In July, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s Unity government, through Minister for Religious Affairs Mohd Na’im Mokhtar, introduced the new Mufti Bill for the Federal Territories. The bill, the next reading of which is expected in Parliament later this month, has raised concerns about growing sectarian competition among Malay elites.
The bill is contentious for several reasons. It requires the Federal Territories Mufti, who advises the king and federal government on religious matters, to strictly follow the Sunni denomination, specifically the Ash’ari creed and Shafi’i jurisprudence, while granting the Mufti qualified immunity from legal action.
This sectarian provision sidelines a wide range of alternative Muslim jurisprudences, including Maliki, Hanbali, and Hanafi that are widely practiced elsewhere, as well as sects like Salafism, Shiism, and other non-denominational forms of Islam, despite their presence in Malaysia and recognition in some parts of the Muslim world. Furthermore, legal immunity for the Mufti reflects an undemocratic move to shield a religious figure from legal accountability, positioning the Mufti above other public officials.
This shift toward theocracy in Malaysia is not unprecedented. Dr. Maznah Mohamad’s book, “The Divine Bureaucracy and Disenchantment of Social Life: A Study of Bureaucratic Islam in Malaysia,” underscores the rapid bureaucratization of Islam during from the 1980s onward. Driven by substantial public funding, religion has now infiltrated every aspect of public and private life. However, the Mufti Bill marks a more explicit sectarian turn in the bureaucratization of Islam since the 2000s, aiming to institutionalize Sunni Ash’arism as the state-sanctioned version of Islam.
Competition Among Malay Elites
To grasp the motivation behind the bill, it’s essential to understand the sectarian competition among Malaysia’s Malay-Muslim elites.
First, within political factions, the bill reveals how religious elites under the Anwar-led Unity government, guided by the minister for religious affairs, a former Sharia chief judge of Malaysia, are proactively advancing the Sharia system through new legislation.
This push comes from pressure by far-right factions, particularly the Perikatan Nasional (PN) opposition, led by the Malaysian Islamist party (PAS). They accuse the religious elites of Anwar’s Pakatan Harapan-Barisan Nasional coalition of colluding with a liberal-leaning, pro-Chinese coalition. Recent high-profile federal court rulings – such as the Nik Elin case that annulled provisions in Kelantan’s Sharia Enactment on 16 moral offenses, the Iki Putra case that overturned Selangor’s Sharia Enactment’s provision on anti-sodomy, and the Loh Siew Hong case that annulled the unilateral conversion of children to Islam – have intensified perceived threats to the Sharia system and fueled this legislative drive. The strategy seeks to consolidate support from religious elites, bureaucrats, and conservative Muslim voters.
Adding to the tension is the divisive #RUU355 Bill, which seeks to expand Sharia criminal jurisdiction nationwide and impose harsher punishments. This bill continues to gain momentum under Anwar’s administration.
Second, religious factions, particularly muftis and bureaucrats, are locked in a power struggle, exposing the deep-seated sectarian rivalry between dominant Ash’ari factions and minority Salafi factions, despite the fact that both belong to Sunni Islam. This long-standing intra-faith divide continues to shape Malaysia’s Muslim majority.
The Mufti Bill received strong backing from 12 state Muftis and support from pro-Ash’ari networks, including the Association of Ahli Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Aswaja) and the Sarawak Scholars’ Association (Ittihad).
In contrast, Perlis, a known safe haven for Salafism, opposed the bill. Salafism thrives there due to the influence of Mufti Asri Zainal Abidin, a leading Salafi advocate. He draws support from the state’s monarchy, local politicians, mosque networks, and foreign Salafi patrons, including the controversial exiled preacher Zakir Naik.
Despite internal divisions between quietists influenced by Saudi Salafis and modernists aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, Salafi factions united against the bill. Prominent Salafi figures like Mufti Asri Zainal Abidin, UPSI lecturer Rozaimi Ramle and Fathul Bari Mat Jahya, the United Malays National Organization (UMNO)’s chief for Kangar city of Perlis, have led the resistance. While these factions often clash over political issues, they recognize that the Mufti Bill, which applies to federal territories, could set a precedent for other states, curtailing their influence nationally. Ironically, though Salafis framed their opposition as a defense of “freedom of thought,” their main concern remains preserving their own sectarian power.
Ash’ari elites, educated mostly at local universities and Egypt’s Al-Azhar, see Salafi scholars, many of whom have received Saudi-funded education, as a direct threat. During the Global War on Terror in the 2000s, numerous Malaysians benefited from Saudi scholarships to study in Saudi institutions. Upon returning, they introduced a puritanical approach that condemned Ash’ari practices as un-Islamic and claimed deviations from the original teachings of the Prophet Muhammad and his early companions. For Ash’aris, this threatened their existing hegemony over Malaysia’s religious institutions and the conservative Muslim life rooted in Ash’ari tenets.
In response, Ash’ari authorities have sought to restrict Salafi influence by preventing their entry into the religious public service, denying them preaching licenses, and even jailing figures like Singaporean Salafi preacher Rasul Dahri. Ash’ari-led institutions also demonize not only Salafis but also Shia, Ahmadis, and liberal Muslims through sermons, textbooks, fatwas, and criminalization.
Yet, Salafis have successfully penetrated Perlis, educational institutions, Malay political parties, and online dakwah or religious preaching platforms like ProMediaTajdid and Ilmu Salaf, branding themselves as “reformists” and attracting newly devout generations. Former Prime Minister Najib Razak further facilitated the spread of Salafism, seeking religious legitimacy through alliances with quietist Salafis, known for their loyalty to the ruling government, and with Saudi patrons amid the 1MDB corruption scandal.
Third, pro-Ash’ari lobbyists have long worked to embed Sunni Ash’arism into national security policies, even before the drafting of the Mufti Bill. Their influence has entrenched a focus on Salafism as the primary source of radicalization in the security sector. For example, this has led to the frequent confiscation of Salafi literature, branding it as subversive, and promoting Ash’ari doctrines in the rehabilitation of terrorist prisoners. Aswaja leader Zamihan Mat Zin and pro-Ash’ari academics from local Islamic universities have spearheaded these deradicalization efforts.
While Salafism’s links to terrorist groups are a legitimate concern, politicized religious ideologies like Ash’arism still foster intolerance and radicalism by promoting dehumanizing values and undermining democracy. In Malaysia, Ash’ari fatwas restrict traditional Malay practices like Mak Yong and participation in non-Muslim ceremonies or at worship places, and actively persecute religious minorities, intellectual dissenters, women, and members of the LGBTQ community. These practices blatantly violate basic human rights and constitutional values. Ash’ari proponents cannot claim higher moral authority in combating radicalization.
This sectarian-based security approach is fundamentally flawed. It unfairly targets groups based on stereotypes while ignoring more pressing threats, such as the rise of far-right extremism, which has eroded national unity and deepened distrust in state institutions, particularly under the Unity government.
Main Leaders Want Different Things
Despite their political differences, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Hadi Awang, the leader of PAS, have both called for a closer examination of the Mufti Bill. As global Islamist figures, they promote taqrib, a vision aimed at bridging sectarian divides within the Muslim ummah. This agenda has gained traction, particularly in light of Israel’s brutal attacks in response to the Hamas attacks of October 7, which have worsened the plight of Muslims in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria.
Both leaders regularly engage with Muslim figures across sectarian lines, including controversial figures from Hamas, the Egyptian and Turkish Muslim Brotherhood, and Iran’s Shia leadership. Hadi’s recent meeting with Iranian clerics and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps emphasized his established ties with Shia leaders. However, this outreach is not about inclusiveness; Hadi’s rhetoric remains deeply marked by anti-Western and “anti-infidel” sentiments, while his party aggressively pushes for ethno-religious dominance and espouses anti-minority sentiment domestically.
Anwar’s administration must confront, not ignore, this growing sectarian competition. After his first release from prison, Anwar endorsed the Amman Message in 2005, alongside prominent Malaysian figures like former UMNO youth leader and Health Minister Khairy Jamaluddin. This historic agreement, supported by global Muslim leaders amid Al-Qaeda’s threats, recognizes all Islamic sects, including Shia, and forbids the excommunication of Muslims.
Anwar’s Unity government must also embed non-sectarian values into its domestic policies. Malaysian Muslims are not a monolithic group, and the nation’s broader society is even more diverse. With strong parliamentary backing and a positive economic outlook this year, the government is well-placed to enact laws that embrace this diversity and address underlying challenges. Islam, as the country’s official religion, should be promoted as a universal value that protects diversity across sects and communities. Religious institutions must also uphold higher standards of inclusivity and accountability, operating within democratic processes like all other public institutions.