(Question from Jennifer Rossi) There is a U.S. Presidential Election on Tuesday. How do you see this impacting U.S. policy towards Asia? How much difference is there between the two candidates on questions relating to the Asia-Pacific?
The election itself will have an impact, although how much is open to debate. I would argue ‘the unknown’ will certainly drive events more than a change in U.S. Presidential leadership. Could there be a crisis in the South China or East China Sea? Could tensions between Japan and China drive some sort of unknown crisis? While I think all claimants in these various island disputes understand a shooting war would be horrific for all concerned, we can look back at history and say the same thing many times over. Nationalism, territorial claims and leadership changes never exactly lend themselves to peace and stability. I think for the next several months tensions in the Pacific will be elevated. As new leaders take their positions and consolidate power, I am optimistic that negotiations can lead to compromises or at the very least smart diplomats can ‘agree to disagree.’
One thing that should be noted is that America’s ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance’ has been underway for a long time – and will continue no matter who is president. American military, diplomatic and economic power has been at play in the Asia-Pacific and in the wider Indo-Pacific for decades. As several scholars have pointed out to me, “America has never left the Pacific!” The 2007 U.S. maritime strategy, produced during the George W. Bush administration, clearly lays out America’s naval rebalancing towards Asia. Last year America made clear from a diplomatic and economic perspective that the region will be America’s top priority.
Where this gets tricky is the level of resources America will have at its disposal when it comes to the ‘pivot.’ With massive deficits that will need to reined in at some point, one could see the United States cutting back the military aspect of its rebalance to Asia as part of an overall reduction in military spending. If that does happen, the diplomatic and economic focus of such a strategy becomes even more important. Do nations that have various disputes with China begin to purchase more arms fearing American abandonment? Does an arms race begin? Could some nations decide to give in to certain territorial or economic demands from Beijing?
We must also remember that America has global commitments that Washington considers essential. Iran still looms large as no progress has been made towards some sort of compromise. Syria’s ongoing civil war also seems to be getting worse by the day. America still has commitments to Europe with Russia upset over planned missile defense deployments. And there is always the Eurozone debt crisis and America’s troubled economic recovery to keep U.S. leaders up at night.
(Question from Thomas Ross) This week Foreign Policy reported that the Pentagon is vigorously debating whether the U.S. should prioritize dispersing their bases in Asia or hardening existing ones. What are the advantages of each? Where do you come down in this debate?
The problem with hardening, according to senior officials I have spoken with, is that it is very expensive (I don’t have figures but when I broached the subject with one official he said it was “out of the question”). In an era where defense planners are looking for the best bang for their buck, it would seem force dispersion will win the day.
However, we need to look at this from a different angle, in fact, maybe even asking a different question all together: is the nature of warfare changing where ‘distance’and ‘access’ matters more? In any major conflict around the globe it seems very likely cyberwarfare would be the first weapon of choice. If you can blind your opponents command and control systems so they are unable to attack, you possess a great advantage. With the nature of cyberwarfare being such that a potential target may not even know entirely who is attacking them, why would someone even start a war with conventional munitions? Forget the revolution in military affairs; cyber is its own revolution that will literally change warfare for generations to come.
However, to answer your direct question, American planners if confronted with a crisis concerning Iran or China will have lots of ballistic and cruise missiles to deal with. I have spoken with many senior analysts that worry American missile defenses aboard Aegis vessels would be quickly overwhelmed with the numbers they would have to defend against. Missiles and missile defenses quickly become a numbers game – factor in how expensive a missile is (relatively cheap) vs. an interceptor (expensive) the offensive missile based on shore seems to win the contest against limited sea-based missile defense. Imagine an American president forced to withdraw from a combat operation simply because defensive measures were exhausted. These are the choice anti-access strategies force upon potential opponents.
Also, China for instance has a well hyped (but untested) ballistic missile with an assumed range of 1500km+ that could potentially come down on its target with a maneuverable warhead. Factoring this and other long range ballistic and cruise missiles, it makes sense to have bases that are diversified but approaching an anti-access challenge like China or Iran requires some distance in order one to have a successful and credible military strategy. This would require the deployment of an enhanced new long-range bomber, possibly unmanned. American forces would also need to maintain their conventional ballistic missile capabilities undersea. We witnessed during the Libya operation what American Tomahawk cruises missiles fired from below the waves can do. Future American submarines should be loaded with such weapons as they are mostly safe under the protective blanket of the oceans. That might be the best ‘hardening’ out there. So dispersing needs to happen over multiple domains in terms of bases, military platforms and new technologies.
(Question from Emily Laffe) Regarding the U.S. pivot, there is a growing sentiment in some quarters that it is really more rhetoric than substance. Do you subscribe to this view? What does Washington need to do in Asia that it hasn’t been doing?
I think in some respects we can’t answer that question just yet – we have to take a longer view than just a year or two—say, the next five to ten years over multiple administrations. It is clear the Obama Administration clearly wants to ‘pivot’ to Asia, but global events have hijacked the strategy to a certain extent. Events in Syria, Iran’s ongoing nuclear crisis, America’s Presidential Election, a struggling economy, and now a terrible hurricane impacting some of the most densely populated areas of the United States have moved the importance of the ‘pivot’ down the list quite a few notches. In watching the last Presidential debate with our friends over at Real Clear World, it was clear the ‘pivot’ is important (it was mentioned by name – I was stunned!), but had fallen off somewhat as the top priority of policymakers.
Over the long-term, America must show a commitment to Asia beyond military or strategic concepts. The U.S. needs to develop a comprehensive economic and diplomatic approach focusing on the larger Indo-Pacific region. This means creating as many free trade agreements as possible, this means working to create a Trans Pacific Partnership that the whole Asia-Pacific and possibly Indo-Pacific will embrace, it means greater cultural exchanges. What I am describing is a comprehensive approach to Asia that is not just a ‘pivot’ or a ‘rebalance’ but instead becoming a full-fledged partner with all nations of the region. It won’t be easy and can’t grind to a halt when a crisis in another region forces America to change direction. It requires a full-blown sustained evolution in thinking and priorities.
America must also engage with China across multiple domains. In my conversations with various senior officials from different nations in the Asia-Pacific, there is tremendous fear U.S-China competition could become something much more like a ‘Cold War’ where nations in the region will have to pick sides. While it is clear U.S.-China relations could become more constrained and fiercely competitive as China rises over the next twenty years, there is also much both sides can do in order to ease potential tensions. I would push for greater military-to-military cooperation – on a tremendous scale. Why not have exchanges of a year or more of officers between both nations? I say send Chinese officers to U.S. military academies for a year or two deployment, with American officers studying at Chinese military equivalents. Nothing breaks down walls like long term relationship building on a personal level.
I would argue that the biggest danger in the U.S.-China relationship is strategic ambiguity – on both sides. If this can be mitigated with both nations knowing each other’s ‘red-lines’ while also looking for common ground at every possible turn, tensions can lessen and partnerships can develop where they can.
(LinkedIn: Michael Letinov) You have written a lot about China’s anti-access area denial (A2/AD) capabilities. What is the U.S. doing to counter this strategy? How much will defense budget cuts impact its ability to execute its strategy?
The United States faces a global challenge when it comes to the issue of Anti-Access – not just from the People’s Republic. Many nations around the world have come to the conclusion that to fight the United States in a direct military engagement is suicide – case in point: Iraq. So why not use asymmetric warfare to level the playing field? Nations such as Iran, China, as well as North Korea and others are now embracing anti-access technology (James Holmes just did a great series on this). Ballistic and cruise missiles, mines, cyberwarfare, advanced air defenses, advanced and quiet diesel submarines could all be pooled to stop U.S. forces in their tracks. Combined with the idea that much of this technology is widely available and won’t break the bank, American strategists face a unique set of problems.
The counter according to most American military planners is the much famed AirSea Battle which is a big part of the January 2012 Joint Operational Access Concept document.
One must however take the long view when it comes to anti-access and how budget realties will impact any strategy to counter it. American forces for the last decade have focused on destroying terrorists and COIN operations. For many over the last decade, great power war seemed like an obsolete concept. Well its back! America now finds itself with an Air Force that was largely built to fight the Soviet Union with many nations now looking to build their own 5th generation fighters that employ stealth technology. America’s Navy is also smaller, and while more capable, it is spread thin around the world.
I think the ultimate solution to defeating any anti-access, no matter who we are talking about, is thinking beyond conventional military weapons of war like an Air Force or Navy. Cyber weapons are truly the most important weapon of war today. Why attack your opponent with billion dollar bombers when you can do tremendous damage to crucial aspects of national infrastructure and military command and control from the comfort and safety of your own nation – or attack from a proxy nation to fool your opponent? The United States, if it is wishes to continue to exert military superiority over potential rivals, must have the world’s best offensive and defensive cyber capabilities. While they are not as sexy as placing a carrier off a rival’s coast and lack a visual deterrent capability, they might be the 21st century’s best weapon of war. Whatever strategy America adopts, cyber must be the very heart and soul of it.
American planners must also be thinking about fighting from distance. This is where drone technology and long range bombers could merge together to create the ultimate non-cyber weapon against any anti-access strategy. If American forces can launch weapons from a far with the ability to cripple an opponent’s anti-access weapons, then issues of access become a moot point.