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How Vietnam Can Realize Its Semiconductor Ambitions

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How Vietnam Can Realize Its Semiconductor Ambitions

Success will require the country to leverage its geo-economic strengths while navigating intensifying geopolitical tensions.

How Vietnam Can Realize Its Semiconductor Ambitions
Credit: ID 5251057 © Popa Sorin | Dreamstime.com

Vietnam recently unveiled its national strategy for developing the semiconductor industry, signaling its ambition to build a robust semiconductor sector by 2030. This is part of the country’s broader national plan to become a critical player in high-tech industries. While the strategy involves gradually building local expertise and integrating Vietnam into the assembly, packaging, and testing (APT) stages of the semiconductor value chain, it signals the country’s long-term objective of becoming a leading global semiconductor hub. This strategy also aligns with Vietnam’s broader goal of developing its electronics industry and enhancing its artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities.

As Vietnam places its bets in its talent pool and local electronics sector to brand itself as the next safe location to host the global value chain, success depends on how the country navigates geopolitical headwinds and leverages its geo-economic strengths.

Carving Out a Niche in a Competitive Region

Vietnam’s aspirations in the semiconductor sector come at a time when the global industry is saturated and fiercely competitive, with regional competitors such as Malaysia having a decades-long presence in semiconductor APT. However, there are a couple of advantages available to Hanoi.

The first of these is the high degree of consistency and predictability afforded by Vietnam’s domestic political environment. Unlike some of its regional peers, Vietnam is not prone to sudden shifts in policy direction or political upheavals. As national strategies tend to be inherited and promoted between generations of leaders, major policy disruptions are de-risked by design. For foreign companies looking to make long-term commitments in Vietnam’s semiconductor and technology industries, this stability is a crucial asset.

Second, Vietnam’s youthful population and substantial talent pipeline provide a strong economic advantage as major semiconductor hubs like the U.S. and South Korea are projecting massive labor shortages by 2030. Planned investment in the talent pool would propel Vietnam as the next Asian net talent exporter to address the global labor market gap. With a large pool of skilled workers, Vietnam has the potential to climb the value chain – moving from APT to chip design, prototyping, and even fundamental research – establishing the country as the next know-how hub.

Lastly, Vietnam’s strategic neutrality and warm diplomatic relations with key players in the global semiconductor industry add to its attractiveness as a leading semiconductor hub. This allows Hanoi to carefully navigate geopolitical risks whilst avoiding taking sides with major superpowers, allowing them to do business with all parties. The comprehensive strategic partnerships that Vietnam has signed have established foundations for deeper business cooperation, as seen in the rising number of business deals – e.g., Amkor’s increased investment in its APT plan in Bac Ninh, delivery of chip design training from Cadence and Synopsys in Da Nang, and the expansion of design operations of Marvell – all of which signal further investments into R&D operations in the country. Leveraging such forms of economic diplomacy will go a long way to help Vietnam position itself strategically in the global semiconductor race and mitigate the shortcomings of coming late to the game.

Potential Challenges

However, warm diplomatic relations do not mean Vietnam can act without due caution. There are numerous potential geopolitical pitfalls, the most significant of which is Vietnam’s relationship with both the U.S. and China. Growing pressure to pick a side could mean that Vietnam’s balancing act would face increasing scrutiny as it attempts to acquire the necessary knowledge and capabilities to move up the semiconductor value chain.

Even as Vietnam enters the global race, there are other countries that are already in the competition and adopting similar strategies. India is an important talent hub, and the likes of Malaysia and Indonesia have a head-start when it comes to attracting foreign investment. Vietnam risks losing momentum should it fail to sell its biggest comparative advantages and pick up the pace.

Vietnam’s entrance into the APT supply chain also comes at a time when there is growing global demand for compliance with sustainability standards. As the semiconductor industry faces increasing scrutiny over its high carbon emissions and extensive water usage, Hanoi is also working to adapt existing infrastructure, balancing between meeting its U.N. climate change targets and expanding its footprint in the global semiconductor industry.

Conclusion

By leveraging its political stability, demographic advantages, and balanced diplomatic relations, Vietnam has the potential to develop into a significant player in the global semiconductor value chain. However, success hinges on Vietnam’s ability to navigate geopolitical tensions, manage environmental challenges, and invest in its workforce and infrastructure.

If Vietnam can successfully address these challenges and seize its competitive advantages, it will be well-positioned to capitalize on the ongoing shifts in global supply chains.

Authors
Guest Author

Ngoc Bach

Ngoc Bach is an Associate at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, based in the Vietnam Country Office. He has extensive public policy experience across the corporate and research sectors. His expertise is on trade facilitation and the geo-economic dynamics of the Asia-Pacific region.

Guest Author

Kenddrick Chan

Kenddrick Chan is a Senior Policy Analyst (Geopolitics) at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. He also leads the Digital International Relations project at LSE IDEAS (the LSE's foreign policy think-tank). He is a member of the United Nations ESCAP Informal Working Group on sustainable digital transformation in the Asia-Pacific region and was previously a G20 delegate at the Think20 for India's G20 presidency.

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