Why is the United States propping up Pakistan in a way that it knows will likely conflict directly with Indian interests? It’s a question being raised with increasing frequency here in New Delhi these days.
The most immediate concern for the Indian establishment has been the US decision to supply sophisticated weapons to Pakistan—weaponry that is much more useful in state-to-state conflict than counter-terrorism (for which it is virtually useless). Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh raised the issue with US President Barack Obama during their 50-minute bilateral meeting in Washington DC earlier this month, having already done so during his previous visit to the United States.
During the meeting, Singh urged Washington to ensure that US military aid to Pakistan is used against terrorists and not against India. But for now, at least, the pleas appear to be falling on deaf ears. The United States is, after all, determined to increase its leverage with Pakistan over operations in Afghanistan, and the US also appears to believe that such aid is required to ensure the survival of the civilian government there.
As a result, the US State Department is increasing its funds for Pakistan’s counter-insurgency efforts—which will allow Pakistan to buy more US helicopters, night vision goggles and other military equipment—from $700 million this year to $1.2 billion in 2011.
Yet reports suggest Pakistan has been using its national funds to buy US weapons more suited to conflict between states—and it surely would have traditional rival India in mind when doing so. According to the US Congressional Research Service, the current tally of US arms that have been purchased by Pakistan since 2001 includes: 18 new F-16 combat aircraft; F-16 armaments including 500 AIM-120C5 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) systems; 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles; 500 Sidewinder air-to-air missiles; six Phalanx close-in naval guns; P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft and their refurbishment; 121 TOW missile launchers and about 5,250 TOW anti-armour missiles.
None of these could be viewed as for anti-terrorist operations—the P-3C Orion, for example, is an excellent anti-submarine and anti-ship platform, while TOW missiles would be deadly against tanks. Al-Qaeda and the Taliban have no submarines, armoured fighting vehicles or airplanes. So who is the most likely intended target? It makes New Delhi wonder.
Pakistan doesn’t need sophisticated weaponry to fight terrorists—what it needs (and is lacking) is the political and military will to go after them. And, while Pakistan certainly needs more economic aid, any such assistance should only be provided by the United States if it can ensure that Pakistan does not misuse it to buy armaments.
As Indian Defense Minister AK Antony stated on March 6,‘the US decision to supply sophisticated arms to Pakistan is a matter of serious concern to New Delhi as the experience has been that these are used against India.’ He also reiterated that India believes the US government should make sure that these weapons are deployed on the Pakistan-Afghan border against Taliban, not diverted towards the Indo-Pakistan border.
Indeed, the failure of Pakistan to allocate its funds properly so far has led to some significant shortcomings in Pakistan’s anti-terrorism efforts, including its 80,000-strong Frontier Corps—the paramilitary force responsible for fight terrorists—which remains ill equipped, underfunded and poorly trained on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Meanwhile, as US Defence Department documents accessed by the Press Trust of India last year indicate, Pakistan has diverted billions of dollars of US aid, supposedly meant for fighting such terrorists, to beefing up its military along the border with India.
The argument put forward by Pakistan and its supporters is that if India wants long-term normal relations, then it shouldn’t object to the US providing arms and ammunition, as doing so is no different to India investing in conventional arms.
But this argument is baseless. India’s security requirements are hugely different from Pakistan’s, with India having long borders with Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Burma, as well as a 6000-kilometre coastline.
US Assistant Secretary of State for South and Central Asia Robert Blake reassured India during his recent visit to New Delhi that US arms supplied to Pakistan would only be used by it on the Pakistan-Afghan border, and he added that the Pakistani government needs strengthening so that it can fight Lashkar-e-Toiba, which has risen to become a significant and potentially global terrorist threat.
But former Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf himself has admitted that US military assistance given to Pakistan during his time in office was used to strengthen defences against India, and he is on record as stating that the financial aid was utilized for transporting troops, arms and ammunition from the Pakistan-Afghan border to the Indian border.
In another interview with a Pakistani TV station, Musharraf ‘clarified’ his remarks, saying that aid would be used depending on the needs for ensuring his country’s security. He suggested that if the threat is perceived as coming from al-Qaeda or the Taliban, then US aid will be used against them. But what if the perceived threat is from India?
Pakistani Foreign Office officials have dismissed any such apprehensions and instead contend that India’s massive militarization is a threat to regional security while Pakistan’s procurement is merely for self-defence.
However Gen. Musharraf has failed to mention, for obvious reasons, that US military aid actually emboldens Pakistan’s rulers to consider action against India, a troubling point when there’s a history of arms and ammunition sold by the US to Pakistan ultimately being used against India.
For example, during the Cold War era, the United States supplied arms to Pakistan as part of its fight against communism, yet Patton tanks, F-86 Sabre jets, F-104 Starfighters and a range of other military hardware ended up being used against India.
It’s clear to policymakers in New Delhi that Washington has failed to receive strategic dividends commensurate to the significant financial assistance that it has handed to Pakistan, whether it be in terms of effective co-operation on counter-terrorism efforts or Pakistani public opinion (recent polls in the Urdu press, an important source for understanding Pakistani public opinion, suggested the United States is still the most hated country among Pakistanis). And the attack on the US consulate in Peshawar earlier this month, meanwhile, was yet another reminder that the United States’ presence is under perpetual challenge in Pakistan.
It remains unclear how many reality checks the United States will need before it starts rethinking its aid policies.