As China-U.S. geopolitical competition intensifies, developments in Southeast Asia are taking on new importance. In Indonesia, while hopes were initially high that the alliance between the outgoing and incoming presidents would provide political stability, differences in policy priorities and ruling styles are threatening to undermine their relationship and destabilize the country’s democracy.
Indonesia’s growing economy, predicted to average growth of 5.1 percent over the next two years, and its expanding military capabilities, facilitate the country’s ability to increase its regional and global standing. Further, similar to Vietnam, it can leverage the competition between the United States and China to its advantage and reap the benefits. These advancements, along with its geostrategically important position, make Indonesia a potential key partner for great powers. However, the country’s continued growth depends on its ability to maintain stable domestic conditions. As a result, instability within ruling coalitions poses a risk to the nation’s capacity to realize its full potential.
Outgoing President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo is extremely popular and his support, in no small part, assisted former Defense Minister Prabowo Subianto’s ability to secure the presidency. Prabowo previously ran for president against Jokowi two times to no avail. But after the term-limited Jokowi tacitly endorsed his former rival, Prabowo handedly won the presidency in February’s election.
However, cracks in their coalition soon began to show.
One area of contention is how to handle the budget. Jokowi is adamant on the completion of Indonesia’s future capital, Nusantara. However, Jokowi’s $30 billion project has faced continuous problems: from difficulties in funding, to critical infrastructure delays, and a lack of civil servants actually showing up in the city. The current government expected 100 trillion rupiah or over $6.4 billion in investments by the end of 2024, with about 80 percent from private and international investors. Yet, Nusantara has so far only received about $3.5 billion in investment from mostly domestic companies and state-owned institutions. Chinese property firm Delonix Group recently became the first foreign company to invest in the capital, with an investment of 500 billion rupiah ($33 million). Despite these difficulties, Jokowi has been insistent that the project will be fully funded under Prabowo, thereby securing Jokowi’s legacy.
The challenge is that Prabowo’s signature policy of providing free school lunches to nearly 80 million school children by 2029 is projected to take up a sizable portion of the country’s budget. The school lunch project’s price tag of $29 billion makes it highly unlikely the government can fund both projects simultaneously. Indonesian law prohibits the budget deficit from exceeding 3 percent of gross domestic product. Credit agencies, such as Fitch Rating, have already raised concerns regarding the potential for increased spending under a Prabowo administration.
In addition to differences over what to prioritize in the budget, Jokowi’s desire to build a political dynasty could also foment tensions with Prabowo and undermine Indonesian democracy. It is evident that one of the stipulations for Jokowi to throw his support behind Prabowo was for Prabowo to agree to the appointment of Gibran Rakabuming Raka – Jokowi’s son – as his vice president. At just 36, Gibran did not meet the age requirement of 40 years old to run for vice president. Jokowi leaned on the chief justice of the Constitutional Court, his brother-in-law, Anwar Usman, to amend the law. Although Usman was swiftly removed from the court for unethical conduct after he amended the law, the legal change stood, and Gibran will be vice president.
While the appointment of Jokowi’s son as vice president had been accepted without too much political backlash, the same cannot be said for Jokowi’s attempts to amend the country’s election laws set by the Constitutional Court. In August, the Constitutional Court lowered the threshold for a candidate to be nominated as a local leader so that they only needed the backing of parties with 7.5 percent of the popular vote for provinces with 6 to 12 million eligible voters, and only 6 percent for provinces with over 12 million eligible voters. This is compared to the previous requirements of 20 percent of legislative seats or 25 percent of the popular vote to nominate candidates for regional positions.
A second case, which would have buttressed Jokowi’s attempts to expand his influence by allowing citizens under 30 to seek regional governorships, was dismissed by the courts earlier that same day. Jokowi had hoped that parliament would be able to change age limits and permit 29-year-old Kaesang Pangarep, Jokowi’s youngest son, to run for office in Central Java.
Jokowi has downplayed these disputes as simply “checks and balances” of government. However, in an emergency session, the parliament, stacked with Jokowi and Prabowo supporters, tried to overturn the rulings and revise the law to return to the threshold of 20 percent. This reversal would have effectively eliminated one of the president-elect’s main rivals, Anies Baswedan, from running as a candidate for the Jakarta governorship – often a stepping-stone to the presidency.
These actions proved too much for the people to accept and resulted in thousands of Indonesians storming the streets in August in protest, with some attempting to overrun the country’s parliament building in Jakarta. In the end, the legislature ultimately postponed an emergency plenary session over the unrest, first citing the body’s failure to meet a quorum before caving to protesters’ demands. Notably, although Anies remains the most popular candidate and cleared the necessary legal hurdles, PDI-P (Jokowi’s former party) chose not to nominate him.
It is clear that Jokowi wants to secure a lasting legacy in Indonesian politics and is willing to erode Indonesian democracy to achieve his goals. Moreover, despite leaving office in October, he will still be able to retain a portion of his influence through the recent appointment of a loyalist – Bahlil Lahadalia – as head of Indonesia’s second-largest political party, Golkar.
Jokowi’s efforts to secure his political dynasty and oversee the continuation of construction of Nusantara have the potential to cause friction with incoming President Prabowo. Due to the authority both figures hold, a split between Jokowi and Prabowo could lead to political instability in one of the fastest growing economies in the world and the most populous Southeast Asian nation. If Prabowo wants to maintain political stability and elevate Indonesia’s regional and global presence, he must develop his own independent base of power, find a way to curb Jokowi’s interference, and endeavor to “rehabilitate” Indonesia’s democracy.