On October 17, the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) of Bangladesh issued arrest warrants for former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, alleging involvement in mass killings during the July-August mass protests. The Hasina government’s brutal suppression of the protests led to the death of more than 800 people, including students. Under pressure, Hasina fled to India, where she remains.
Following Hasina’s ouster from power after an unbroken 15 years at the helm, calls for her prosecution have gained momentum. With so many youth losing their lives under her watch, especially during the student-led protests, the demand for accountability from leaders who brazenly abused their authority has mounted.
However, putting Hasina on trial and convicting her will not be easy and is fraught with political, institutional, and societal challenges.
In theory, Bangladesh’s legal framework allows high-ranking officials, including a former prime minister, to be tried on various offenses that include corruption, human rights abuses, and abuse of power. The Penal Code and the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) Act provide mechanisms for prosecuting public servants. However, the implementation of these mechanisms is often problematic, leading to challenges in effectively prosecuting these cases.
So, although there are laws to prosecute top leaders, the judiciary in Bangladesh, which has often been perceived to be politicized, has undermined their efficacy. Besides, during Hasina’s regime, the courts often functioned as a tool of political vendetta in the hands of the ruling party to prosecute opposition leaders.
When Bangladesh was under neutral caretaker rule between 2006 to 2008, Hasina, who was in opposition then, was charged with corruption. But these charges were droppped after she returned to power, laying bare how political control influences what cases will be tried and what dropped.
In the context of the recent charges, many legal experts have also pointed out that it may be difficult to prove that Hasina did in fact order law enforcement agencies to open fire on students during the protests. Documented evidence will be needed to prove this.
From 2009 onward, the consolidation of power in Bangladesh’s key institutions — the judiciary, law enforcement, and the ACC — ultimately rendered these bodies vulnerable to political interference. The ACC pursued cases against opposition figures with great vigor, while toning down allegations against Hasina’s close associates. These indicate that a conviction, even when evidence is adequate, could be thwarted by political obstacles.
Although public sentiment dramatically turned against Hasina during the protests, especially amongst the youth, Hasina retains a formidable base of support within the Awami League (AL) that she led for decades. One must not underestimate such political support because her prosecution could be projected by her supporters as a personal attack on Hasina and her legacy, triggering violence and unrest among them.
After Hasina’s ouster, AL supporters organized numerous rallies across the country, particularly in Gopalganj, Hasina’s hometown. In some instances, they even attacked soldiers. Post-Hasina, AL activists are slowly becoming more visibly active on the streets and in social media. On the night of October 19, for example, a group of around 15-25 men took out a procession and chanted slogans in support of the AL in Chittagong.
Given the AL’s ground support and influence, convicting Hasina, the most popular figure in the party and its leading face, will deepen the already serious political polarization in the country. This could in turn tear Bangladesh’s fragile democratic fabric.
There is also concern over Hasina’s conviction setting a bad precedent.
If Hasina is convicted, other leaders who pursue an authoritarian style of politics may be even more unwilling to relinquish their grip on power, aware that if they do, they do will be brought to trial for their crimes.
This could create an environment where incumbents cling to power, using all means available to avoid the fate of prosecution. In a country like Bangladesh, with its history of volatile political transitions, this fear alone might dissuade new leaders from pursuing legal action against Hasina.
International dynamics could further deter Hasina’s conviction. As prime minister, Hasina maintained a good balance between regional rivals India and China by utilizing their strategic interests in Bangladesh to her advantage. China was investing billions of dollars in infrastructural projects, while India had strengthened cooperation with Bangladesh, particularly in areas of security and regional influence. Anything that might make Hasina face prosecution will upset these relationships, possibly viewed by her international friends as destabilizing the region.
India has long been a safe haven for Hasina. It was India that sheltered her during the turbulent years after the 1975 assassination of her father, then Bangladesh’s President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and now after she was ousted in mass protests. India is unlikely to hand her over to Bangladesh for trial due to its strong bond with her family and the fact that she did act to protect India’s security interests. Additionally, there is the question of how India’s neighbors will view India handing her over to the Bangladeshi government. Other leaders in the region would lose trust in India.
Western powers, most notably the United States were critical of Hasina’s record on human rights and democratic processes. The Biden Administration even imposed sanctions on top leaders of Bangladesh’s Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), citing various human rights abuses.
But if Hasina were to be taken to court, international pressure from human rights groups and even governments could escalate. There could also be backlash at home. Some in Bangladesh are already raising concern over foreign interference and their deepening of divisions within Bangladesh’s already polarized political environment.
The role of civil society and the formation of public opinion are probably the most unpredictable elements in this equation. The protests in July showed that grassroots movements, particularly those led by students and the younger generation, redraw political discourses for the country. It sent ripples across the nation as the demand for transparency, accountability, and justice resonated in a public outcry for reforms. Civil society, media and activists could push for Hasina’s accountability. It is tough, however, to sustain such movements over time, as scenarios change and other issues come to the fore.
While the conviction of Hasina may be legally possible legally, the path to justice is far from straightforward as Bangladesh’s institutions are deeply intertwined with political agendas and international ties, creating significant obstacles in the pursuit of accountability.
Without real judicial independence, military support, and sustained public pressure, any move to prosecute her will stall or boomerang. As Bangladesh charts a transition towards its post-Hasina future, the question of legal accountability for her thus remains open, like an unresolved chapter in this complex political history of the nation.