Japan recently agreed to join talks regarding the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Many in Japan are concerned that the agreement could damage the country’s agricultural industry. Do you feel Japan will be able to join TPP considering what many feel is tough domestic opposition? How much of a risk is TPP for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe if TPP talks were to stall or fail?
I do feel that Japan can and will join TPP. It’ll take considerable time, and it’s complicated—particularly since it involves so many countries and their negotiators and is not an urgent U.S. priority. (The Obama administration does want to move TPP forward, but the administration’s highest priorities are domestic.) But the key point for Japan is that the agriculture industry is becoming less important for Japan’s economy, and therefore its politics. The average Japanese rice farmer is now 67 years old, and his children are less likely than in the past to follow him into the fields. Adding to the momentum is the sharp deterioration in Japan’s relations with China. Japan needs as many commercial partners not named China as it can get, and security relations with the United States are crucial.
The bigger risk for Abe is that he’ll see a stall or fail of Abenomics—the use of loose monetary policy and economic stimulus to revive private investment and reinvigorate stagnant economic growth—than that TPP falls apart.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry recently announced he would be travelling to Asia next month. Considering tensions in region (Japan/China dispute in East China Sea, North Korea), was it a mistake to wait so long to travel to Asia? Does it damage the “pivot” or “rebalance” the Obama Administration is promoting?
Kerry probably should’ve gone to Asia first. But given that he doesn’t have as much experience or as many old friends in Asia as in Europe—and that there was an administration impulse to signal a sense of urgency on Syria—I can’t say I’m surprised that he’s only getting to Asia now. That said, there’s no less administration commitment to Asia or the pivot. It was vital to have a successful Obama-Abe summit, and they got that. The other important signal is that there is no summit planned for Obama and new Chinese President Xi Jinping. (They’ll meet in the fall on the sidelines of the G20 gathering in St Petersburg.) These signs are more important than anything to do with Kerry’s schedule.
There has been a tremendous amount of interest in recent comments by President Obama during his recent State of the Union address. During the address, he advocated for a free trade deal between the U.S. and the European Union. Is such an agreement possible? How would this impact TPP talks? If such an agreement were concluded, would it shift America’s focus away from Asia?
A transatlantic deal is certainly possible, but it’s longer term. TPP has momentum and a head start—and negotiating with the Europeans will be complicated. But there is support in both parties for a deal that would boost economies on both sides of the Atlantic and maintain Britain’s influence within the EU. Support for these two deals flows from the same strategic goal—to move beyond the dead-in-the-water Doha round to build large trade architecture and common standards that countries with other preferences and values will feel compelled to join.
China is the crucial long-term puzzle piece. Years from now, if there is a robust TPP, a substantive transatlantic deal, a Japan-EU agreement, and a NAFTA strengthened by the inclusion of Brazil, we’ll have a framework that a then-wealthier China will want to sign on to.
President Xi Jinping recently took formal control as leader of China last week. How do you feel his time in office will be different from Hu Jintao’s? Are we likely to see any political or economic reforms?
The difference is already visible. China is scrapping its commitment to non-intervention in the affairs of other countries. That alone is historically important. There is an embrace of the “Chinese dream,” an explicit rejection of the universality of Western values, a refusal to simply invest more deeply in U.S.-led institutions, and an implicit assertion that China will become a maker–rather than a taker—of international rules and norms. This is a big deal, and Washington can expect new challenges,
There is also much talk of tackling corruption and rolling back state capitalism, though I’m skeptical on both counts. But there will certainly be an effort to make the current system more efficient and effective and much more spending on China’s social safety net and other projects designed to safeguard social and political stability. In short, expect more perestroika (restructuring) without more glasnost (greater openness across society).