In Bangladesh, religion has always been an influential factor in domestic politics. Islamist political parties have long held value as pressure groups in politics. Before the Monsoon Revolution of 2024, two major parties – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL) – dominated the political landscape of Bangladesh. Although one party is center-right and the other is center-left, both allied with Islamist political parties when politically advantageous.
Among the religious-based parties, Islamist political groups, particularly Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), and Islami Andolon Bangladesh (IAB), have often been central in political discussions. Some of the Islamist political parties in Bangladesh are labeled as “banner parties” or “one-man-army parties” due to their lower political contribution and lower electoral success.
While Islamist political parties often form alliances with major parties for elections, new dynamics are emerging in the post-Hasina era. It is widely predicted that the AL, the party of recently ousted leader Sheikh Hasina, may not perform well in the next national election. Additionally, many political parties in Bangladesh have a present informal commitment not to give the AL any political space. In this political vacuum, Islamist parties are exploring new alliances, with JI and IAB calling for unity among Islamist political groups for the upcoming parliamentary election. These parties aim to establish themselves as the primary opposition in Parliament, especially in the absence of the AL.
However, despite significant attention in political debates, the electoral outcomes of Bangladesh’s Islamist parties have been underwhelming. In the 1991 national parliamentary election, JI, which claims to be the biggest Islamist group, received 12.13 percent of the popular vote, winning 18 out of 300 seats – the best performance in JI’s history. In the 1996 election, they garnered 8.6 percent of the vote, securing three seats; in 2001, 4.28 percent and 17 seats and in 2008, 4.7 percent but only 2 seats. Over time, JI’s popularity has declined and in the 2001 and 2008 elections, their parliamentary seats were won only through alliances with the BNP. Given these figures, questions arise about how JI can aspire to be a major party with such a small share of the popular vote.
Naib-e-Amir (vice president) of JI, Dr. Syed Abdullah Mohammad Taher, who primarily manages the party’s diplomatic affairs, has recently been meeting with ambassadors from Western and Muslim countries, as well as China and key non-state actors. He told The Diplomat, “It cannot be concluded that our vote has decreased. In 1991, we contested 300 constituencies, but later, we only contested in 30–40.”
When asked if JI plans to contest 300 seats in the next election he answered, “We are still deliberating on our electoral strategy, but we sense that public sympathy and support for Jamaat [JI] have grown.”
When asked about the reasons for this support, Taher explained, “The Jamaat [JI] and Shibir [a student ally of JI] played a role in the August 5 revolution; we all wanted this change and played a strong role in bringing it about.”
Regarding the possibility of Islamist parties uniting and contesting the elections together, Taher commented, “The electoral landscape remains unclear. The issue of unity among Islamist political parties is not yet settled, but we do seek it. Jamaat-e-Islami believes Bangladesh needs both strong national unity and unity among Islamist parties.”
When asked whether JI aims to become the main opposition party in Parliament, he tactfully replied, “Jamaat speaks in the interests of the people, and we will be satisfied with the mandate given by them.” Addressing the possibility of seeking power with the support of Islamist parties, he remarked, “No one could have foreseen Hasina’s potential downfall on August 5, even a month prior. We believe a similar miracle could happen in the upcoming election, much like the rise of the Aam Aadmi Party in Delhi.”
After JI, IAB has become Bangladesh’s most popular Islamist political party in recent times. Over the past decade, IAB has actively pursued political and religious causes, especially during periods when JI’s political activities were unofficially restricted. Despite its active engagement, however, IAB’s influence in electoral dynamics remains limited; in the 2001 national election, it received just 0.01 percent of the vote and secured no seats. In the 2008 election, the Election Commission listed its vote count under the “other” category due to a low voter turnout. Now, IAB is exploring a potential alliance with JI.
Why has IAB responded to JI’s call for unity despite their ideological differences and JI’s declining vote share? One possible reason is the desire for parliamentary representation in the next election, although no party is publicly claiming this goal.
IAB’s Senior Naib-e-Amir Syed Muhammad Faizul Karim told The Diplomat that the alliance is currently in its initial stages, focused on invitations. Once the alliance is fully formed, he said, all stakeholders will collectively decide the future direction. When asked if the alliance is solely to secure parliamentary seats with JI, he clarified, “Our call for alliance is rooted not only in electoral success but in the broader goals of Islam, national welfare, and humanitarian concerns.”
When questioned about specific partnerships with JI and the ideological differences between JI and IAB, he noted that such details would only be finalized in due time.
IAB has gained notable social and political traction, hosting dialogues and social events attended by major political parties, including the AL, BNP, and JI. Even in the post-revolution environment, they continue discussions with right-central parties and with revolutionary student leaders (Students Against Discrimination). This reflects an open-door policy to potential alliances across various groups.
However, IAB leaders maintain a firm stance on their intentions. Syed Muhammad Faizul Karim affirmed, “Our mission is to foster national unity based on the principles of Islam and to ensure a unified commitment to the country’s welfare. Through this unity, we aim to bring welfare-focused politics closer to the people.”
Another significant Islamist political entity is Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), an alliance of six Islamist parties. Until 2016, IOJ was allied with the BNP, but a faction split in 2016 to form a separate group. In the 1991 election, IOJ received 0.79 percent of the vote and secured one seat. In 1996, they received 1.09 percent of the vote and again won one seat. In 2001, they secured two seats with 0.68 percent of the popular vote, this time as an ally of the BNP.
Lastly, Hefazat-e-Islam (HI) has also been a notable player in Bangladesh’s political scene. Following a crackdown by the Hasina administration in 2013, during which the human rights organization Odhikar reported 61 deaths, HI garnered significant public sympathy over the last decade.
Both IOJ and HI are likely to act as pressure groups in the next election, particularly influencing vote dynamics in certain constituencies in Bangladesh.
Dr. Abdul Latif Masum, a retired professor from the Department of Government and Politics at Jahangirnagar University, Dhaka, and an analyst focusing on the BNP and Islamist political parties, told The Diplomat, “I think the alliance of Islamist political parties has potential for two reasons: first, global factors, and second, the internal political dynamics of Bangladesh.
“Globally, Islamist politics has seen a resurgence and revival. In Bangladesh, during Hasina’s regime, Islamist parties were marginalized, yet they contributed during periods of revolution, which earned them some sympathy and support… The BNP has a less transparent past, and in the post August 5th [period], some local BNP leaders were involved in looting and land grabbing, similar to AL leaders.”
Masum went on to say, “Nowadays, we notice large gatherings at Islamist political party programs, but they still struggle in the electoral arena. A bitter reality in Bangladeshi elections remains the influence of the ‘three Ms’ (money, muscle, and media), and Islamist parties lag far behind in this race. On the other hand, the BNP has unseen support that Islamist political parties cannot surpass. While JI and other Islamist political parties’ alliances may not form the government in the next election, their seat count could still increase.”