The end of Sheikh Hasina’s regime on August 5, 2024 came as a surprise to many. No one anticipated her imminent downfall even the day before. It appeared that Hasina’s 15-plus-year rule would continue uninterrupted, given her firm grip on state institutions and the political system.
In her time in office, Hasina had maintained strong diplomatic relations with key global powers like China, the United States, India, and Russia. However, for many years, political analysts speculated that Bangladesh under her leadership was gradually shifting toward a Chinese-style authoritarian model. This perception was further fueled by Hasina’s strategy of consolidating power, weakening democratic institutions, and adopting a “hyper-responsive” government – mirroring some aspects of the Chinese governance model.
Yet, despite her attempts to emulate China’s model, Hasina failed to replicate its success for two critical reasons: her ideology was disconnected from the masses, and Bangladesh’s economic struggles from 2021 onward undermined her regime’s legitimacy.
For many political observers, Hasina’s governance had increasingly resembled the authoritarian model of China. Over her long tenure, Hasina systematically dismantled political checks and balances, weakening key institutions such as the judiciary, media, and electoral system. Like the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), her government suppressed dissent, marginalized opposition parties, and was highly intolerant of militancy, crime, and drug-related offenses. Her party, the Awami League, drew its legitimacy from its pivotal role in the country’s 1971 war of independence, similar to how the CCP ties its political dominance to its revolutionary roots. For these reasons, Bangladesh’s drift toward authoritarianism under Hasina was often compared to China’s one-party system.
However, Hasina’s ability to replicate the Chinese model only went so far. China’s success in maintaining authoritarian control is deeply rooted in the CCP’s “Mass Line” ideology, which emphasizes governance based on the aspirations of the masses. This ideology, first articulated by Li Lisan and later refined by Mao Zedong, operates on the principle of “from the masses, to the masses,” where the government seeks to understand and reflect popular demands. Over time, the CCP has initiated various movements to engage with the population, such as the anti-prostitution campaigns of the 2010s, and has cultivated a strong relationship with the peasantry and working class, which form the backbone of Chinese society.
In contrast, Hasina’s political ideology was elitist, alienating the majority of the population. The ideology she espoused – what could be termed “Bengali-Awamism” or “Hasinaism” – was rooted in Bengali nationalism and her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s legacy of Mujibism, which consisted of four key pillars: Bengali nationalism, secularism, democracy, and socialism. Bengali nationalism, in particular, became a cornerstone of Hasina’s regime. It was an identity constructed around the Bengali language, culture, and ethnicity, which had taken shape in the wake of Bangladesh’s liberation from Pakistan in 1971.
Mujibism was, to some extent, anti-Islamist, due to Bangladesh’s separation from the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the subsequent banning of Islamist parties. Hasina took this ideology a step further by emphasizing a “consciousness of the Liberation War.” In her political rhetoric, this “consciousness” became a divisive tool: those who opposed the Awami League were branded as enemies of the state, effectively aligning them with Pakistan, the defeated power of 1971. Being a supporter of the Awami League was portrayed as synonymous with being a true Bengali, a strategy that dehumanized the opposition.
This constructed form of Bengali nationalism – Bengali-Awamism – was inherently elite-driven. It had little to no connection with the masses, particularly the rural poor, religious communities, and Islamist groups, who felt excluded from this narrative. The lack of grassroots engagement in Hasina’s political ideology marked a stark contrast to the Chinese Communist Party, which was deeply intertwined with the peasantry and laborers. This disconnect became one of the critical reasons Hasina failed to consolidate the kind of control that China’s leaders enjoy. By alienating large segments of the population and aligning her regime with an elitist and exclusionary ideology, Hasina sowed the seeds of her own unpopularity.
Another key reason why Hasina could not emulate China’s success was the sharp decline in Bangladesh’s economy. While China’s authoritarianism has been bolstered by its economic success, particularly its rapid growth and rise as a global economic powerhouse, Hasina’s regime faced mounting economic challenges from 2021 onward. Up until that point, Bangladesh’s economy had been lauded as one of the fastest-growing in South Asia, often referred to as a new “Asian Tiger.” However, after 2021, the country’s economic fortunes took a sharp downturn.
By June 2024, Bangladesh’s foreign exchange reserves had dwindled from a robust $48 billion in 2021 to a mere $16 billion. Inflation had surged to over 9 percent, and the cost of living became unbearable for many ordinary citizens. This economic instability caused widespread dissatisfaction, particularly among the working class and youth, who were struggling to cope with rising food and fuel prices. Hasina’s government, which had once been praised for its economic growth, found itself blamed for the sudden economic hardships.
In contrast, China’s authoritarian system has been able to maintain legitimacy through sustained economic growth, lifting millions of people out of poverty and transforming the country into the second-largest economy in the world. The Chinese government’s success in maintaining social order and stability is intrinsically tied to its ability to deliver economic prosperity. For Hasina, the opposite occurred – economic decline eroded her political capital, and the hardships faced by ordinary Bangladeshis further alienated her regime from the masses.
Unlike China, where the CCP faces little organized religious opposition, Bangladesh’s political landscape is characterized by the presence of numerous Islamist parties and groups. These groups, which have been highly resilient in times of crisis, played a significant role in mobilizing opposition against Hasina’s government. Despite Hasina’s attempts to suppress Islamist organizations and control religious narratives, these groups remained influential, particularly during moments of social and economic unrest.
When the student-led movement for jobs gained momentum in early 2024, it quickly snowballed into a broader protest against government corruption, economic mismanagement, and authoritarianism. The non-political nature of the movement initially provided it with a certain level of protection, but as Islamist groups began to lend their support, the protests gained traction among broader segments of the population. Hasina’s government, already weakened by economic challenges, was unable to contain the growing unrest.
In the end, Hasina’s efforts to transform Bangladesh into a Chinese-style authoritarian state failed due to a combination of factors. Her elitist and exclusionary ideology of Bengali-Awamism failed to resonate with the masses, in stark contrast to the CCP’s mass-oriented ideology. Additionally, the economic downturn that began in 2021 severely undermined her regime’s legitimacy, while the resilience of Islamist groups further destabilized the political landscape. These factors, combined with the rising discontent among students and the broader population, ultimately led to Hasina’s downfall, marking the end of her rule and her failed attempt to follow the China mode in Bangladesh.