Persistent talk that the Australian government is reassessing its $16 billion-plus,100-plane commitment to the F-35 fighter programme has sharpened following recent statements by Australian Defence Minister Stephen Smith.
As one of only eight official F-35 global partners, analysts fear that any serious reduction in Australian commitments could have a major impact on the shareholders and indeed the approximately 125,000 employees of the defence contractor.
When asked about reports that Australia is reconsidering its options, Tom Casey, Director of International Communications at Lockheed, said the firm ‘isn’t aware of any change in the Australian government’s decisions concerning the F-35 Lightning II programme.’
In fact, Lockheed has such strong faith in Australia’s commitment that it continues to advertise the following on its the F-35 website: ‘Eventually, some 100 fifth generation F-35As will transition the RAAF into a next generation net-centric fighter force that is capable of assuring the nation's territorial integrity and national security.’
However, regional analysts don’t all share Lockheed’s optimism. Indeed, many believe that the programme is facing serious political and bureaucratic pushback – even those who maintain that the F-35 represents the best option for the Royal Australian Air Force.
More importantly, they argue that Australia likely will pull back from a portion of its 100 unit commitment in favour of procuring other platforms. In their eyes, the question is not ‘if’ a reduction in unit orders will occur, but rather ‘how much’ that reduction will be.
Ultimately, they judge that the issue facing Lockheed isn’t poor performance in the early stages of research and development. Instead, it is lingering concerns with Lockheed’s ability to guarantee on-time and on-budget delivery of F-35 units designed to meet Australian national security needs after multiple budget, schedule, and technical requirements revisions.
Alan Stephens, visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, echoes this view. ‘My take is that most people accept that the F-35’s development is back on track, after frustrating delays, and that it will clearly offer the best capability for Australia,’ he says. ‘The issue now, and it’s a serious one, is the constantly increasing price tag.’
‘Matters haven’t been helped by what are regarded as Lockheed Martin’s less than forthcoming statements on the subject,’ he adds.
While some analysts believe that the Pentagon’s failure to put its full political weight and confidence behind the programme has been a factor, one Australian think tank scholar suggests that schedule and cost remain the core concerns for key stakeholders. ‘I haven’t heard that the administration is the driver behind Smith’s recalculation,’ he said. ‘The primary concern for the Australian Department of Defence is whether the defence industry behind the F-35 is capable of producing the aircraft on-time and on-price.’
If these are in fact the major concerns driving the reassessment, Canberra may seek to offset the risks associated with the F-35 programme by shifting some of the programme’s budget to less technically cutting edge but still competent platforms.
‘Smith is…aware that…the RAAF effectively bypassed the usual acquisition process when it (recently) bought the C-17 and Super Hornets,’ he says. ‘These were bought more or less “commercial-off-the-shelf,” and are regularly cited in Defence circles here as great acquisition successes.’
‘Presently, Defence can’t spend the acquisition funding it’s been allocated because of system inefficiencies. More “COT” purchases therefore seems an attractive way to go. Canberra is rife with rumours to that effect.’
If Canberra elects to go the COT route, analysts agree that the most likely beneficiary would be Lockheed’s strategic rival, The Boeing Company. This could be a major boon for Boeing, which isstrategically focused on expanding its presence within the Asia-Pacific region.
Eddie Walsh is The Diplomat's Pentagon (accredited) correspondent and a MPhil/DPhil candidate in Politics at the School of Oriental and African Studies. His work has been featured by ISN Insights, CSIS, The East Asia Forum, The Jakarta Globe and The Journal of Energy Security. He blogs at Asia-Pacific Reporting and can be reached at asiapacificreporting@gmail.com.
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pugman
What worries me is, the amount of people in the industry and military analysts who are questioning the purchase of the F35 in the first place, given that; it is inferior in performance in all the crucial categories to the Russian Su35S (and the PAK-FA), and, it is not capable for long distance, nor carrier landing. So, can anyone justify why Oz would want to purchase something that can be shot at like a fish in a barrel by the Russian craft, which is also ten times less expensive than the F35?
Matt
If the prices continue to rise the US will have to seek a deal a cap on price reduced numbers similar to the F-22 procurement. Once the US announces the reduced procurements the price will rise further, there will be no foreign sales. So the price is capped, limited numbers are procured and the line is closed and the tooling destroyed. Australia will fit their reduced numbers into the US procurement.
Misquoted Again!
A piece by The Diplomat’s Washington correspondent Eddie Walsh appeared online today quoting me on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. It says that I think the F-35 is probably more capability than we need against Southeast Asian air forces. However…
…”if the adversary is China, then question marks emerge, particularly if China can get fifth-generation fighters like the J-20 into squadron service in the next decade in numbers.”
That’s an accurate quote, but it doesn’t mean I’m in favour of getting something superior to the F-35 (even if it were available). For understandable space reasons, my long caveat to the above judgment did not make it into the article. Here’s what I told Eddie via email:
…there is a larger question here: Australia would only ever go to war with China by America’s side, so even if Australia did have air power that could match China’s air forces one-for-one, could Australia bring decisive strategic weight to any military engagement?
At most, we are going to buy 100 JSFs, and only a fraction of those would be committed to, say, a war over Taiwan. Would that even make a difference to the larger strategic picture? If not, wouldn’t we be better off with a cheaper, less capable aerial platform and instead investing more in a potentially decisive capability such as diesel submarines, which our ally would truly value?
Eddie Walsh
This comment is cut and pasted from: http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2011/09/09/The-F-35-is-more-than-enough.aspx.
It is in reference to a different article though (not this one): http://www.examiner.com/air-force-community-in-arlington/is-lockheed-s-f-35-a-fundamental-investment-for-australia-s-national-security
Sam made this post to provide context for his quote in the Examiner piece because the China comments were to be featured and cross-linked in a third article on the Foreword Report: http://foreword.com.au/2011/09/the-ones-who-walk-away-from-bethesda-f-35-deal-up-in-the-air/
That article was supposed to go up last Thursday before the Examiner.com piece but did not due to technical issues on that site.
I hope this helps to clarify things.
RaceTrackFighter
Misquoted Again! – This appears to be from Sam Roggeveen over at Lowy. I read it last week prior to this article being released. It actually appears to be in reference to a completely different article by the same author which appeared in a U.S. publication and cited M. Roggeveen. (M. Roggeveen is not cited in this article so I don’t think the comment applies here.) I therefore would recommend going over to the Lowy Interpreter and having a read for yourself (since the hyperlink to the correct story does not appear in your comment). Separately, the issue appears to have worked itself out as Sam’s opinions from above appeared in an article on Monday in the Foreword report.
Geoff Koh
Will the first operational units delivered be block III, or block IV? Reportedly, block III maturity will be achieved by around 2018 now. I thought block IV – including software/hardware-oriented and next-gen communications upgrades and thermal management issues being resolved – was actually the game-changing block of choice?
And by staying the course with F-35A procurement; from which other parts of Defence budgets will funding come to effectively maintain, SLEP and MLU the remaining Hornet squadron(s) until sufficient operational F-35 squadrons achieve IOC/FOC? (e.g. 2021-2022?)
Doing it all over, I feel RAAF’s overall superior common airframe selection would have been the modernized F-15E path.
RaceTrackFighter
Aviation Week’s blog has a long post on this in the new J-20 blog thread. The AW Community does not seem able on any of the dates on this program in either America or Aussieland.