Lee Jae-myung won the South Korean presidential election on June 3, with almost 50 percent of the popular vote. Compared to his previous presidential run in 2022, Lee’s campaign this year focused almost exclusively on domestic issues. However, he campaigned on a pragmatic approach to domestic and international issues and is likely to take a foreign policy stance that falls somewhere between the more liberal positions of the previous Democratic Party president Moon Jae-in and Lee’s conservative predecessor from the People Power Party (PPP), Yoon Suk-yeol, whose impeachment over the declaration of martial law triggered the June 3 snap election.
China, Russia, and Japan greeted Lee’s victory with a mixture of hope and unease, while North Korea’s response has been less clear.
The Domestic Context
The 21st South Korean presidential election saw the highest turnout rate in almost 30 years at 79.4 percent. Lee overwhelmingly secured the southwest provinces and Gwangju, while maintaining a comfortable margin in the northwestern provinces, including Seoul and Incheon. High-stakes issues in the presidential election included the economy, social issues, political polarization, and South Korean democracy.
In a Time Magazine interview just a few days before the election, Lee stressed that South Koreans needed to engage in dialogue to overcome differences, touching upon a major issue of political polarization. However, in the same interview, Lee referred to the PPP as a “far-right criminal organization.” With two conservative candidates – Kim Moon-soo of the PPP and Lee Jun-seok of the New Reform Party – almost garnering a collective 50 percent of the votes, Lee’s rhetoric is unlikely to diminish ongoing political tensions.
Since Yoon’s December 3, 2024, declaration of martial law, South Koreans have questioned the stability of their democracy. Lee, one of the first legislative members to rush back to the National Assembly to vote against the martial law decree, heavily focused on promoting the “Real Korea” – showcasing the strength of South Korean democracy. Lee’s presidential campaign argued that promoting economic growth would help resolve the polarization, inequality, and the gender divide. In his inauguration speech, Lee said that the government would “prepare, support, and invest in the future”. He notably mentioned AI innovation, renewable energy, and the semiconductor industry – all rising sectors in the South Korean economy.
The North Korea (and Russia) Factor
Regarding North Korea, it is likely that Lee will overturn Yoon administration policies that increased tensions between the South and North to promote “national interests.” Lee is likely to reverse the Yoon administration’s suspension of the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement, a series of confidence-building measures intended to reduce border and maritime incidents. In a potentially controversial move, Lee is expected to make anti-North leaflet campaigns and broadcasting illegal once again, after a months-long tit-for-tat trash balloon campaign in 2024 that caused significant personal property damage and close-call airport runway disasters as well as spurring concern about national security.
In his inauguration speech, Lee pledged that the South would seek to reopen communication with North Korea, including the military hotline that Pyongyang severed, to “move forward in building peace on the Peninsula.” Lee’s policies toward North Korea and his Cabinet picks aim to create new momentum on inter-Korean relations, but Pyongyang’s level of interest in engagement remains to be seen.
Although much of South Korea’s coverage has focused on Lee’s presidency vis-à-vis inter-Korean relations, North Korea’s state media has remained relatively quiet. The Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported on the South Korean presidential election matter-of-factly, mentioning Lee’s win after Yoon’s martial law attempt. There were no additional details regarding the North’s opinion on the political shift in Seoul.
However, as South Korea went through its political transition, KCNA reported on its front page that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was hosting a Russian delegation. North Korean media reported that Kim Jong Un stated that the North would “unconditionally support” Russia and “its foreign policies in all crucial international political issues,” according to their 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. The article also noted that both leaders, Kim and Russia’s Vladimir Putin, will continue to develop and expand their partnership, which has enabled North Korea to modernize its military, acquiring drones, anti-aircraft missiles, and other long-sought technology.
As Lee was making his inaugural address in Seoul, Sergei Shoigu, secretary of Russia’s Security Council and the former minister of defense, was visiting Pyongyang, just days after a Ukrainian drone attack decimated one-third of Russia’s strategic bomber force. Russian experts note that despite Lee’s purported interest in developing ties with Russia, South Korean progressives and conservatives are united in their condemnation of North Korea’s military support for Russia’s war in Ukraine, including supplying millions of rounds of ammunition, missiles, and as many as 14,000 troops for the Kursk front. Despite Lee’s claim to pursue a more pragmatic foreign policy, Russian experts doubt any major change in South Korea’s Russia policy is likely in the near term, at least without Washington’s blessing.
Moscow’s tilt to North Korea is not without costs. Prior to the full-scale war in Ukraine, Russia viewed South Korea as an important economic partner, especially for shipping LNG from the Russian Arctic.
China Policy
For China, Lee’s election represents an opportunity to improve relations. In anticipation, Beijing instituted visa-free travel for South Koreans and relaxed an unofficial ban on South Korean cultural imports, from K-pop to films. China had banned such imports in 2016 in protest against South Korea agreeing to the deployment of a Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) missile defense system on its territory.
Although China remains South Korea’s top export destination, China’s economic share has declined, and since 2023, South Korea’s combined exports to the United States and Japan have outpaced exports to China. This more balanced approach to trade provides South Korea with greater strategic autonomy.
Nevertheless, Chinese officials had reason to be optimistic that Lee would move away from his predecessor’s harder line on China. Lee previously had argued against further THAAD deployments on Korean soil and stated that South Korea should remain neutral in case of Chinese military action against Taiwan. However, during his presidential campaign, Lee tried to distance himself from these positions and present himself as a centrist-conservative on foreign policy issues. Right before the election, he evaded a question by a Time Magazine interviewer on his likely response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, stating only that he would “think about that answer when aliens are about to invade the earth.” However, Seoul’s intervention in a Taiwan scenario may depend on whether North Korea takes advantage of a Taiwan crisis to make a move of its own on the Korean Peninsula.
During his inaugural address, Lee notably failed to mention China by name. Instead, he spoke broadly of approaching “relations with neighboring countries through the lens of practicality and national interest” and expanding South Korea’s “diplomatic reach.” Although China-based observers still expect South Korea to follow the lead of the United States in relations with China, they are guardedly optimistic about Lee’s election moving South Korea away from Yoon’s “weaponization” of the China threat against domestic opponents.
Whither the Japan-South Korea-U.S. Trilateral?
For Japan, which faces an election in the House of Councillors (the upper house of its National Diet) this July, the Lee presidency has the potential to reduce the momentum in bilateral ties and trilateral relations with the United States if historical grievances regain the spotlight. During his campaign, Lee tried to allay such fears, claiming to the contrary that he wanted to be “proactive” and advance economic and cultural ties with Japan – although he also said he could not be “lenient” on historical or territorial issues. In Japan, there is hope that a more unpredictable economic and international environment may facilitate smooth relations with South Korea in the short term.
Lee’s pragmatism means a period of uncertainty for South Korea’s neighbors as he fleshes out what policies are in South Korea’s national interests. He pledged in his inaugural address to maintain the “bedrock” South Korea-U.S. alliance and to “solidify trilateral cooperation with Japan.” These positions reflect recent shifts in public opinion in South Korea – the Asan Institute for Policy Studies April 2025 poll found the U.S. receiving the highest favorability rating, followed by Japan, and then by China and Russia. As he seeks to emphasize domestic priorities, how Lee will balance ties with the United States, Japan, and China and navigate the North Korea-Russia alliance remains to be seen.
Lee’s participation at next week’s G-7 summit – with the potential for sideline meetings with leaders from the U.S. and Japan – will provide an early test case. Whether Lee keeps up Yoon’s track record of attending NATO summits will also be closely watched; the new South Korean president has reportedly not decided whether to go.