Since Israel began its aerial strikes on Iranian territory, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and top leaders have repeatedly voiced strong condemnation of Israel’s actions, accusing Tel Aviv of escalating tensions in the Middle East. Following the dramatic U.S. military operation on June 21 – codenamed “Operation Midnight Hammer” – that targeted three Iranian nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight, China’s rhetoric intensified. In a statement, China’s Foreign Ministry “strongly condemn[ed] the U.S. attacks on Iran,” adding, “The actions of the U.S. seriously violate the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law, and have exacerbated tensions in the Middle East.”
China portrays itself as a responsible global power calling for de-escalation, protection of state sovereignty, and adherence to international law and United Nations principles. However, this façade of moral uprightness masks China’s deep and layered strategic calculations. While China champions peace and stability in its official statements, its short-term and long-term interests in the region tell a more complex story – one of calculated ambivalence and strategic flexibility.
In the short term, China unequivocally prefers stability in the Middle East. Any escalation between the United States, Israel, and Iran threatens to destabilize a region critical to Beijing’s economic and energy strategies. The most immediate risk lies in China’s massive dependence on Middle Eastern energy – including from Iran. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, accounting for approximately 80-90 percent of Iran’s total oil exports.
In March 2025, China imported a record 8.07 million metric tons of crude oil from Iran, equivalent to 1.91 million barrels per day. This volume marked a historic peak, revealing the depth of their energy ties. Despite U.S. sanctions, China has maintained and even expanded its crude imports from both Russia and Iran by employing sanction-evasion tactics such as ship-to-ship transfers, false labeling, and using third countries like Malaysia for transshipment.
On average, China imports about 11.1 million barrels of oil per day. A military escalation resulting in a closure or severe disruption of the Strait of Hormuz – and Iran is moving toward just such a closure – would be a catastrophic blow to China’s energy security. Not only is Iranian oil at stake, but shipments from Saudi Arabia – another major Chinese oil supplier – also pass through this strategic chokepoint. With a national petroleum reserve estimated to cover roughly 90 days of imports, any prolonged disruption would leave China scrambling for alternatives.
In addition to energy, China’s broader Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the Middle East is highly vulnerable to regional conflict. China has invested heavily in infrastructure, telecommunications, and logistics in countries like Iran, Iraq, Egypt, and the UAE. For example, the China-Iran 25-Year Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2021, includes plans for massive investments in energy, banking, transportation, and cybersecurity. These initiatives would suffer if the region descended into war. Instability would raise insurance costs, disrupt supply chains, and increase security risks for Chinese personnel and assets. During a time when China’s export-driven economy is already facing headwinds from the ongoing China-U.S. trade war and sluggish domestic demand, further economic disruptions are the last thing Beijing wants.
Moreover, China has ideological and regime-security reasons to oppose a rapid collapse of the Iranian government. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has explicitly called for regime change in Iran, and U.S. President Donald Trump also floated the idea on Sunday on his social media. Regime change is a prospect that deeply worries the Chinese leadership. A pro-Western, post-theocratic Iran would not only complicate China’s strategic presence in the region but also become a cautionary tale for authoritarian regimes everywhere. The Chinese Communist Party fears a scenario where domestic dissent, emboldened by international support and inspired by Iran’s upheaval, could one day threaten its grip on power – especially in the context of a potential military conflict over Taiwan.
Despite all these reasons for caution, a longer-term and less visible calculation may push China toward a more ambivalent stance should the conflict escalate. In the grand chessboard of geopolitics, particularly in the context of escalating Sino-American rivalry, prolonged U.S. military entanglement in the Middle East is not entirely unwelcome in Beijing.
The historical precedent is instructive. After the Cold War, the United States was poised to leverage its unchallenged global dominance to shape the post-Soviet order. However, the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent war on terror and military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq consumed Washington’s attention and resources for two decades. During that time, China experienced its fastest economic growth and dramatic rise in global influence – largely unopposed. If the United States and Israel were to become bogged down in a new Middle Eastern conflict, it could offer China a similar window of strategic opportunity.
The Russia-Ukraine war has already diverted U.S. attention and resources. Over three years into that conflict, the United States is still deeply involved in military aid and diplomatic maneuvering. If Washington is drawn into another draining military engagement in the Middle East, its bandwidth to counter Beijing in the Indo-Pacific would be stretched even thinner. As a result, China could benefit from a reprieve in its great-power rivalry with the United States, buying time to consolidate its influence in Asia, expand its military capabilities, and fortify domestic political control.
Furthermore, China has moved steadily closer to forming a de facto geopolitical bloc with authoritarian regimes like Russia and Iran. In March 2025, Chinese state media reported that the People’s Liberation Army Navy participated in joint military exercises in Iran’s southern waters alongside Russian and Iranian forces. These drills are only the latest in a series of cooperative measures. China supported Iran’s accession to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS group, lending diplomatic legitimacy to a regime increasingly isolated by the West.
In the likely event that the U.S. and Israel fail to achieve a clean regime change in Iran, residual Iranian military forces or allied militias could transform into decentralized insurgent or terrorist groups, inflicting damage on Western interests in the region. American facilities, personnel, and even infrastructure like data centers in the Persian Gulf could become prime targets. This risk is not theoretical. U.S.-backed regimes in Iraq and Afghanistan proved to be politically unstable, economically dependent, and militarily ineffective, dragging the United States into prolonged nation-building efforts with dubious outcomes. A similar situation in post-conflict Iran would repeat this burden.
Meanwhile, as tensions escalate, China is likely to pivot from advocating restraint to providing tacit or indirect support to Iran. Its playbook from the Russia-Ukraine war offers clues. Beijing has avoided direct military support for Moscow but has provided diplomatic cover in international forums, expanded trade to soften the blow of Western sanctions, and exported dual-use technologies and critical components useful to Russia’s defense industry. A similar posture could emerge in the Middle East. China could increase economic engagement with Iran, provide logistical and technological assistance for rebuilding its military-industrial capacity, and shield Tehran diplomatically at the United Nations and other multilateral bodies.
Nonetheless, one must not overestimate China’s appetite for risk. Its preference remains peace – not out of benevolence but out of necessity. Short-term disruptions to its oil supplies, investment projects, and export routes pose clear and immediate threats while long-term gains are filled with uncertainty. Its calls for de-escalation and negotiation are therefore genuine, but this sincerity is not immutable. Should war become inevitable or prolonged, China will not passively endure its consequences. Instead, it will recalibrate swiftly, shifting from damage control to opportunity exploitation.
In conclusion, China’s public condemnation of Israel and calls for peace are deeply rooted in its immediate interests: energy security, economic stability, and regional influence. But just beneath the surface lies a shrewd calculus of long-term strategic advantage. The same conflict that threatens China’s economic lifelines could, if it entangles the United States deeply enough, offer Beijing a geostrategic windfall.
China does not want an escalated war in the Middle East. But if it does come, Beijing is poised to adapt, exploit, and quietly benefit from the chaos. Such is the essence of China’s dual-track diplomacy – moral high ground on the outside, realpolitik strategy within.