these strategic moves deliver the intended results will be a litmus test for Indian diplomacy.