Recently, The United States concluded a Presidential election and China has now finished its 18th Party Congress. In a recent New York Times article, Diplomat contributor Minxin Pei made the case for a “Reset” in U.S. – China relations. Do you think this would be possible? What could be done in your view to improve relations?
A “reset,” at least as Minxin Pei describes it, seems unlikely.
To begin with it is far from clear that anyone on the Chinese side would be strongly in favor of such a development, and more importantly, have the ability to gain consensus among the various factions and groups within the upper levels of the Chinese state about what it should look like.
At the same time, it does not appear that the Obama administration will be inclined to forward another major initiative on China so soon after it has experimented with first the Asian ‘pivot’ and then ‘re-balancing’ in the region.
I think that Professor Pei is well aware of such constraints, and, was writing more along the lines of forwarding an aspiration, rather than a practical policy goal. On this score I do not disagree with him, but where I do differ is over his sense that the relationship is entering dire straits. I think it is in rocky waters, but that a “reset” is not only unlikely, but also, for the most part, not especially needed.
Make no mistake, the U.S. and China are not friends on the world stage, but my sense is that there is an awareness at the top of both countries that our fates have become entwined, and even if we do have differences, the frictions produced by such contentions, are likely to be contained.
In short, neither side appears to have the motivation, nor will, to change the basic contours of the U.S.-China relationship, for better or worse. What is possible, perhaps, would be an American led effort to seek out points of potential common interest and downplay those of obvious contention. It is in such a context that I recently wrote for The Diplomat that addressing climate change may be emerging as an issue of mutual concern, one that could lead to unexpected compromises and outcomes.
You recently moderated a debate between Aaron Friedberg and Mike Lampton entitled “Is China the Next Superpower?” Please tell our readers about the nature of the debate and what the general consensus was (if any). In your view, is China a “superpower?” What criteria would you use to define a superpower?
Aaron Friedberg is one of America’s leading scholars of great power politics, and Mike Lampton has long been a prominent figure in study of Chinese domestic politics and foreign relations. Based on their writings one might anticipate that the two would be deeply divided over this issue. They did express contrasting assessments about what Washington should do in response to changes in China, but, they both largely agreed that China couldn’t, for the foreseeable future, be considered a superpower. In making such a contention Friedberg focused more on the capabilities China lacked, while Lampton raised broader questions about the very applicability of the superpower concept within the current international order.
I concur with their assessments, and would only add that it may be most accurate to think of China as something of a paradoxical great power, in that it has accumulated rather impressive strengths abroad over the last decade, but at the same time has faced growing internal challenges within its own borders. Such a juxtaposition does not then make China a superpower, but has turned it into the world’s second most influential state, one that now has an extensive presence far from its own shores, but which is still quite unsure of itself, and its relationship to its own people, at home. Moreover, while Susan Shirk first identified such a dynamic in 2009 in dubbing China a “fragile superpower,” I think the contrasts and contradictions between these two trends has only become more pronounced in the intervening years.
Tensions have seemingly cooled slightly in the South China Sea as tempers have flared in the East China Sea. It seems territorial claims in and around China’s near-seas will be with us for years to come. In what ways can China’s new leaders work with its neighbors to ease tensions? Could you see any possibility of joint exploration and resource development in the East or South China Seas?
The possibility of joint development appears remote as there is so much acrimony hanging over these waters. This is the product of a series of actions that China and other claimants have taken over the last several years in their attempts to secure the territory in question. In addition, it is hard to envision that the new Chinese leadership, especially as seen in the composition of the new Standing Committee, will be in a position to make the type of deals and compromises that would create the conditions for such a development to unfold. In this regard, the future in both maritime regions looks rather bleak.
However, it is important not to overlook the fact that to date virtually all of the confrontation in both the eastern and southern maritime regions has been in the realm of words and symbolic actions, not military engagements. Shots still have not been fired in either the South or East China Sea. Moreover, this condition is consistent with the fact that dating to the mid-1990s China has demurred from engaging any of its neighbors in direct military conflict. In addition, in principle the 2002 South China Sea code of conduct still holds (if barely), as does the Sino-Japanese agreement to set aside differences over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. In other words, the fulcrum has not tilted fully in either region in the direction of war. In this sense, there is some continued room for optimism about a peaceful resolution of both disputes.
Yet, as Taylor Fravel has noted Beijing did resort to the use of force on a number of occasions to lay claim to contested ocean and continental territories, especially when the Chinese leadership experienced legitimacy crises at home. The risk, as Fravel, recently noted in the Wall Street Journal, is that we may be approaching such a tipping point, especially with reference to the ongoing confrontation between China and Japan in the East China Sea.
My own reading, though, is somewhat more sanguine, as at this point in time while the Chinese leadership is too weak to agree to a new round of compromises, it is not so diminished that it will risk higher levels of confrontation in order to placate the more nationalistic and combative voices within China that are calling for more aggressive action in both sets of disputes. In other words, gridlock at the top in China is likely to prevent major breakthroughs, but also, limit the likelihood of an even greater escalation of tensions.
Recently, Dr. Robert Ross from Boston College in an op-ed for Foreign Affairs sketched out several problems with the U.S. ‘pivot’ to Asia. Do you feel the pivot has been beneficial to Asia as a whole? In President Obama’s second-term, do you see any changes to U.S. policy to Asia that could foster greater bonds between the United States and its Asian partners?
As I understand it in the article Ross contended that the Obama administration’s ‘pivot’ in Asia was based on a fundamental misreading of the mindset and actions of the Chinese leadership. As a result, it has been quite counter-productive to American interests in Asia. It has exacerbated Chinese insecurities, and may be pushing China into taking more aggressive measures in the region. To be honest, such a summary stems from a quick read of the piece, which just came out, but I largely agree with its central thesis, and, frankly, wish I had written about it before he did.
For me the central point here is not that the U.S. should not show resolve in dealing with China, nor that China is not without culpability for the waves of assertive policies it has implemented within Asia over the last several years. Rather it is imperative for U.S. policy makers to consider how those within China may read the pivot in an especially malign light, and such a perception could then elicit more combative Chinese actions, leading to the need to escalate U.S. counter-measures, producing a type of security dilemma that could otherwise have been avoided.
The key to handling such a situation, at least in terms of avoiding a total deterioration of the relationship and an escalation of tensions in Asia, is to find the right balance between credible threats and assurances, without overplaying either side, or, in some ways even worse failing to deliver on rhetorical positions one way or the other. The problem with the pivot is that in some ways it was the worst of all worlds, it contained damaging rhetoric (from the Chinese perspective, but lacked real substance (in terms of actual American deployments).
I think there has been something of a realization in this regard within Washington. What, though, remains to be seen, is what can follow in the pivot’s wake. Once more, I would suggest that it may be possible to seek out points of cooperation that have the potential for mutual benefits for all parties involved, and while I am not especially optimistic about the prospect, one such avenue for opening such a new chapter, if not a total “reset”, is dealing with outstanding issues of climate change and the environment.