It is a grim irony to consider that the International Day of Peace in 2024 (September 21) is overshadowed by the very real risk of serious escalation across the Israeli-Lebanon border. The trade of high-stakes barbs has continued throughout the summer in particular, culminating in the pager attack this week. Simultaneous explosions of pagers and then walkie-talkies over the course of two days killed 37 and injured over 3,000 in Lebanon.
Caught in the middle of this looming crisis are the civilians of southern Lebanon and the settlements in northern Israel. On the Lebanese side there is also the 10,000 strong UNIFIL force, which was originally deployed in 1978 following the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF’s) invasion of the south. Despite the IDF’s withdrawal in 2000, conflict flared again in 2006 in the Second Lebanon War, resulting in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 and a beefed-up military force, double the size of the original mission throughout its earlier phase.
Thirteen Indo/Asia-Pacific nations contribute personnel to UNIFIL, totaling over 5,000 troops and field personnel, which represents just under half of UNIFIL’s strength. Indonesia is the single-largest troop-contributing country to the mission, with 1,231 peacekeepers deployed. India and Nepal are close behind, at 903 and 876, respectively.
The mission has, on various occasions, come under fire from a derisive and skeptical Israeli political establishment and media. Even beyond Israel, questions arise periodically about the effectiveness of the mission, not least when Israel and Hezbollah teeter on the edge of all out conflict.
Nevertheless, it is important to be clear-eyed about the purpose of UNIFIL, lest it become a scapegoat for actual problems that lie elsewhere.
Inception
As U.S. President Jimmy Carter inched toward a historic Middle East Peace agreement in 1978, Palestinian militants orchestrated the Coastal Road massacre in Israel, killing 38 Israeli civilians including 13 children. In response, over 20,000 IDF troops invaded southern Lebanon. In a desperate attempt to stave off threats to the elusive handshake between Israeli and Egyptian leaders on the White House lawn, the U.S. administration managed to align sufficient support within a Cold War-era Security Council to establish a peacekeeping force. UNIFIL’s first troops commenced deployment in the early summer of 1978 and almost immediately the serious flaws in its premise were apparent. In short, there was no peace to keep.
UNIFIL’s mandate was outlined in Security Council Resolution 425: confirm Israel’s withdrawal, restore international peace and security, and assist the government of Lebanon in the restoration of its effective authority in the area. A tall order, and not one that really engaged with the root of the Israel-Lebanon problem. The continuation of hostilities today emanates from UNIFIL’s inability, despite patience and its best efforts, to realize the third component of Resolution 425 – restoration of Lebanese authority in the south.
The deeper problem was and remains a combination of profound cleavages within Lebanese politics and society, compounded by Syrian, Israeli, and later Iranian meddling, and the fissiparous dynamic of a large Palestinian refugee presence. UNIFIL’s Westphalian design was ill-suited to a context that bore a greater resemblance to a Kaldorian “New War” than a traditional inter-state conflict.
Questions like “Why hasn’t UNIFIL succeeded?” and “What’s the point of UNIFIL?” make little sense when considered within the context of the Levant’s infinitely complex geopolitical landscape. UNIFIL wasn’t really meant to succeed. It was meant to buy time, to provide a coolant to larger political crises.
Fast forward to its drawdown after the pullout of IDF troops in May 2000 – over two decades after deployment – and we find that Israel’s compliance with Resolution 425 failed to embed peace and stability along Israel’s northern frontier. The Shebaa Farms, an area actually controlled by Syria when the IDF took it over in 1967, provided a pretext for Iranian-backed Hezbollah to continue antagonizing the Israelis. Hezbollah, much like Hamas, have little interest in bettering the lives of the people they purport to represent. Their primary function lies within Iran’s regional ambitions.
Psychologically, the Israelis and its security establishment left Lebanon in 2000. UNIFIL was drawn down to around 1,000 troops in total and had scaled back its presence, almost becoming an archived entry in U.N. peacekeeping history. When Hezbollah pulled off its spectacular attacks in 2006, Israel was caught off guard. Following the Second Lebanon War, UNIFIL was revamped with an approved force strength of 15,000 (three times its original strength) under U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701. This second resolution again sought to cajole the Lebanese authorities to reassert their authority in the south. It hasn’t happened, and it’s unlikely too for the foreseeable future.
UNIFIL Today
This lies at the heart of UNIFIL’s travails. Much like the Lebanon of the late 1970s and 1980s, Lebanon today is politically very fragile. Its body politic is riven with ethno-religious rivalries and political clientelism, which have been exacerbated through international meddling. The Palestinian issue looms large, burrowed deep into Lebanon’s post independent experience. The Lebanese government, infused with Hezbollah’s political wing since the early 1990s, is unwilling and unable to act as a traditional state actor and extend its full authority over all of its territory. A parallel paramilitary force, eclipsing the formally constituted Lebanese Armed Forces, operates freely within its borders at the behest of a foreign power. Instability suits Hezbollah. Iran’s support for the militia is in direct contravention of Resolution 1701.
UNIFIL has no control over these factors. It has succeeded in maintaining a presence – a current force of 10,058 peacekeepers – by pragmatically recognizing its own limitations. Its continuation into the future is likely to be fragile should open conflict break out. Why hasn’t UNIFIL attempted to enforce peace in its area of operations? Quite simply because the mandate of a peacekeeping force is only sustainable while it meets three key conditions: impartiality, minimum use of force to achieve the mandate, and – above all – consent. Going beyond that is “enforcement,” and that requires a change in mandate.
If UNIFIL were to attempt to forcefully constrain Hezbollah or other factions, as Israel and hawkish external observers demand, it would require the active assent of the governments of contributing nations, including those of its Indo- and Asia-Pacific contingents. Such a move is unpalatable, for two principal reasons.
First, by acting against a well-supported Lebanese force like Hezbollah, it jeopardizes a fundamental plank of peace operations – consent. Hezbollah’s original 1985 manifesto viewed UNIFIL as an enemy. But the mission was not dislodged by the militia, which undoubtedly had the ability to do so, indicating at least tacit consent. Consent has also been granted by the Israelis, who could have withdrawn it at any point. They haven’t done so, despite endless propaganda against it in Israeli society since the mission began in the late 1970s.
It would also be a tall order to wrangle consensus on an expanded missions scope from the governments of contributing nations. Looking only at the Asian governments involved, troop-contributing countries range from Muslim-majority nations with deep sympathy for Palestine (like Indonesia and Malaysia) to more neutral parties like China, India, Nepal, and South Korea.
Second, overt and forceful opposition to Hezbollah would certainly result in U.N. casualties. This happened in UNIFIL’s earlier phase. Those casualties are not merely U.N. troops. They are troops drawn from nation states that voluntarily contribute their military and field personnel. The top six troop contributors – Indonesia, Italy, India, Nepal, Ghana, and Malaysia – would at greatest risk of casualties if the UNIFIL came under attack.
All parties to this conflict – the Palestine Liberation Organization, the IDF, Amal, Hezbollah, and the South Lebanon Army – have historically shown scant regard for the lives of U.N. peacekeepers. It would not take many homebound coffins for contributing nations to reconsider participation. The beheading of 10 Belgian troops in Rwanda in 1994 prior to the genocide there ended the Belgian battalion’s participation, emasculating the U.N. force under General Dallaire.
UNIFIL will undoubtedly remain a convenient whipping boy for all sides, particularly the Israelis, who see in its presence a manifestation of deficient international will to reign in militant forces like Hezbollah. But the reality is that Lebanese politics, and Hezbollah’s role in them, provide barren ground for UNIFIL’s success. The Cedar Tree nation is barely a shade above failed state status. As such it cannot and will not do what is required to stabilize the Lebanon-Israel border. Despite much effort on the part of the force and the United Nations itself, the Lebanese Armed Forces have not been deployed into the south of the country in numbers sufficient to assume a monopoly on legitimate force. Other forces in Lebanon want to keep it that way.
UNIFIL cannot, and was never intended, to establish peace, only to “keep” it. Establishing peace in Lebanon, and between it and Israel, depends on the actions of politicians, not peacekeepers. The U.N. operation there is less a case of failure, and more a case of not yet succeeding. As the rockets fly across the Blue Line once again it is clear that the wait for peace will be a long one.