On August 16, Cambodian authorities “forcibly disappeared” Vannith Hay, the brother of Vanna Hay, an activist leading the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Movement in Japan. Former Prime Minister and current Senate President Hun Sen had threatened Vanna a week before his brother went missing. In May, Sun Chanthy, the head of the opposition National Power Party, was arrested after returning from Japan, where he gave a speech urging the Cambodian government to allow opposition parties to operate freely.
In July, a Cambodian court found Teav Vannol, leader of the opposition Candlelight Party, guilty of defamation and fined him $1.5 million for criticizing Hun Sen and his son, Prime Minister Hun Manet, in a media interview in Tokyo. Speaking a few weeks later, Hun Manet directed his anger at the Japanese government: “Does Japan support the use of its territory as a base for leading protests and overthrowing [the government]?”
The ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) is currently in one of its periodic bouts of repression. It has been spooked by rumblings of discontent on social media about the economic costs of the controversial Funan Techo Canal and by the considerable outpouring of anger surrounding the Cambodia-Laos-Vietnam Development Triangle Area (CLV-DTA), a scheme started in 2004 but which has now suddenly riled anti-Vietnamese nationalists in Cambodia, who claim Phnom Penh is ceding more territory to the country’s historical bête noire. (Hun Sen was dogged for four decades by accusations of being a Vietnamese puppet, so the CPP is no doubt concerned that the same accusations are now being directed at his son.)
“The Hun Manet administration has done nothing to depart from his father’s legacy of authoritarian control,” Charles Santiago, APHR Co-Chairperson and former member of the Malaysian Parliament, said in a recent statement.
Hun Sen has alleged that a group, apparently called Unity for the Nation, is plotting to whip up public anger over the CLV scheme in an attempt to topple his son’s government. Moreover, he claims the group is backed by the Khmer diaspora in Japan, South Korea, and Australia. These allegations are nonsense. There isn’t such a group capable of dismantling the CPP’s political machinery. However, it’s a convenient line for the CPP, which is particularly fretful of criticism from abroad. That’s partly because the Hun family knows it can easily repress dissent at home, thanks to its complete control of all political and social institutions, but the CPP’s many arms of repression aren’t so long. Activists living in Thailand have been silenced (or worse), but those residing in liberal democracies like Japan and Australia are harder to target.
Two key issues are at play here. First, Cambodia’s authoritarian government is increasingly concerned about its international reputation. With the economy faltering, Phnom Penh knows it must attract foreign investment and trade. This concern is heightened as it watches China’s economy implode, prompting Cambodia to need to improve its relations with the West. Whatever rapprochement has occurred between Cambodia and the West since Hun Manet became prime minister last August depends on perceptions. In a classic case of judging actions by reputation, rather than the other way around, most Western governments eagerly bought into the fiction that Hun Manet’s rule will be softer, more liberal than his father’s. In fact, this belief was prevalent long before Hun Manet shed his military fatigues and took his seat in the Peace Palace. Because perceptions matter, Phnom Penh cannot tolerate activists abroad pointing out this fiction.
The second issue is more complex. Ever since the CPP took power in 1979, after overthrowing the genocidal Khmer Rouge, much of the Cambodian diaspora has been resolutely opposed to its rule. For those who fled Cambodia in the 1970s at the start of the Cambodian Civil War, the CPP was seen as a Vietnamese lackey – a view that still prevails, hence the CLV controversy. Up until a few years ago, the Cambodian diaspora remained staunchly anti-CPP. The now-dissolved Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), the most promising opposition party in recent history, dug heavily into the pockets of the diaspora and established deep roots in overseas Khmer communities.
After forcibly dissolving the CNRP in 2017 and consolidating power, the CPP turned its focus on the diaspora. Hun Manet, then an army chief, was put in charge of the ruling party’s youth wing and (informally) its Overseas Commission, where he was instructed to launch influence operations abroad to woo and cajole the diaspora. These efforts were an important part of Hun Manet’s succession process, allowing him to build an influence base where he could bestow honors and gain loyalty within the diaspora.
Indeed, many of the officials who manage these overseas networks rose to prominent positions alongside Hun Manet during the leadership transition last year. For instance, I’m told that Huot Hak, who became minister of inspection last year, oversaw operations in Europe; Heng Sour, the new labor minister, managed operations in South Korea and Japan. Justice Ministry spokesperson Kim Santepheap has deep connections in Australia, so much so that last year an Australian MP petitioned Canberra to deny him a visa. Sok Veasna, director-general of immigration, is reportedly the head of the CPP branch in Darwin, Australia. However, Hun Manet micromanages most of these activities. According to an Australian lawmaker, Julian Hill, the Cambodian prime minister “oversees CPP political infiltration operations here and in New Zealand.”
Half of this work involves wooing the diaspora. The CPP has funneled considerable money into expanding or establishing new CPP chapters worldwide. Some of the funds have been spent on lobbying foreign politicians, particularly in Australia. Most of the money has gone toward patronage, such as funding new pagodas, providing loans to businesspeople, or engaging in propaganda work, especially on social media.
Readers may recall last year’s saga of a Times Square billboard welcoming Hun Manet to New York when he attended a U.N. General Assembly session. The CPP’s propaganda machine went into overdrive to promote the image. After some confusion about whether the CPP had funded the billboard, Hun Manet thanked David Soth, a Cambodian-American businessman, for apparently organizing the advertisement “for free.” (The billboards were supposedly paid for by the CPP’s San Francisco chapter.) It turns out the images were fake; they were digital mockups, except for one that appeared on an electronic billboard far from Times Square and attracted little social media attention. My sources suggest this was an ill-conceived influence operation by the CPP’s overseas team, which Hun Manet was not made aware of.
The other half of the work is more sinister. There are allegations of vast money laundering and other illegal activity, while members of CPP overseas branches are also tasked with carrying out the ruling party’s bidding. One source told me, “The main objective of establishing CPP overseas branches was to suppress dissent, but they are also moving into setting up front organizations, similar to the Chinese United Front. Lots of military figures are also involved.” This involves intimidating members of the diaspora who criticize the CPP. Assets are paid to feed the party information about the activities of activists or visiting Cambodian politicians. (Sources claim certain Buddhist abbots have been feted by Hun Manet himself in order to get them to spy for the CPP, for example.) The information gathered is relayed to the CPP’s Overseas Commission, which Hun Manet closely guards, and to the Information Ministry’s “Quick Response Team,” a unit set up some time ago to counter foreign media that publish information critical of the government.
The Hun family knows that Cambodia’s economic future depends on improving its international reputation, which is necessary to attract more trade, investment, and aid. To achieve this, it must maintain the narrative that Hun Manet is a reformist – a gentler and more liberal leader than his father, someone with whom Western leaders don’t need to pinch their nose when doing business. And to sustain this fiction, dissent abroad must be kept to a minimum, lest foreign governments stop turning a blind eye to the CPP’s crimes.