Former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris offer two distinct visions for U.S. foreign policy: Trump’s “America First” approach and Harris’s commitment to liberal internationalism. But here’s the rub – neither vision is likely to result in a significant enhancement of the India-U.S. strategic relationship.
On the one hand, Trump’s transactional diplomacy and tolerance of India’s ties with Russia, as well as its membership in the anti-U.S., counter-hegemonic BRICS coalition, may avoid immediate conflict, but will fail to elevate the partnership to a more strategic level. On the other hand, Harris’s focus on human rights and a tougher stance on India’s relationship with Russia and BRICS could create friction, particularly given India’s insistence on maintaining its strategic autonomy.
Both candidates, however, have one thing in common. They overlook the deeper structural issues – from ongoing trade disputes to India’s domestic political trajectory – that continue to impede a more meaningful and enduring India-U.S. alliance.
India-U.S. Relations in 2024
Under President Joe Biden, India-U.S. relations appeared to experience a revival. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to the United States for the Quad Leaders’ Summit and the United Nations’ Summit of the Future underscored commitments to a new era of cooperation across technological, military, economic, and diplomatic spheres.
Yet, beneath this hopeful façade, tensions loom that threaten the partnership. Despite U.S. pressure, India maintains its economic and military ties with Russia and remains a key member of BRICS, a bloc often seen as countering U.S. global influence. Trade disputes, though recently settled, may resurface.
Domestically, India’s increasingly authoritarian tendencies, marked by rising Hindu nationalism, are cause for concern. Political opponents have been jailed, activists like U.S. citizen Gurpatwant Singh Pannun have allegedly been targeted for assassination, and discrimination against religious minorities has increased.
Left unaddressed, these issues could derail the partnership. Unfortunately, neither Trump nor Harris seems well-equipped to navigate these challenges.
Russia and Ukraine
India’s relationship with Russia has long been a point of friction with the United States. In the 2023-24 financial year, India imported $140 billion worth of Russian oil – 56 times more than pre-Ukraine war levels. India’s refusal to condemn Russia at the United Nations and its long history of purchasing Russian military equipment complicate India-U.S. relations. While diversification is underway, India remains closely tied to Russia diplomatically, and its membership in BRICS aligns it with other states challenging U.S. global leadership.
If elected, Harris is expected to continue, or even intensify, the Biden administration’s foreign policy toward Russia, which could strain relations with India. Any pressure on New Delhi to distance itself from Russia or BRICS will likely be resisted, as India values its strategic autonomy and perceives its ties with Russia as essential for counterbalancing China.
Trump, on the other hand, is unlikely to confront Modi over India’s ties to Russia or BRICS. His skepticism about continued aid to Ukraine and his softer stance on Russia contrast sharply with Harris’s approach. While this may reduce short-term friction with India, a Trump administration could weaken long-term efforts to decouple India from Russia, especially if U.S. sanctions on Russian defense articles are overlooked, as they were when India purchased Russian S-400 air defense systems during Trump’s first term.
Trade Disputes
For years, trade disputes have clouded India-U.S. relations. While bilateral trade has increased, so have trade conflicts over protectionism. U.S. tariffs on Indian steel and aluminum triggered retaliatory measures, and the United States criticized India’s digital services tax and agricultural policies. In 2023, outstanding trade disputes at the World Trade Organization (WTO) were resolved, potentially signaling a new chapter in trade relations.
A Trump victory, however, could reignite trade tensions. His first-term tariffs could resurface, and his campaign pledge to impose a 20 percent tax on all U.S. imports would almost certainly provoke retaliation from India, reigniting WTO feuds.
Harris, while not offering a clear trade policy, is likely to maintain Biden’s measured approach. While the administration kept some Trump era policies, they were focused on reducing dependence on China and for the most part coordinated with allies. This should provide stability for future trade growth between the two countries.
Democracy
Modi’s authoritarianism threatens the shared democratic values that are meant to underpin the India-U.S. relationship. Under his leadership, India has shifted toward electoral autocracy, and despite the Bharatiya Janata Party underperforming in the 2024 elections, Modi’s authoritarian policies and Hindu nationalism remain potent forces.
Harris has been critical of Modi’s government in the past, particularly on human rights and the Kashmir issue. Should she choose to focus on these concerns, tensions with India could rise, particularly if she presses on issues that touch on India’s territorial integrity, such as Kashmir.
Conversely, Trump has been openly supportive of Modi, praising his leadership and drawing parallels with other authoritarian figures like Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Hungary’s Viktor Orban. Under a Trump administration, India’s authoritarian shift is unlikely to strain India-U.S. relations, but it could create a less stable foundation for future cooperation, particularly under a future administration with different values.
Indo-Pacific Geopolitics
The core driver of the India-U.S. partnership is shared concerns over China’s rise. India’s border disputes with China in the Himalayas and its dominance over the Indian Ocean align with U.S. efforts to counter China’s influence. India has begun decoupling from Chinese technology and is increasingly integrated with Western institutions like the Quad.
Neither Trump nor Harris is expected to dramatically alter the U.S. stance on China. Both view China as a major threat, albeit with different approaches to dealing with this threat. Harris is likely to continue Biden’s policies of strengthening alliances, maintaining tariffs on Chinese goods, and preventing military escalation. Trump’s approach, while also aimed at countering China, has been more erratic, marked by tariffs but inconsistent on key issues like Taiwan’s defense.
Although both approaches align broadly with Indian interests, Trump’s unpredictability regarding alliance commitments could give India pause. Uncertainty over U.S. support in the face of Chinese aggression might prompt India to revert to its earlier strategy of balancing relations with both the United States and China. However, given Trump’s strong rhetoric against China, this is unlikely.
It is improbable – but not impossible – that a President Harris could ramp up engagement with China. She was a leading figure in talks with President Xi Jinping in 2022 and emphasized the importance of managing competition. More importantly, Governor Tim Walz, Harris’ running mate, taught in China for a year, and while critical of the Chinese government, he could take a Nixonian role toward rapprochement.
This would be a nightmare scenario for the Indian security establishment, who fear a China-U.S. G-2 would displace them in Asia. Nonetheless, this shouldn’t be a concern if Harris stays the course of the Biden administration.
India-U.S. Relations Beyond 2024
Regardless of who wins the U.S. presidential election, fundamental security interests will continue to bind the United States and India, making a breakup unlikely. Yet, both candidates face significant challenges in strengthening the partnership. Without a clear strategy to address trade, democracy, Russia, and India’s role in BRICS, there’s a risk that existing tensions will escalate and opportunities for deeper cooperation will slip away.