The ideological divide that emerged between the Shahbagh Movement and the Hefazat-e-Islam uprising in 2013 has had a lasting impact on Bangladesh’s political and social discourse. The Shahbagh Movement, largely secular with some radical leftist elements, began with demands for the death penalty for war criminals involved in Bangladesh’s 1971 Liberation War. The central slogan of the movement was “Hang the Razakars (collaborators),” referring specifically to leaders of the Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (BJI) who were accused of collaborating with the Pakistani military during the 1971 war.
Lucky Akter from the Bangladesh Students’ Union (BSU), a secular student wing, was the key figure of the Shabagh platform. Later, Imran H. Sarker, who was associated with the ruling Awami League (AL), assumed domination of the movement. With this, the AL quickly moved to co-opt the Shahbagh movement for its own political benefit.
The ideological roots of Shahbagh date back to around 2007 when secular youth began using blogs as platforms for their ideas, some of which leaned toward radical leftist and atheist ideologies. Blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, a self-proclaimed atheist and Shahbagh supporter, was killed on February 15, 2013. His blogs were later published by Amar Desh, a newspaper critical of Shahbagh.
The focus on Rajib’s writings fueled a perception that Shahbagh was an anti-Islamic movement. In response to Shahbagh, Hefazat-e-Islam (Protector of Islam), a coalition of madrassa-based Islamic organizations, emerged. Hefazat demanded the implementation of 13 points, including a blasphemy law, and staged a mass protest in Dhaka’s Motijheel area on May 5, 2013.
The government crackdown on Hefazat’s May 2013 protest led to significant casualties, with at least 61 deaths reported by human rights group Odhikar. Due to that report, the Awami League government filed a case against Odhikar’s then-Secretary Adilur Rahman Khan and the organization’s sitting director, A.S.M. Nasiruddin Elan, under section 57 of the draconian Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act, 2006 (amended 2009). However, the crackdown’s portrayal in the media and civil society further polarized opinions. Hefazat members were often labeled as radicals or terrorists in the media, which downplayed the death toll.
Over time, the Shahbagh and Hefazat camps developed into opposing ideological factions. The Shahbagh Movement’s supporters often branded their critics as “new Razakars,” a term carrying immense historical weight in Bangladesh, as it was used to describe those who collaborated with the Pakistani military in 1971.
Even in 2024, during the protests against Sheikh Hasina’s regime, this term was used, contributing to the heated ideological environment. Hasina herself used the term “sons of Razakars” against the protesters, further fueling public anger.
The 2024 protests united a broad coalition against Hasina’s authoritarian rule, because both left-wing activists (like Shahidul Alam) and right-wing figures (like Mamunul Haque) were persecuted by the Hasina regime. The Digital Security Act (DSA) became a tool for silencing dissent. For example, cartoonist Ahmed Kabir Kishore and writer Mushtaq Ahmed were detained under the DSA for posting on Facebook satirical cartoons and comments critical of the Bangladeshi government’s response to COVID-19 pandemic. Later Ahmed died in custody, highlighting the regime’s harsh tactics.
Despite the unity during the 2024 protest movement, old divisions between Shahbagh and Hefazat quickly resurfaced in the post-revolutionary environment, reigniting ideological battles. Despite efforts to reform Bangladesh’s political and social institutions in the wake of the 2024 revolution, the ideological conflict between Shahbagh and Hefazat remains a central issue, complicating attempts to build a more inclusive and democratic society.
Prominent leftist scholars, such as Salimullah Khan and Anu Muhammad, had strongly called for Hasina’s resignation, but they continued to face criticism in post-Hasina Bangladesh, particularly from anti-Shahbagh activists. Both scholars, affiliated with the University Teachers’ Network, had played roles in organizing new platforms like the Gonotantik Odhikar Committee (Democratic Rights Committee). Their platform was also targets of online critics from the right-wing. Anu Muhammad, known for his activism against the Rampal Power Plant due to its environmental impact on the Sundarbans, even withdrew from consideration for a vice chancellor position in Jahangirnagar University (JU) due to the controversy surrounding his candidacy.
The Shahbagh-Hefazat debate has resurfaced recently with the candidacy of practicing Muslim scholars for the vice chancellor and pro vice chancellor positions at the University of Dhaka. Left-leaning activists expressed concerns about these appointments, while right-wing factions accused the critics of Islamophobia.
One of the key figures, Mohammad Ismail, a pro vice chancellor candidate for the University of Dhaka, faced intense scrutiny due to his past association with the Islami Chhatra Shibir, an Islamist student organization. Fahmidul Haq, a former professor of the University of Dhaka and a member of the leftist University Teacher Network, was among those leading the criticism. In the end, while Ismail was not appointed to the University of Dhaka, he was appointed to another rural university.
In another instance, two professors – Samina Lutfa and Kamrul Hasan – who were appointed to an education reform committee, were criticized by pro-right scholars, who labeled them as pro-LGBTQ, anti-Islamic figures. Ultimately, the government dissolved their appointment.
These examples, fueled by the Shahbagh-Hefazat debate, show how these ideological divisions continue to influence policy decisions. The debate, which has spilled into cyberspace, often exacerbates tensions and distress within society. Online attacks, where people are labeled and attacked based on ideological differences, have intensified. A striking example is Mahbub Morshed, appointed managing director of Bangladesh Sangbad Sangstha (BSS), who was criticized online as “pro-Shahbagh,” despite being a vocal critic of Shahbagh’s perceived fascist tendencies.
Mahfuj Alam, the mastermind of the 2024 revolution and special assistant to Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus, highlighted in a recent interview that, through intellectual and cultural activities, the interim government has made efforts to bridge the ideological gaps in the country. In post-revolution Bangladesh, the government, students, and civil society have all committed to reforming political and state institutions. The youth are committed to not just institutional reforms but also to building an inclusive nation with contributions from individuals with diverse ideologies. However, the identities formed around being “pro-Shahbagh” or “anti-Shahbagh” continue to shape political discourse and influence policy, creating challenges for the government as it seeks mass support for reform initiatives.
The government has establish six reform commissions for key sectors: an election system reform commission led by Dr Badiul Alam Majumdar, a police reform commission led by Safar Raz Hossain, a judiciary reform commission led by Justice Shah Abu Naeem Mominur Rahman, an anti-corruption reform commission led by Dr. Iftekharuzzaman, a public administration reform commission led by Abdul Mueed Chowdhury, and a constitution reform commission led by Ali Riaz. The constitutional reforms commission may face significant hurdles as secular groups push for a more secular constitution, while Islamist groups apply pressure for pro-Islamic clauses to be added.
Although the 2024 revolution was driven by a spirit of unity across ideological divides to fight against the former regime’s authoritarianism, challenges remain. The police force and public administration are still recovering from the trauma of the previous regime, and while many district commissioners appointed by the Hasina government have been replaced, the process is still incomplete.
The 2024 revolution sparked a sense of collective consciousness and a drive for a democratic and humanistic Bangladesh. However, the practice of labeling and attacking opponents on social media persists. During the revolution, social media played a crucial role in countering Hasina’s narrative with memes and viral videos, often mocking her statements with counterarguments. In the post-revolution period, however, social media has also seen instances of harmful behavior, such as the social media trial of an Indigenous adolescent who claimed “Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) is ours” amid unrest in the CHT.
The revolution was also marked by irony, particularly in the way people reclaimed Hasina’s accusations of being Razakars. People responded to her use of the label by chanting: “Who are you, who am I? Razakar, Razakar” as an ironic counter.
Rehnuma Ahmed, a prominent leftist activist, protested on August 3, just before Hasina’s fall, with a placard saying, “Hasina, you are a killer.” More recently, she staged another protest with a placard that ironically countered radical Islamists’ labeling of opponents as “anti-Islamic,” echoing the student protesters’ words: “Who are you, who am I? Anti-religious, anti-religious. Stop tagging.”
Despite the need for unity to rebuild and reform Bangladesh, the ideological tensions from the 2013 Shahbagh-Hefazat conflict continue to influence the political landscape. This ongoing debate complicates efforts to foster the revolutionary spirit of 2024 and creates obstacles for building a more inclusive, reformed nation.