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Can the Interim Government Ensure Justice and Bring Radical Changes in Bangladesh?

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The Pulse | Politics | South Asia

Can the Interim Government Ensure Justice and Bring Radical Changes in Bangladesh?

One of the primary reasons for skepticism lies in the historical context of governance in Bangladesh.

Can the Interim Government Ensure Justice and Bring Radical Changes in Bangladesh?
Credit: Wikimedia Commons/ Fredrik Rubensson

The 15-plus-year rule of Sheikh Hasina, marked by authoritarian governance, ended dramatically on August 5, 2024, following a massive student-led revolution. This uprising forced Hasina to resign and flee the country, leading to the establishment of an interim government under the leadership of Nobel Laureate Mohammad Yunus. 

For many, this was a moment of hope – a potential turning point for Bangladesh, offering a chance for justice and radical reforms. However, despite the optimism surrounding the downfall of a long-standing authoritarian regime, this interim government will face significant challenges in ensuring justice and implementing transformative changes. Several key factors indicate that the current trajectory may not lead to the fundamental overhaul Bangladesh needs.

The Legacy of Failed Regimes

One of the primary reasons for skepticism lies in the historical context of governance in Bangladesh. Over the decades, the country has witnessed a wide variety of regimes, including one-party states, military governments, neutral caretaker administrations, and even military-backed civil governments that promised reform. Yet, despite these varied approaches, the dream of establishing a liberal democracy has never been realized. All these initiatives, while different in structure and intention, failed to bring about the profound and sustainable changes needed to build a democratic society.

The key issue, I believe, is that every regime has attempted to initiate change from within the existing system. The entrenched political culture and institutional weaknesses made it nearly impossible to break free from the cycle of corruption, inefficiency, and authoritarianism. Rather than dismantling or restructuring the system, these governments operated within its confines, perpetuating the same dynamics that eventually led to the rise of Hasina’s authoritarian rule. This historical context makes me doubtful that Yunus’ government will succeed where others have failed.

A Missed Opportunity for Radical Change

What sets the interim government apart from previous regimes is the unprecedented situation it inherited. During the revolution, many key state institutions became either non-functional or operated at a severely reduced capacity. For a brief period, the police force was almost entirely absent, and other institutions, including the judiciary and the bureaucracy, were only partially functional. This created a rare window of opportunity for the interim government to step outside the existing system and forge a new path with the help of the revolutionaries.

However, this government has failed to seize that opportunity. Rather than embracing a revolutionary approach and using the momentum of the revolution to dismantle and rebuild broken institutions, the government has chosen to operate within the same constraints that have long plagued the country. This is perhaps the most significant reason why justice and radical reforms will remain elusive under this administration.

The Problem of Identity

The confusion surrounding the government’s identity further complicates its ability to bring about meaningful change. This interim government is neither a neutral caretaker government tasked solely with overseeing elections nor a revolutionary government intent on reshaping the nation. Its ambiguous position has created a sense of instability and uncertainty. It lacks the legitimacy of a neutral government that commands broad political support, and at the same time, it does not have the revolutionary zeal or mandate to push through the kind of radical reforms that are desperately needed.

This confusion in identity is not just theoretical – it has real-world consequences. Political parties are already starting to push for elections, sensing that the government’s lack of clarity and direction makes it vulnerable. The pressure to hold elections will only grow, diverting attention away from the more pressing issues of justice and reform.

A Weakening Government

Adding to the problem is the fact that the interim government has shown itself to be weak in the face of protests and opposition. Rather than standing firm in its policies and demonstrating a commitment to the reforms it claims to seek, the government has repeatedly capitulated to various demands. While consensus-building is important in any democracy, this pattern of appeasement signals to both domestic and international observers that the government is not strong enough to withstand political pressure.g

In a country with as many deep-rooted problems as Bangladesh, this weakness will prevent the interim government from taking the tough decisions necessary for reform. The country faces significant challenges as a developing nation, and the inability of the government to address these issues will only compound the public’s frustration. Already, rising inflation and the failure to address the price hikes of basic commodities have left ordinary citizens disillusioned. If the government continues on its current path, this growing frustration will delegitimize it in the eyes of the people, making it increasingly difficult for Yunus and his team to implement the changes they promised.

The Failure to Address Accountability

One of the most glaring failures of the interim government is its inability to ensure justice for the victims of the revolution. The mass killings that occurred during the uprising remain largely unpunished, with many of the perpetrators either escaping the country or remaining embedded within the system. The public’s demand for accountability is being ignored, which is a major source of frustration for those who sacrificed so much during the revolution.

This failure to hold perpetrators accountable is symptomatic of a larger issue – the inability of the government to break from the past. The same elites, officials, and power structures that enabled Hasina’s authoritarian rule are still in place, limiting the scope of reform. Reports of corruption in bureaucratic promotions during the tenure of the interim government raise serious concerns about its ability to deliver on promises of justice and reform. This early signal suggests that the government is already facing challenges in breaking away from the entrenched culture of corruption that has long plagued Bangladesh’s governance structures. Without a clean break from these elements, justice will remain elusive, and any attempts at reform will be superficial at best.

In an effort to demonstrate its commitment to change, the interim government has established six commissions tasked with bringing about reforms. If the interim government continues to lose legitimacy, however, these commissions will likely become symbolic efforts rather than agents of real change.

Conclusion

The student-led revolution of 2024 brought with it the hope of a new beginning for Bangladesh, but the interim government led by Mohammad Yunus appears unlikely to deliver the justice and radical reforms that many had hoped for. The historical failures of previous regimes, the missed opportunity to operate outside the existing system, the government’s confused identity, its weakness in the face of opposition, and its failure to hold perpetrators accountable all point to an administration that is struggling to find its footing. Unless the government can address these issues quickly and decisively, it will face the same fate as its predecessors – falling short of the dream of a truly democratic and just Bangladesh.