Militant groups do not operate in a vacuum, they are byproducts of international geopolitics, and hence both are closely interlinked. As global geopolitical circumstances evolve, militant groups also adjust their strategic aims, ideological goals as well as operational, fundraising and recruitment strategies.
International geopolitical events shape militancy in several respects. For instance, during the final phase of the Cold War, jihadist groups were used as proxies by the West to fight the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, while after 9/11 the erstwhile militant proxies became “terrorists” for attacking the U.S.
In the last four decades, the Russia-Afghan war and the global war on terror have birthed two generations of jihadists spearheaded by the Afghan mujahideen groups in the 1980s and later by al-Qaida and the Islamic State (IS) in the 2000s.
Below the threshold of global militancy, several local and regional militant movements waging armed insurrections in Kashmir like Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen; Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Palestine; and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Islamic Jihad Council in Central Asia also emerged.
After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and the shift in focus from the war on terror to its geopolitical competition with China, global militancy lost its preeminence. Despite the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan in August 2021, al-Qaida and IS were at their weakest, suffering from leadership decapitations, territorial losses, the inability to mount largescale attacks as well as declining appeal of their extremist ideologies.
However, Israel’s Gaza War has partially revived the global militant movement. Concerningly, the fight, which started with Hamas’ Operation al-Aqsa Flood has spawned into a regional conflict, engulfing Lebanon and Iran into its vortex as well. In the coming months, the duration of the Israel-Palestine conflict, Washington’s support for Tel Aviv and the scale of Israeli hostilities will be three key critical factors in defining a new wave of global militancy. The anger in the Muslim world against Israel, the Western double standards and moral hypocrisy will provide militant groups with a fertile ground to recruit and radicalize.
If the conflict lasts for a longer duration, it has a greater potential of straining the ties between the Muslim and the Western worlds. This fault-line will provide groups like al-Qaida and IS with an ideal opening to exploit Muslim sentiments. At the same time, if the Iran-Israel tensions continue to escalate in the aftermath of Tehran’s ballistic missile attacks on Tel Aviv, it will mobilize Shia fighters to form new proxy groups. For instance, following the emergence of IS in Iraq and Syria, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) recruited, trained and financed Shia fighters from Pakistan and Afghanistan, establishing al-Zainabiyoun and al-Fatimyoun bridges, respectively.
Jihadist groups in South Asia have appropriated the Israel-Palestine conflict in their propaganda narratives to fuel recruitment and funding. They have aligned themselves with evolving sentiments in the Muslim world. For instance, al-Qaida in the Indian Sub-continent (AQIS) has compared Hamas’s October 7, 2023 attack with al-Qaida’s 9/11 attack and the Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan, calling it a watershed movement. Likewise, al-Qaida’s de-facto leader Saif al-Adl has written eight lengthy essays on the Gaza war between November 2023-July 2024, inciting attacks against Israel, Jews and the West. Similarly, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) termed the October 7 attack as a victory for Hamas and drew parallels with its own armed insurrection with the Pakistani military. Interestingly, while congratulating Hamas and condemning Israeli atrocities, TTP reassured the world about its Pakistan-centric agenda.
The de-facto Taliban regime in Afghanistan criticized Israel and expressed support for Hamas in various statements. However, rather than urging Muslim youth to pick up arms, it urged the United Nations and the Organization of Islamic Countries to use their diplomatic influence on Israel to stop Gaza’s ground invasion. The Taliban’s behavior is geared towards showcasing their regime as a responsible member of the international community despite lacking diplomatic recognition. Hence, by issuing statements corresponding to the existing diplomatic structures and parameters of the international political system, the Taliban aim to gain support for their diplomatic recognition.
On the contrary, the Islamic State of Khorasan (ISK)’s response in South Asia has been pro-Palestine and anti-Taliban. ISK has maneuvered its propaganda on the Israel-Palestine war in a way to name and shame the Taliban for paying lip service to the Palestinian cause and shying away from sending its fighters to fight against Israel. In doing so, ISK has accused the Taliban of being a “U.S. stooge.” The group’s narrative also censured Hamas and its principal supporters, Iran and Qatar, for pushing Palestine into bloodshed. ISK proposed its parent group’s so-called Sunni Caliphate as the best and most durable solution to address the issue of occupied Muslim lands. ISK has also exploited the anger in the Muslim world against Israel and the West to inspire lone-wolf attacks.
Beyond South Asia, the Middle Eastern countries’ focus on socio-economic reforms to evolve from oil-based economies, break from conventional religious paradigms of Wahabism and normalize ties with Israel created hopes for a post-Islamist era. However, the Israel-Palestine war will potentially take the Middle East back to the old paradigm and spawn a new militant generation feeding on anti-Israel and anti-West rhetoric.
Likewise, an entire generation of militant leaders like Haniyeh and Nasrallah have been eliminated in the recent tensions, at a time when al-Qaida and IS were already suffering from a lack of charismatic leadership. Therefore, the potential mobilization of a new generation of militants would also produce a new crop of militant leaders. In the 1980s, the Russia-Afghan war produced militant figures like Abdullah Azzam, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Likewise, the post-9/11 generation of militants were represented by the likes of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Similarly, current tensions and the concurrent leadership vacuum will throw up a new leadership.
On the other side of the ideological spectrum, due to growing anger of Muslims against the West for supporting Israel, there has been a significant rise in hate speech against Muslims and Islamophobia. While some far-right, Neo-Nazi groups revel in anti-Semitic rhetoric and hold Jews responsible for the unrest in the Middle East, others have expressed their anger against Muslims for pro-Palestine rallies and anti-Israel slogans. White supremacist groups hold migrant communities, particularly Muslims, responsible for all ills befalling the West. They are staunch advocates for expelling the Muslims from the West. This tit-for-tat rhetorical propaganda on both sides of the ideological spectrum can produce reciprocal radicalization.
In a nutshell, just as the U.S. failed to eliminate al-Qaida following the 9/11 attacks and left Afghanistan by paving the way for the Taliban’s return to power, Israel will not be able to eliminate Hamas and Hezbollah. Likewise, the Palestinian resistance will live on as long as a two-state solution is not found, and Israeli atrocities persist. On the contrary, prolonging the conflict under the illusion of eliminating the resistance will birth a new generation of militants.