On July 19, Nguyen Phu Trong, the long-serving general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), died at the age of 80. His passing appears to have marked the end of an era in Vietnam. During his 13 years at the apex of the Party, Trong arguably did more than any other figure to shape the tone and direction of Vietnamese politics: he purged corrupt officials, clamped down tightly on dissent, and adroitly positioned Vietnam in a turbulent and fast-changing world.
To assess Trong’s political and foreign policy legacy, and the country’s possible future trajectory under his successors, The Diplomat’s Southeast Asia Editor Sebastian Strangio spoke with Alexander Vuving, a professor at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu.
What do you think will be Trong’s main domestic political legacies, and what impact did his policies have on Vietnamese society as a whole? Place him in the context of the CPV’s history; how did he conceive of the Party’s role, as a locus of political and/or moral leadership?
Nguyen Phu Trong was at the helm of the Vietnamese party-state for more than 13 years. During this long period of time, he focused his policy-making efforts on party-building, in which field he had a doctoral degree and the title of professor. This focus was due in part to his belief that the mission of the Communist Party is to lead the country and thus the Party must both stand on the moral high ground and possess the power needed to govern the country. Throughout his three terms, he fought a two-front battle against corruption and liberalism while trying to “confine power within the institutional cage,” as he said. He was most famous for his “blazing furnace,” a metaphor he created to refer to his anti-corruption campaign, which targeted not only graft and cronyism but also liberal thoughts. He said more than once that “political decadence,” by which he meant primarily liberalism, was more dangerous than economic corruption.
Highly risk-averse, he held back political and economic reform. He also relied on the authorities rather than the populace to fight corruption. A key principle of his anti-corruption campaign was, to use his own analogy, “striking the rats (the corrupt officials) without breaking the vase (the Party and the regime).” His building of the “institutional cage” followed a centralized approach to governance. His “blazing furnace” positioned the security and police apparatus as the gatekeeper and executor of the campaign. The centralization of policy-making, the reliance on the security and police forces, and the purge of liberal thoughts have enormously changed Vietnam’s political system. As a result, Trong left behind a party-state that governs mostly by control and coercion rather than consensus and legitimacy. Just a decade ago, the CPV was more dynamic and less centralized than it is today. By the same token, the largest impact of Trong’s policies on society at large was the shrinking of space for civil society.
As things stand, who do you think stands the best chance of inheriting Trong’s mantle as party chief at the next National Congress in early 2026?
As things stand today, General Secretary To Lam has the largest chance to be elected – or re-elected in his case – Party chief in early 2026. If nothing happens to him, he will preside over the preparations for the next CPV Congress, including the selection of Party chief. He will pass the age limit (65 years) for the re-elected Politburo members including the Party chief. But the rule has been substantially weakened in the past, as it was waived for more than one leader, including Party chief Trong, at the last two CPV Congresses, in 2016 and 2021. Another waiver of the rule to keep Lam as Party chief is quite possible. And Lam has something that none of his predecessors did. Unlike any previous Party chief, he was a former security and police chief and enjoys strong backup by the security and police apparatus, which has been extremely privileged and become extremely powerful as a result of the anti-corruption campaign.
Can you elaborate on what motivated Trong’s anti-corruption campaign? How successful was it, and how do you think it will fare under new leadership?
Trong launched the anti-corruption campaign in late 2011, less than a year after being elected CPV chief. The central motive of his campaign was to rescue the Party from decay. As he repeatedly said, “corruption is threatening the survival of the Party.” The campaign was very successful on the surface: thousands of Party and government officials, including many high-ranking leaders, were sacked in its name. But a deeper look tells a different story. The campaign completely avoided tackling the root cause of corruption in the system while being largely utilized as a weapon in the inner-party “game of thrones.” As it proved to be an excellent tool for power competition, it will continue to be taken advantage of by people in power going forward.
In the wake of Trong’s death, we have seen a lot of praise for his notion of “bamboo diplomacy” and his ability to balance deftly between the major powers. That said, omnidirectional balancing has been a hallmark of Vietnam’s foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Aside from coining the phrase, how much credit does Trong deserve for this, and do you foresee any changes to Vietnam’s foreign policy orientation in the years to come?
Trong didn’t coin the term “bamboo diplomacy” – the Thais did. In the 1980s, some of Vietnam’s foreign policy elites argued that unlike their country, which suffered long periods of war, Thailand was able to avoid war and get on a development path because it pursued “bamboo diplomacy.” The term referred to a foreign policy approach that is flexible regarding the ideological and strategic alignment with the major powers. The debate continued into the 1990s, but the prevailing argument was that “bamboo diplomacy” was unsuited for Vietnam’s principled foreign policy.
However, Vietnam’s foreign policy underwent a turning point in 2003 when the Communist Party adopted a new national security strategy that removed ideology as the key criterion for determining friends and foes in Vietnam’s foreign relations. This paved the way for a more flexible, less ideological version of the omnidirectional foreign policy that Vietnam had pursued since the end of the Cold War. Two major reviews of this national security strategy in 2013 and 2023, both under Trong’s leadership, reaffirmed its key tenets.
Although Trong didn’t coin the term “bamboo diplomacy, he popularized it as a distinctive feature of Vietnam’s strategic behavior. He gave a metaphor that helped to capture the essence of Vietnam’s omnidirectional foreign policy. He articulated this essence in a way that was easy to understand. He also practiced it at a highly sophisticated level. During his 13 years in power, Vietnam became the “comprehensive strategic partner” of all major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, from Russia and India to South Korea, the United States, Japan, and Australia (Vietnam and China became each other’s first comprehensive strategic partner in 2008). This was a great feat in an increasingly divided region.
However, Trong did not fully appreciate the epochal changes that are transforming the world and the region. For him, the major world trends today remain the same as those identified in CPV Politburo Resolution 13 of 1988, which anticipated the post-Cold War era.
Nevertheless, subtle changes in Vietnam’s foreign policy are underway. On the one hand, the post-Cold War era is behind us and we are now in the early stage of a new era of heightened great power rivalry and shaken international order. Events in this strategic environment will sooner or later cause a turning point in Vietnam’s foreign policy by directly and fundamentally affecting Vietnam’s quest for security, resources, and identity. On the other, Vietnam’s new leader, To Lam, views the world differently than his predecessor. In an article published the day after he was elected CPV general secretary, he wrote: “Developments in the recent years show that the world is in transition to a new era. The time from now until 2030 will be the most important period to determine the new world order.”
After Trong’s death on July 19, it was reported that many Vietnamese social media users had uploaded black and white versions of their profile pictures in a sign of respect for the CPV leader, and his reportedly incorruptible character. What do you think this says about how Trong was viewed within Vietnamese society? Can we use this to infer anything about popular perceptions of the Party and its rule?
People did this for various reasons. Some genuinely admired him, others did this under peer or social pressure, and still others didn’t want to be blacklisted by the authorities. That said, Trong embodied the ideal official as defined by the traditional Vietnamese culture: an incorruptible mandarin. This image of him contrasted with the reality of the Communist Party as revealed by his anti-corruption campaign. Trong was like the exception that proved the rule. So, for many Vietnamese social media users, this action expressed their high respect for the unbribable leader. But for many others, it was also a subtle form of resistance and protest against the corrupt power, as James C. Scott has eloquently discussed in his works on the Southeast Asian peasants.
What impact do you think a possible second Trump term could have on Vietnam?
It would be highly speculative to talk about what a second Trump administration would do partly because most of the polls are forecasting a Harris win and partly because Trump is very unpredictable. That said, there are several ways in which Trump’s America might affect Vietnam directly or indirectly. First, Trump is likely to pressure Vietnam to reduce its trade surplus with the United States. As this is extremely hard for Vietnam to do since the surplus is structural, Hanoi will probably have to find a way to compensate for this bad optic.
Second, a United States under Trump may put more pressure on Vietnam to take its side in its rivalry with China. A second Trump administration may be more confrontational than the Biden administration against China, causing Beijing to be more assertive in the South China Sea and the Mekong Subregion. Trump may also threaten to reduce U.S. commitment to Asia, creating a sort of power vacuum where China will step in. Trump is likely to turn his back on the international institutions and rules, thus further weakening the international order. Any of these possibilities will place Vietnam before a big dilemma that necessitates a rethink of Vietnam’s grand strategy.