President Donald Trump made the United States a direct party to the Iran-Israel conflict through a series of strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21. That decision has forced the Asia policy community on both sides of the Pacific to ask whether the Trump administration is truly committed to an “Asia First” approach to U.S. national security strategy. The U.S. is deepening its engagement in the over 16-month-long Middle East conflict even as Trump is straining its network of allies and partners over trade and pressuring its Indo-Pacific allies on defense spending. This backsliding on prioritizing the Indo-Pacific theater is compounded by cuts to foreign assistance offices, U.S. information and media programs, and key China staff at the National Security Council.
U.S. policy in the Middle East has impacted Washington’s alliance management in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Japan’s Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru’s decision to skip the NATO Summit can be read as linked to the escalation in Iran. This, along with reports that Tokyo is rescheduling July 2+2 talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth over the Trump administration’s mixed messaging on Japan’s defense spending, suggests that Trump’s call sheet should include leaders well beyond the Middle East and Europe.
What happens in the Middle East has historically yielded global ripple effects, from oil shocks and mass migration to spikes in terrorist attacks. U.S. allies Japan, Australia, and South Korea and burgeoning partner India – to say nothing about China – will be directly impacted by any strain on oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) exports caused by a prolonged conflict. More broadly, it is well recognized by both sides of the political aisle – albeit ignored by policymakers in successive U.S. administrations – that U.S. overextension in the Middle East comes at the expense of focusing on the Indo-Pacific and China, by siphoning away finite military and political resources.
What is less discussed is how U.S. resolve and credibility, often on display in the Middle East as the predominant theater of U.S. military action – be it in Iran, Gaza, Syria, or Libya – impacts decision-making, defense planning, and political alignment among U.S. allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific. Years ago, colleagues in Japan shared with me how they had interpreted then-President Barack Obama’s 2013 “red-line” moment in Syria, where the U.S. did not respond militarily to the former Bashar al-Assad regime’s chemical weapons massacre. The decision was justified as the U.S. not wanting to repeat the mistakes of Iraq, but this perceived weakness, which ultimately gave Russia a stronger strategic foothold in the Middle East, gave foreign policy thinkers and decision-makers pause in East Asia.
During the Biden administration, when I worked as a China adviser at the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), we heard from colleagues in Muslim-majority Southeast Asian countries that Israel’s U.S.-backed campaign in Gaza made it difficult to robustly champion U.S. diplomatic and development initiatives in their countries and region.
U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific should observe that the Trump administration’s strategic approach to foreign policy is a moving target. Future bilateral and multilateral forums present opportunities to remind Trump and his Cabinet of the priority theater. The first 100 days of the second Trump administration appeared to yield a distinct “Commerce Not Chaos” approach in regions like the Middle East – welcomed by Arab Gulf allies who have been bidding for Trump’s favor. At the time, it appeared that the U.S. would cut its losses in campaigns like the Red Sea, deprioritize human rights international development assistance, and focus on shifting resources to priority theaters.
Likewise, the new administration’s early diplomacy on Ukraine, which adopted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s framing of the conflict and centered on a Ukrainian critical minerals deal, suggested that Trump would be ruthlessly committed to ending conflicts and maximizing the United States’ returns. But Russia’s onslaught in Ukraine and Israel’s devastating operations in Gaza have continued, and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has appeared to pull Trump into the Israel-Iran war. Trump’s “peace through strength” moniker appears to be less of a doctrine and more of a cover for the lack of disciplined decision-making in the Oval Office.
Another shoe may drop in the Middle East, if Iran’s retaliation to the June 21 U.S. operation draws in further U.S. military engagement. An attempt to block the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most critical energy chokepoint, might be such a scenario. As of this writing, Trump’s announcement of a ceasefire between Israel and Iran seems to have been premature, with both countries continuing to carry out attacks on each other.
As I wrote prior to the U.S. operation this weekend, China would love to see the U.S. further entangled in the region. But for the United States, the hope that Trump’s “peace through strength” approach to Iran yields a diplomatic nuclear agreement that is more acceptable to the U.S. and the region, which have been menaced by Iran’s foreign policy for decades. A geopolitically humbled Iran and a reset in the Middle East’s security environment may ultimately pave the way for a right-sized U.S. presence in the region and long-awaited “Asia pivot.” But if history is any guide, a scenario where the U.S. remains stuck in a long-running conflict in the Middle East seems more likely.