The overthrow of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina by a sustained student-led protest has plunged Bangladesh into violent chaos. But there is a promise that a more democratic and more economically equal Bangladesh could emerge from this chaos, labeled by some as the “Second Revolution.”
While there are far-reaching domestic political and economic consequences of this uprising, we focus on one of the key geopolitical issues, Bangladesh-India relations, that will have both short-term and long-term impact on what will eventually be “new” in the new Bangladesh.
Sheikh Hasina’s rule was mixed; it produced economic growth and development, but her government eventually also became increasingly more authoritarian and undemocratic, even at times downright oppressive. It was also perceived as corrupt, and the benefits of the economic development seemed to accrue only to those who were aligned with her party. The resentment among those left behind eventually overflowed and overthrew Hasina, just months after her fourth electoral victory in January 2024.
One of the highlights of her rule was her close relations with India, especially with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. As protesters sought to overthrow the Hasina regime, their anger has also been directed at Modi, her biggest international ally and supporter. They believe that it is with Modi’s support that Sheikh Hasina’s regime was able to stay in power for so long. The movement for a new Bangladesh therefore harbors distinct traces of strong anti-India sentiment as well as anti-Hindu sentiment, resulting in inexcusable violence against Bangladesh’s Hindu minority.
Muhammad Yunus, newly sworn-in advisor to Bangladesh’s interim government, understandably will focus on basically reconstructing the Bangladeshi polity, its governance structure and its democracy. He cannot, however, allow foreign policy to run on autopilot. If he is not attentive the strategic and critical Bangladesh-India relations could go south very fast. He needs to monitor and nurture this relationship carefully.
In his phone call with Modi, Yunus gave assurance that Hindus will be safeguarded. He also informed the Indian prime minister that reports of violence against Hindus were much exaggerated. An investigation by BBC Verify further exposed the exaggerations by Hindutva voices in the Indian media and social media. This is a good start.
Bangladesh can certainly benefit from a bit more autonomy and independence from India’s overbearing presence in its political and economic sphere, but Bangladesh needs India and remains dependent on it in many ways. Yunus deserves credit for not only reaching out to Modi but also for attending the Third Voice of the Global South Summit hosted by India, which nearly 90 of the 123 invited heads of state skipped. It signals his openness to and prioritization of a positive relationship with India.
The first thing that ties Bangladesh to India is its immutable geography. Bangladesh is an India-locked country. Ninety-four percent of its 4,367 km-long border is shared with India. While this makes Bangladesh dependent on India for both security and trade, it also gives Bangladesh some leverage over India because Bangladesh provides easy and inexpensive connectivity between the eastern parts of India and the rest of the country. Thus, Bangladesh is critical for India’s internal connectivity.
There are critical issues of water sharing, border trade and smuggling, and tensions over migration and refugees. These issues stem primarily from the shared geography and will never go away. The two nations will have to build a shared understanding and robust institutions to deal with these issues on an ongoing basis.
Bangladesh depends heavily on India for its supply of rice, wheat, onion, ginger, garlic, sugar, cotton, cereals, iron and steel, refined petroleum, electronic equipment, and plastics. Bangladesh’s economic boom before the pandemic hit it hard was based on the export of garments to the West. This key industry depends heavily on the supply of raw materials from India. Deterioration of relations with India will immediately result in a decline in exports, a reduction in GDP, higher inflation, and a loss of jobs. No matter what attractions other nations may hold, for now, Bangladesh cannot afford to break its ties with India.
Bangladesh-India relations are further complicated by religion. The rise of Hindu nationalism and its attendant anti-Muslim and anti-Bangladesh rhetoric finds a reciprocal echo in Bangladesh. In the current uprising, anti-Hindu violence has generated a lot of anger in India and animosity towards Bangladesh. This will become a hurdle to better Bangladesh-India relations if it is not nipped in the bud.
Bangladesh has become the playground for regional and global great power rivalries. There is an ongoing contest between India and China for hegemony in South Asia. China can now boast of having close allies like Pakistan, the Maldives, and even to some extent Sri Lanka in the region. India can count Bhutan and Afghanistan as its friends. That leaves Nepal and Bangladesh up for grabs.
Bangladesh under Hasina executed a foreign policy based on a hedging strategy to great advantage. It was friends with both and benefitted from both. If the new Bangladesh tilts one way or the other, it will fundamentally alter the regional balance of power. A pro-China Bangladesh will make South Asia the Chinese subcontinent. On the other hand, a pro-India or even neutral Bangladesh will keep the region in play.
Bangladesh cannot abandon China either. China is a major source of investments, imports and defense procurements. Bangladesh owes China over $6 billion, and it is also a part of Xi Jinping’s signature Belt and Road Initiative. China has invested over $7 billion in Bangladesh and Chinese exports to Bangladesh in 2023 were over $22 billion. China is Bangladesh’s biggest arms supplier. Bangladesh is as dependent on China as it is upon India.
That said, the absence of a shared border with China gives India a slight edge over China when it comes to dependence. Add to this historical and cultural similarities between India and Bangladesh and it is apparent that India has more soft power than China.
Bangladesh has also attracted the attention of the United States. The U.S. has been pressing Bangladesh to improve its democracy. Many in the region suspect that the U.S. may have played a role in Hasina’s ouster and Yunus is also seen in many quarters as very pro-U.S. The growing cold war between the U.S. and China may have now reached the shores of Bangladesh. The pulls and pushes of global geopolitics will make domestic reforms and peaceful change more complicated for Bangladesh.
The presence of the U.S. in this theater increases the salience of the already critical Bangladesh-India relationship. In the past, India successfully shielded Sheikh Hasina from U.S. pressure. If Bangladesh leans toward India, India will balance China and shield Dhaka from the U.S. But if Bangladesh leans toward China, then both the U.S. and India will start exerting all forms of pressure on it. In the past India had restricted exports to Bangladesh; New Delhi could do it again and cause economic difficulties. The U.S. is always trigger-happy with sanctions and Bangladesh has had a taste of it.
Bangladesh is indeed in a delicate geopolitical quagmire, and it needs a delicately crafted foreign policy to navigate to safe harbors. The so-called second revolution is not the solution; it is just a window of opportunity. Will Bangladesh succeed in both crafting a successful reform agenda at home and smart policies abroad? Only time will tell. But we believe that the foreign policy work starts with India because it has greater implications for domestic harmony, and admirably Yunus has begun there.
In 1971, Bangladesh emerged as a new nation with India’s help. In 2024 it can again emerge as a new Bangladesh, and again it will need India’s help.