On June 23, Japanese Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru canceled his attendance at the NATO summit held in The Hague from June 24 to 25. Ishiba had originally planned to attend to “reaffirm with NATO allies and others the recognition that the security of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific is inseparable,” according to an announcement from the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Ministry cited “various circumstances” for Ishiba’s cancelation, which came a day after the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear sites.
Japan – along with the other Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4) countries, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand – were invited to the annual NATO summit, as they have been every year since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This year was the first time since then-Prime Minister Kishida Fumio attended in 2022 that the Japanese prime minister skipped the NATO summit.
Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi attended the summit instead. During his 30-minute meeting with NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, the two sides welcomed the progress in Japan-NATO relations since Rutte’s visit to Tokyo in April, and “concurred to work together to elevate the Japan-NATO cooperation to a new height in various fields, including the defense industry.”
In a notable setback for this goal, however, a NATO official confirmed that NATO was not currently discussing opening a Tokyo liaison office. Japan had been pursuing such an office to strengthen ties with NATO at least since spring 2023, but France had opposed it due to concerns about China’s backlash. Germany was also cautious.
Also at the NATO summit, Iwaya had a 10-minute meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, where they both agreed to support the ministerial-level negotiations on tariffs between the two countries and confirmed that they would communicate closely to maintain the Israel-Iran ceasefire.
The “various circumstances” alluded to with regards to Ishiba’s cancelation likely included the U.S. strike on Iran – which would make a Japan-U.S. bilateral summit meeting difficult to schedule – and the decisions of Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and South Korean President Lee Jae-myung to not attend – which made an IP4-U.S. summit meeting impossible. (New Zealand’s prime minister was the only top leader from the IP4 countries present.) Another consideration is the upper house elections in Japan, now scheduled for July 20.
Some in Japan have criticized Ishiba for not attending, arguing that the prime minister should have tried harder to get other regional countries to attend. Even with hindsight, it can be difficult to know what the right course of action was, but the limited amount of time between the U.S. strikes on Iran and the start of the summit would have severely constrained Ishiba’s freedom of maneuver, even if Albanese and Lee would have been receptive to foreign interference.
Such criticism also seems to miss how dramatically the world has changed since the NATO summit of 2022, when Japan was shoulder-to-shoulder with its sole ally rallying international opinion against Russia’s war. The NATO summit of 2025 occurred in a context where the U.S. has backtracked on support for Ukraine, and Japan faced a dilemma over how to respond to its ally’s actions in Iran.
Another possible reason that Ishiba stayed home was continued disagreement between the United States and Japan over Tokyo’s defense spending and ample signals that allies’ defense spending would be a key theme at the NATO summit. Japan is on track to meet its stated goal of spending 2 percent of its GDP on national security-related spending by 2027. According to a June 20 Financial Times report, however, a sudden demand from Washington for Tokyo to increase defense spending still further led Japan to cancelled the annual “2+2” security dialogue between the Japanese and U.S. foreign affairs and defense chiefs scheduled for July 1 in Washington, DC. However, it is unclear whether the meeting was “canceled” or “postponed.”
From Japan’s perspective, part of the problem is the ever-shifting goalposts for defense spending. U.S. officials have at times urged different benchmarks for defense spending, from 3 percent to 3.5 percent or even 5 percent of GDP.
Earlier, in his written response to questions from U.S. senators, then-nominee for under secretary of defense for policy Elbridge Colby (who has since been confirmed) had answered that Japan should spend “at least 3 percent of GDP on defense as soon as possible.” Following the agreement at the NATO summit that members will increase their defense and related spending to 5 percent of GDP, White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt answered a reporter’s question about U.S. Asia-Pacific allies: “If our allies in Europe and our NATO allies can do it, I think our allies and our friends in the Asia-Pacific region can do it as well.”
Following the NATO summit, a senior Japanese government official acknowledged, “There’s no doubt that the United States will step up its demands.” An expert panel is currently reviewing the next Defense Buildup Program within the Ministry of Defense, and there is a widespread view within the ministry that increasing Japan’s defense spending is inevitable given the severe security environment. However, it is still unclear where the additional funding would come from. The previous Kishida Cabinet had decided to raise income taxes to achieve the 2 percent target yet the timing for the tax hike has not been determined yet.