In a surprise move on July 31, 2023, during an official visit to China, then-Prime Minister of Georgia Irakli Garibashvili signed a strategic partnership agreement with Beijing. The ruling Georgian Dream party hailed the deal as a landmark foreign policy achievement, while many analysts warned of its asymmetrical nature and the potential risks it posed to Georgia’s long-standing pro-Western trajectory.
Nearly two years later, a critical question arises: What has Georgia actually gained from this strategic partnership?
China has established more than 80 strategic partnerships around the world, which it categorizes into various tiers depending on the depth of cooperation and political trust. These range from basic cooperation agreements to “all-weather” or “comprehensive strategic partnerships.” Generally, China starts with a low-level agreement and upgrades it if political alignment, economic promise, or strategic interests deepen over time.
Examples abound. China signed a basic strategic agreement with Kazakhstan in 2005, which evolved into a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2011 and was upgraded again in 2019. Similarly, Serbia moved from a strategic partnership in 2009 to a comprehensive one in 2016, accompanied by a surge in infrastructure and technology investments.
The agreement between China and Georgia is a low-level general strategic partnership and it outlines cooperation in four dimensions: political, economic, cultural, and international affairs.
Politically, both countries affirm respect for each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. They commit to making bilateral ties a foreign policy priority and pledge to deepen high-level consultations and party-to-party cooperation. Georgia welcomes China’s modernization model and expresses readiness to exchange governance experiences.
Economically, the agreement encourages trade and investment and reaffirms collaboration under China’s Belt and Road Initiative, particularly in infrastructure, digital technology, and environmental projects. The two sides also discuss expanding cooperation under the Free Trade Agreement and Georgia’s participation in trade expos and fairs in China.
Culturally, the agreement promises enhanced academic exchanges, joint programs, language promotion, and the establishment of cultural centers.
In international relations, the two countries agree to coordinate more closely in regional and global affairs, promote U.N.-centered multilateralism, and support each other’s core global initiatives. Georgia also explicitly endorsed China’s Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives.
Looking at other countries, strategic partnerships with China have often been followed by notable increases in trade, infrastructure projects, or foreign direct investment. Hungary saw over 7 billion euros in Chinese investments by 2023 under its upgraded strategic partnership. China pledged $400 billion in investment over 25 years in Iran under their strategic cooperation agreement. Morocco secured over 13 billion dirhams in battery manufacturing projects from Chinese firms. Pakistan saw commitments of up to $20 billion through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.
By contrast, Georgia has seen minimal tangible returns.
In 2023, Chinese foreign direct investment in Georgia totaled just $98 million; by 2024, that figure fell to only $29 million. China did not make it into Georgia’s top 10 sources of FDI. Meanwhile, Georgia’s exports to China have halved compared to previous years.
On the diplomatic front, China has not supported Georgia in key votes at the United Nations. In both 2024 and 2025, Beijing abstained from voting on Georgia’s resolution supporting the return of internally displaced persons to Russia-occupied territories.
One area of visible growth is in tourism. Georgia and China introduced visa-free travel for Georgians in May 2024, following earlier visa relaxations for Chinese nationals. Following this visa waiver, the number of Chinese tourists visiting Georgia rose sharply: over 48,000 in 2023 (a 555 percent increase year-on-year), and nearly 89,000 in 2024 (an 83 percent increase). However, in relative terms, this remains a small fraction of Georgia’s 5.1 million tourist visits in 2024.
It is increasingly clear that Georgia’s motivation for signing the strategic partnership agreement with China was not rooted in a genuine strategy to diversify investment sources or attract new flows of tourism. Instead, for the Georgian Dream government, the agreement primarily serves as a symbolic move aimed at domestic audiences. The government can point to the strategic partnership with China as a diplomatic achievement amid souring relations with the West.
Equally important is the role such a partnership plays in gaining international legitimacy from a global power unconcerned with democratic reforms. China was one of only six countries whose leaders officially congratulated the ruling party’s handpicked president, Mikheil Kavelashvili, following a contested electoral process. That symbolic gesture signaled to the Georgian Dream leadership that China could act as a counterweight to Western criticism and provide a form of validation for its political direction.
Moreover, unlike the EU or Western institutions, which often tie financial aid or concessional loans to democratic benchmarks and governance reforms, China presents itself as an alternative source of funding – albeit one known for its preference for high-interest loans rather than grants. Even before the strategic partnership was formalized, there were signs of this pivot: Georgia’s government rejected low-interest loans from the European Union and instead opted for significantly larger financing packages from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), where China holds dominant influence.
The Georgian government may also hope to attract China’s deeper interest through this agreement and capitalize on Georgia’s geostrategic location as part of the Belt and Road Initiative’s Middle Corridor. However, so far, there is no concrete sign of Chinese strategic engagement in infrastructure or logistics in Georgia beyond general statements of intent.
One notable exception could be the recent awarding of the Anaklia deep-sea port development rights to a Chinese company. The Anaklia Port project has long been a focal point of geopolitical interest, having previously attracted U.S. involvement, yet its construction has stalled for years. Since the strategic partnership was signed, China has secured these development rights, but no actual investment has followed, nor has construction begun. The project’s future remains ambiguous, raising further questions about whether this symbolic gain for Beijing will materialize into meaningful economic activity for Georgia.
For China, the agreement allows Beijing to extend its diplomatic footprint in the South Caucasus at minimal cost, while for the Georgian government, it serves as a convenient geopolitical message: one that aligns with domestic political narratives and offers symbolic recognition at a time when its standing with democratic partners is under increasing strain.
Whether this partnership will bring more tangible benefits for Georgia in the future remains uncertain. As it stands, it is more of a political gesture than a transformative alliance.