On Monday, August 26, the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), a Baloch terrorist organization, launched a series of attacks across Pakistan’s Balochistan province, killing more than 70 citizens and military personnel. Such attacks come on the heels of protests over the last few weeks across the province. The attacks themselves represent a new level of sophistication for the BLA, not only in their coordination, but in their targeting of vital infrastructure, such as railway links leading to the city of Quetta. They also represent a continuing commitment on behalf of the BLA to wage its insurgency campaign in the southwestern province.
Viewed in a vacuum, these attacks may seem to be an internal security challenge for Pakistan, but not a source of instability in its regional security environment. Yet, the attacks are part of a broader insurgency on both sides of the Iran-Pakistan border.
The last year has witnessed several attacks by Baloch terrorists operating within Iran. In response to these attacks, the Iranian military launched a series of deadly strikes in January on Pakistan, reportedly targeting insurgents that had slipped through the two nations’ common border. In retaliation, Pakistan launched a series of its own tit-for-tat strikes on suspected BLA militants residing in Iran. Although both powers restored diplomatic relations and agreed to coordinate counterterrorism efforts in the aftermath of the strikes, the incidents highlighted the sensitivity of both nations to the perception that insurgents launching attacks within their respective borders might be operating within their neighbor’s. It also highlighted their willingness to use unilateral force in addressing this issue.
It is this context that underscores a far graver consequence of the August 26 attacks, namely a rising suspicion on Pakistan’s part that Iran may not be doing its best to pursue BLA militants in its own borders. After all, in the weeks leading up to Monday’s attacks, several incidents suggested that insurgents were operating on both sides of the porous border.
For one, on July 19, Wahid Kambar, a prominent leader of the Balochistan Liberation Front (a predecessor to the BLA), was arrested by Pakistani security forces. On its face, this may not seem all that troubling, but there has been widespread speculation that the abduction took place on Iranian soil, suggesting that Balochi militants can easily cross the border into Iran and operate there. Moreover, his abduction by Pakistani (instead of Iranian) personnel highlights Islamabad’s distrust in Iran’s cooperation on counterterrorism efforts.
Another sign pointing toward a cross-border insurgency came in Quetta on August 16. Five bullet-ridden bodies were found hanging from electrical poles. The bodies, identified as Afghan nationals, were just 20 days earlier featured in a hostage video released by Jaish-Ul-Adl (JUA), the most prominent of the Baloch insurgent groups operating on the Iranian side of the border. The message JUA is trying to send here is unmistakable: We can operate all across Balochistan, and there is little Pakistani security forces can do to stop us.
In light of these incidents, it would be hard for either Pakistan or Iran to argue that their respective Baloch insurgent groups were not operating within the other’s territory. It would also be hard for either to argue that their counterparts were waging a successful counterterrorism campaign against such groups within their own borders.
One might reasonably point out that such cross-border terrorist ties do not necessarily mean increasing tensions between Iran and Pakistan. There is, after all, a long history of militants operating on either side of the porous border. Furthermore, the agreement on counterterrorism between Iran and Pakistan earlier this year would seem to underscore the degree to which both countries recognize the necessity of cooperation, however imperfect.
Yet, the history of the insurgency on either side of the border demonstrates that these commitments do not necessarily translate into sustained success. Both countries have been aware of the problem of cross-border militants for quite a while, yet engage in recriminations more often than cooperation.
In 2009, after Baloch militant groups with links to Pakistan launched attacks in Iran, Tehran accused Islamabad of supporting the militants. After a deadly attack in 2013 that killed 13 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members, Iran went so far as to launch missile strikes on Pakistan in order to target those responsible for the attack. After four Iranian soldiers were kidnapped by Baloch militants in 2014, Iran threatened to send troops into Pakistan.
The tensions between the two countries on the Baloch issue has not abated in recent years, either. Rocket attacks by Iran on Pakistan in 2017, Pakistan’s downing of Iranian drones in 2017 and 2019, and accusations by Pakistan of Iranian support for Baloch militants as recently as 2023 all underscore the degree of mistrust that undergirds the relationship. Most notably, as Matthew Elliott pointed out in his thesis on the subject, such periods of heightened tensions are almost always followed by some commitment by both parties to jointly address the insurgency, and yet such commitments are rarely enough to prevent the next outbreak of violence.
This history of tit-for-tat retaliation over the failure of joint counterterrorism efforts between Iran and Pakistan, then, is worrying, especially given the sophistication and scope of the August 26 attacks and the failure of both countries’ intelligence establishments to stop cross-border terrorist activities in the last few months. Certainly, there is evidence already to suggest that Pakistan’s intelligence establishment does not view this problem as strictly internal, with defense officials pointing toward “hostile intelligence agencies” trying to disrupt Pakistan’s infrastructure in the province, centered around the Chinese-owned port of Gwadar and its associated China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). This speculation that the militants are targeting CPEC infrastructure was repeated by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on August 27.
Although such comments do not necessarily point the finger at Iran, they do suggest that Pakistan believes 1) international actors are partially responsible for the attack and 2) such actors are opposed to the success of the CPEC corridor.
In this respect, it would not be difficult to see how Pakistani intelligence officials could identify Iran as a principal culprit, whether in the failure of its counterterrorism operations or in outright support for the BLA. Iran has, for the last several decades, been developing a competitor port to Gwadar in its own Chabahar, signing several agreements on the port with India, Pakistan’s arch-rival, just earlier this year. Such plans are at the core of the so-called International North-South Transportation Corridor, India’s answer to China’s own Belt and Road Initiative, of which CPEC is a vital part.
This is not to say that Iran actually played a role in the August 26 attacks. Rather, it is merely to highlight that, if Pakistan goes looking for an external actor to blame, Iran does fit the bill of a country that might have the motive and means to, at the very least, not act on intelligence that would otherwise suggest an imminent attack in Pakistan. This, combined with the long history of mistrust that both nations have in addressing this cross-border insurgency jointly, their willingness to use force against each other, and the recent uptick in cross-border terrorist activities prior to the attack, should be a cause for alarm.
These attacks represent, if nothing else, a novel and profound blow against Pakistan’s strategic efforts to develop and pacify Balochistan. Shocked by the sophistication of Monday’s attacks, distrustful of its neighbors, and looking for a culprit, there is a real possibility that Pakistan may view counterterrorism cooperation with Iran with increasing suspicion. It certainly would not be the first time Pakistan decided to take a more unilateral approach to the Balochistan insurgency.