Society

What Happened: In January 2024, Kim Jong Un broke with decades of propaganda to declare that South Korea is henceforth an enemy nation and that the North would no longer be working toward reunification. Notably, Kim’s move directly contradicted decades of rhetoric from his father and grandfather, both of whom are considered infallible in the state narrative. To cement the shift, Pyongyang has been eliminating all traces of the previous pro-unification policy, from dismantling monuments to removing references to unification and a common Korean ethnicity from textbooks. The official line has done a complete reversal – but what do ordinary North Koreans think?

Our Focus: Daily NK and Unification Media Group surveyed North Koreans about their government’s new policy; Kwangbaek Lee and Rose Adams of UMG summarized the responses in an article for The Diplomat. Many North Koreans expressed a sense of bewilderment over the change in narrative: “Reunification of the fatherland was the Dear Leader’s [Kim Il Sung’s] final wish, so I can’t understand why they are suddenly telling us not to use the word unification,” one man complained. Along with the confusion comes a deep sense of despair. North Koreans have long looked forward to unification, hoping it will bring some of the South’s economic prosperity. “I had long privately wished that we would unify soon so that we could live well like people in other countries,” said a resident of North Hamgyong Province. “But now it seems like unification is completely impossible, so I’ve lost strength.”

What Comes Next: Because hope for unification is so closely tied in North Korean minds to the prospect of a better future, one North Korean student suggested that Kim Jong Un’s new order was tantamount to telling his country to “completely throw away hope for reunification and optimism for the future.” That explains the difficulty in getting buy-in from the people, even as the policy proceeds apace. Some North Koreans are skeptical that their compatriots will ever give up on the 70-year-old wish for a unified Korea. Does the government “think that the people’s long-cherished wish for fatherland reunification or their thoughts of ‘one peninsula, one Korea’ will disappear?” one middle-aged housewife asked rhetorically.

INTERVIEW

Shafi Md Mostofa, a Bangladeshi theologian and security studies scholar with broad interests in political Islam, on the role of Jamaat-e-Islami in Bangladesh’s politics: “While JeI remains a formidable organizational force within Bangladesh, its influence is more pronounced on the streets than in the ballot box, underscoring the distinction between visible activism and actual electoral power.”

Northeast Asia

From September 4-6, Beijing will host dozens of African heads of state for the FOCAC summit. The triennial gathering has special importance this year, as the 2021 edition was downgraded to the ministerial level due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The first full-fledged FOCAC summit in six years will be closely watched for the topline figures of Chinese aid and investment to Africa, but FOCAC 2024 will also expand Africa-China cooperation into new fields – including the hot-button issue of critical minerals.

South Asia

Last week, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), an armed separatist group, conducted the deadliest coordinated operation in the group’s history, killing over 70 people in a series of attacks in Pakistan’s Balochistan province. The BLA’s assault was an embarrassment for Pakistan, as the security establishment should have been on high alert: not only was China’s top army commander visiting Pakistan, but the attacks were predictably timed to the anniversary of a high-profile Baloch separatist’s death. Pakistan’s military has stepped up operations against both Islamic and Baloch militants in the week since the attack, but with Islamabad claiming such groups find safe haven across the border – in Afghanistan and Iran, especially – the effectiveness of its campaigns are in doubt without a diplomatic element.

Southeast Asia

Paetongtarn Shinawatra, who was appointed Thailand’s prime minister last month after her predecessor was removed from office for an ethical violation, this week finalized her incoming Cabinet. The names of the 35 minister and deputy prime minister candidates are set to be submitted for royal endorsement this week and could take office by the middle of the month. The coming Cabinet is expected to represent a mix of continuity and change. Paetongtarn’s Pheu Thai party will reportedly hold 17 Cabinet posts in the new government, including the finance and foreign ministries, followed by eight for the Bhumjaithai party, its largest coalition partner. The biggest change from its predecessor is the exclusion of the military Palang Pracharath Party, and its replacement with Pheu Thai’s erstwhile bitter arch-rival, the Democrats.

Central Asia

Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev finally announced a date for a referendum to determine whether the country will pursue the construction of a nuclear power plant. The referendum is deeply controversial, but the government clearly wants it to pass. On October 6, Kazakh voters will weigh in, but in the country’s constrained political environment, opposition has been muted.

Source: Global Nuclear Power Tracker

China currently ranks second in the world in terms of nuclear power capacity – but by 2030 it will have rocketed into first place.

Society

Ikusei-shuro, Japanese for “training and employment,” is the name for the new visa system that will replace Japan’s much-maligned Technical Intern Training Program (TITP) for foreign workers.